{
  "id": 8527770,
  "name": "DR. BRENDA D. RIVENBARK v. PENDER COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION",
  "name_abbreviation": "Rivenbark v. Pender County Board of Education",
  "decision_date": "1989-07-18",
  "docket_number": "No. 885SC1097",
  "first_page": "703",
  "last_page": "706",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "94 N.C. App. 703"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:07:12.068465+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges Phillips and Lewis concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "DR. BRENDA D. RIVENBARK v. PENDER COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "BECTON, Judge.\nIn this suit by a school board member against the Pender County Board of Education (\u201cBoard\u201d), the question presented is whether the Board could renew the county superintendent\u2019s contract in the last fiscal year of the contract, which overlapped with a calendar year in which new board members were slated to take office. To answer this question, the parties ask us to determine whether \u201cfiscal year\u201d or \u201ccalendar year\u201d was the intended meaning of the word \u201cyear\u201d in N.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. 115C-271\u2019s prohibition of contract renewal \u201cuntil after new members have been sworn in\u201d during \u201cany year when new members are to be elected. . . .\u201d For the reasons that follow, we reverse the order granting summary judgment for the plaintiff.\nI\nThis dispute concerns Dr. Haywood Davis\u2019 contract as superintendent of the Pender County school system which ran from 1 July 1984 to 30 June 1988. On 22 February 1988, the then current five member Board voted, three to two, to renew Dr. Davis\u2019 contract for another four year term, to begin 1 July 1988 and end 30 June 1992. Two Board members who voted for renewal had terms in office which were to expire in December 1988, at which time two newly-elected Board members were to be sworn in.\nThe plaintiff brought the present action, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground that the vote was taken in violation of Section 115C-271. The trial judge granted summary judgment in her favor, ruling that the Board\u2019s renewal of Dr. Davis\u2019 contract violated Section 115C-271, which provided, in relevant part:\n. . . The county board of education may, with the written consent of the current superintendent, extend or renew the term of superintendent\u2019s contract at any time during the final year of his term. Provided, however, in any year when new members are to be elected or appointed, the board may not act until after the new members have been sworn in. . . .\nN.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. 115C-271 (1987) (emphasis added). The trial judge declared Dr. Davis\u2019 contract \u201cnull and void ab initio and of no force and effect.\u201d\nThe Board appeals, contending that because a school superintendent\u2019s term of office is measured in fiscal years, from 1 July to 80 June, the trial judge\u2019s ruling, construing Section 115C-271 to prohibit board renewal of a superintendent\u2019s contract during any calendar year in which board members will be elected, thwarts the legislative purpose behind the statute and imposes absurd time limits on reelection of superintendents. The Board argues that the term \u201cyear\u201d in both of the disputed sentences in Section 115C-271 must be read to refer to the final fiscal year of the superintendent\u2019s contract.\nIf the word \u201cyear\u201d is interpreted to mean \u201ccalendar year,\u201d the Board contends, a school board would be prohibited from acting until after the superintendent\u2019s contract had already expired, thereby incurring the risk of not attracting or retaining the most qualified candidate for the position, who, in the competitive market for superintendents, would surely prefer a settled contract to the uncertainty of delayed board action. As a result, the Board argues, the operation of the school system could be disrupted, in turn adversely affecting the education of the county\u2019s schoolchildren. Moreover, the Board asserts, if this court adopts the plaintiff\u2019s position, a duly elected, currently sitting board \u2014 ostensibly empowered to oversee the operation of all aspects of the county school system\u2014 would be powerless from January to December of any election year to employ a superintendent to run the county\u2019s schools. The Board contends that such a result would be absurd and would conflict with the legislature\u2019s visible expansion in recent years of school board discretion to choose a superintendent.\nThe plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that the legislature intended in Section 115C-271 to prohibit a \u201clame duck\u201d board from imposing an unwanted superintendent upon an incoming board. To effectuate that intent, she argues, \u201cyear\u201d must be read in accord with its ordinary meaning, that is, \u201ccalendar year,\u201d measured from 1 January to 31 December. She points out that a county school system would not necessarily face being without a superintendent during the period between the expiration of the superintendent\u2019s contract and the swearing-in of new board members because Section 115C-271 permits a superintendent to remain in office \u201cuntil his successor is elected and qualified.\u201d\nII\nWe need not address the merits of the parties\u2019 contentions because the question before us has been resolved by the legislature\u2019s recent clarification of Section 115C-271. On 15 June 1989, the General Assembly ratified H.B. 1072, entitled \u201cAn Act to Clarify Legislative Intent Regarding Renewal of Superintendent\u2019s Contracts.\u201d The two disputed sentences were amended to read as follows:\nThe county board of education may, with the written consent of the current superintendent, extend or renew the term of the superintendent\u2019s contract at any time during the final 12 months of the contract; provided, however, when new members are to be elected or appointed and sworn in during the final 12 months of the contract the board may not act until after the new members have been sworn in.\n1989 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 339, sec. 3 (emphasis added). The bill further provides: \u201cThis act is effective upon ratification and shall apply to all superintendent contracts extended or renewed by local boards of education since July 1, 1985.\u201d Id.\nThus, it is clear that the Board was free to renew its superintendent\u2019s contract at any time during the final 12 months of the contract since no new members were to take office during that period. Accordingly, we hold that the Board\u2019s renewal of Dr. Davis\u2019 contract was valid, and the order granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff is\nReversed.\nJudges Phillips and Lewis concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "BECTON, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Terry B. Richardson for plaintiff-appellee.",
      "Tharrington, Smith & Hargrove, hy Richard A. Schwartz, Douglas A. Ruley, and Daniel W. Clark, for defendant-appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "DR. BRENDA D. RIVENBARK v. PENDER COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION\nNo. 885SC1097\n(Filed 18 July 1989)\nSchools \u00a7 4.1\u2014 extension or renewal of superintendent\u2019s contract\u2014 authority of \u201clame duck\u201d board\nPursuant to legislative action taken on 15 June 1989, \u25a0 N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-271 provides that a county board of education may \u201cextend or renew the term of the superintendent\u2019s contract at any time during the final 12 months of the contract; provided, however, when new members are to be elected or appointed and sworn in during the final 12 months of the contract the board may not act until after the new members have been sworn in\u201d; therefore, it was unnecessary to determine whether \u201cfiscal year\u201d or \u201ccalendar year\u201d was the intended meaning of the word \u201cyear\u201d in the statute as originally enacted. 1989 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 339, sec. 3.\nAPPEAL byxdefendant from David E. Reid, Jr., Judge. Judgment entered 16 June 1988 in Superior Court, PENDER County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 June 1989.\nTerry B. Richardson for plaintiff-appellee.\nTharrington, Smith & Hargrove, hy Richard A. Schwartz, Douglas A. Ruley, and Daniel W. Clark, for defendant-appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0703-01",
  "first_page_order": 733,
  "last_page_order": 736
}