{
  "id": 8520220,
  "name": "RALEIGH PLACE ASSOCIATES v. CITY OF RALEIGH, BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT",
  "name_abbreviation": "Raleigh Place Associates v. City of Raleigh",
  "decision_date": "1989-08-15",
  "docket_number": "No. 8810SC1349",
  "first_page": "217",
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      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1970,
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    {
      "cite": "277 N.C. 242",
      "category": "reporters:state",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges COZORT and GREENE concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "RALEIGH PLACE ASSOCIATES v. CITY OF RALEIGH, BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JOHNSON, Judge.\nPetitioner Raleigh Place Associates submitted building plans for a proposed office building, to be located at 316 West Edenton Street in Raleigh, to the City of Raleigh for zoning approval. These plans included drawings depicting a sign which was to be located on a structure which would cover the drive-through teller windows of Southern National Bank, a tenant in the proposed office building. The City approved these plans. The City requires that every individual sign be approved in a separate review process, but petitioner did not obtain such approval for the sign in question.\nThe office building at 316 West Edenton Street was completed in August, 1986. Petitioner then erected the sign in question. The sign is approximately 42 inches high and 171 inches long, and it displays in 14-inch block lettering the words \u201cSouthern National Bank.\u201d The sign is located on the top of a structure which extends approximately 25 feet from the wall of the building and covers two driveway lanes which are used by patrons who use the drive-through teller windows.\nOn 10 September 1986, petitioner received notification from City of Raleigh Zoning Inspector Scott Mills that the sign in question violated sec. 10-2065.5(9) of the Raleigh City Code. This section of the Code prohibits any newly erected roof sign which is not authorized by the city council. On 15 September 1986, petitioner filed an application with the Raleigh Board of Adjustment seeking either a reversal of the zoning inspector\u2019s decision or, in the alternative, a variance allowing the sign in question to remain. On 13 October 1986, the Board upheld the zoning inspector\u2019s decision and denied petitioner\u2019s request for a variance.\nOn 21 November 1986, petitioner filed a petition for review by the superior court of Wake County requesting that the court issue its writ of certiorari to review the Board\u2019s decision. This petition was granted on 12 May 1987. The court filed a certiorari decision on 1 September 1988 which reversed the Board\u2019s decision. The court found that the sign in question was not a roof sign, which is prohibited by the Code, but was instead a canopy sign, which is permitted by the Code.\nRespondent\u2019s first contention on appeal is that the Board properly found that the sign in question is a prohibited roof sign and not a permitted canopy sign. We agree.\nThe sign in question is prohibited by the Raleigh City Code if it is attached to a roof, but the sign is permitted if it is attached to a canopy. Any newly erected roof sign which is not authorized by the city council is prohibited, Raleigh City Code sec. 10-2065.5(9), and there is no evidence that petitioner sought or received authorization from the city council to erect the sign in question. The Code defines a \u201croof sign\u201d as \u201c[a]ny sign . . . attached to and extending from the roof of a structure or building.\u201d Id. sec. 10-2002. The Code does allow marquee signs, however. Id. sec. 10-2065.2(a). The Code also states that a sign erected on a canopy is considered to be a marquee sign. Id. sec. 10-2002. The Code does not provide any definitions of the words \u201croof\u201d or \u201ccanopy.\u201d\nThe sign in question is not attached to a canopy. The words of a statute must be construed in accordance with their ordinary and common meaning unless they have acquired a technical meaning or unless a definite meaning is apparent or indicated by the context of the words. State v. Lee, 277 N.C. 242, 176 S.E.2d 772 (1970). The Lee rule, like other rules of statutory construction, is applicable to the construction of municipal ordinances. Cogdell v. Taylor, 264 N.C. 424, 142 S.E.2d 36 (1965). The ordinary meanings of the word \u201ccanopy\u201d are set forth in Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary, which in part defines a canopy as \u201ca covering usufally] for shelter or protection.\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 328 (1968). Webster\u2019s includes with this definition an exhaustive list of sub-definitions. Id. This list of sub-definitions includes \u201ca ... cover providing shelter and decoration (as over a door or window)\u201d and \u201can awning or marquee often stretching from doorway to curb.\u201d Id. The structure in question is not located over a traditional type of window or door, and it doesn\u2019t extend from the doorway to the curb, so it cannot be classified as a canopy according to what we believe to be the ordinary and common understanding of the word \u201ccanopy.\u201d\nWe find that the sign in question is attached to a roof. Webster\u2019s defines a roof as \u201cthe outside cover of a building or structure.\u201d Id., p. 1971. This broad definition clearly encompasses the cover of the structure to which the sign in question is attached.\nRespondent\u2019s second contention on appeal is that the superior court erred in reversing the Board\u2019s decision that the sign in question is a roof sign. We agree. The decisions of a municipal board of adjustment are final, \u201csubject to the right of the courts to review errors in law and to give relief against its orders which are arbitrary, oppressive, or attended with manifest abuse of authority.\u201d Lee v. Board of Adjustment, 226 N.C. 107, 109, 37 S.E.2d 128, 131 (1946). Our discussion of respondent\u2019s first contention on appeal demonstrates that the Board\u2019s decision did not constitute an error of law, and the Board\u2019s decision was also not arbitrary, oppressive, or attended with manifest abuse of authority. The superior court therefore erred in reversing the Board\u2019s decision.\nReversed.\nJudges COZORT and GREENE concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JOHNSON, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Smith Helms Mulliss & Moore, hy David C. Keesler, for petitioner-appellee.",
      "Associate City Attorney Elizabeth C. Murphy for respondent-appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "RALEIGH PLACE ASSOCIATES v. CITY OF RALEIGH, BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT\nNo. 8810SC1349\n(Filed 15 August 1989)\nMunicipal Corporations \u00a7 39.13\u2014 sign across bank drive-through lanes \u2014prohibited roof sign\nRespondent board of adjustment properly found that a sign erected by petitioner was a prohibited roof sign and not a permitted canopy sign where the sign was located on the top of a structure which extended approximately 25 feet from the wall of petitioner\u2019s building across two driveway lanes used by bank patrons who used drive-through teller windows.\nAPPEAL of respondent from Ellis, Craig B., Judge. Judgment entered 31 August 1988. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 June 1989.\nRespondent, the Board of Adjustment of the City of Raleigh, appeals from a certiorari decision which, declared that petitioner Raleigh Place .Associates\u2019 sign was not prohibited by the Raleigh City Code.\nSmith Helms Mulliss & Moore, hy David C. Keesler, for petitioner-appellee.\nAssociate City Attorney Elizabeth C. Murphy for respondent-appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0217-01",
  "first_page_order": 245,
  "last_page_order": 248
}
