{ "id": 8520125, "name": "LARRY ALLEN v. WEYERHAEUSER, INC., a/k/a WEYERHAEUSER COMPANY", "name_abbreviation": "Allen v. Weyerhaeuser, Inc.", "decision_date": "1989-08-15", "docket_number": "No. 883SC1202", "first_page": "205", "last_page": "209", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "95 N.C. App. 205" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "378 S.E.2d 220", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "223" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 N.C. App. 439", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8528081 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/93/0439-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 S.E. 584", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1917, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "585" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "173 N.C. 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11268754 ], "year": 1917, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "44" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/173/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "25 S.E.2d 850", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1943, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "223 N.C. 265", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8605455 ], "year": 1943, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/223/0265-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 S.E.2d 204", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 711", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559140, 8559174, 8559111, 8559152, 8559126 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0711-03", "/nc/291/0711-05", "/nc/291/0711-01", "/nc/291/0711-04", "/nc/291/0711-02" ] }, { "cite": "229 S.E.2d 57", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 N.C. App. 157", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548234 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/31/0157-01" ] }, { "cite": "314 S.E.2d 823", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "826", "parenthetical": "quoting Mozingo v. Bank, 31 N.C. App. 157, 162, 229 S.E.2d 57, 61 (1976), cert. denied, 291 N.C. 711, 232 S.E.2d 204 (1977" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 N.C. App. 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526773 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147", "parenthetical": "quoting Mozingo v. Bank, 31 N.C. App. 157, 162, 229 S.E.2d 57, 61 (1976), cert. denied, 291 N.C. 711, 232 S.E.2d 204 (1977" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/68/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 S.E.2d 264", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "265-66", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 32", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566601 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "34-35", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0032-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 S.E.2d 601", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "606" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4719700 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "40" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0033-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 514, "char_count": 9449, "ocr_confidence": 0.728, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.103001312287158e-08, "percentile": 0.3807303051258973 }, "sha256": "0075e73ad2596932d52635f9234942700b1ef8f0dc25be2cc4472ab50c9af6b5", "simhash": "1:0ff0de260b4f1573", "word_count": 1496 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:25:49.576177+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Johnson and Greene concur." ], "parties": [ "LARRY ALLEN v. WEYERHAEUSER, INC., a/k/a WEYERHAEUSER COMPANY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "COZORT, Judge.\nPlaintiff was under contract to drive a truck to haul defendant\u2019s timber. He claims that defendant wrongfully terminated his contract. The trial court granted defendant a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff\u2019s evidence. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.\nPlaintiff hauled timber for defendant pursuant to a contract signed in March 1985. Plaintiff previously had for several years been an employee for defendant as a truck driver. In 1983, he began working for defendant as an independent contractor.\nThe provision of the contract relevant to this dispute provided:\nl. Scope of Work\n* * * *\n(d) Contractor agrees to comply with all operational safety and conservation rules and regulations promulgated by Weyerhaeuser and in effect at the various loading and delivery places, while upon or about such places. Weyerhaeuser shall inform Contractor of any such rules and regulations and amendments thereto.\nPlaintiff\u2019s witness, Billy Corey, was defendant\u2019s supervisor in charge of contract trucking. Mr. Corey, a long-time friend and former co-worker of plaintiff\u2019s, was responsible for informing contractors of defendant\u2019s safety regulations and for insuring that the drivers complied with those regulations. Mr. Corey informed plaintiff, before plaintiff signed the contract in March 1985, that he would have to burn his headlights while he was on the road. Defendant required all of its contract truckers to operate trucks with headlights on as part of defendant\u2019s \u201cLights On For Safety\u201d program.\nInitially, plaintiff complied with the headlight requirement. There were occasions, however, when Mr. Corey would have to remind plaintiff to turn on his headlights. Plaintiff\u2019s noncompliance became more frequent, even though Mr. Corey sat down with him on several occasions and explained that he had to comply with company policy. Finally, in May 1985, plaintiff told Mr. Corey that \u201che won\u2019t [sic] going to run with his lights on; that he was tired of it anyway and if . . . [Corey] would fire him it would do him a favor.\u201d\nOn 17 May 1985, Mr. Corey sent plaintiff a letter giving him notice that defendant was terminating plaintiff\u2019s hauling contract. Mr. Corey wrote that plaintiff had been requested to turn on his headlights on 6 May by the company dispatcher and on 15 May by Mr. Corey, but had refused.\nPlaintiff sued claiming that defendant wrongfully terminated his contract. The trial court granted defendant a directed verdict at the close of plaintiffs evidence.\nThe standard of review for the granting of defendant\u2019s directed verdict motion involves the question whether, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, no reasonable juror could find for plaintiff. West v. Slick, 313 N.C. 33, 40, 326 S.E.2d 601, 606 (1985).\nPlaintiff argues that the contract required him to comply only with those safety rules that were in effect \u201cat the various loading and delivery places.\u201d (Emphasis added.) He contends that nothing in the written contract gave defendant the right to force his compliance with the \u201cLights On For Safety\u201d program when he was on the open road and not at a \u201cloading or delivery place.\u201d\nThe issues are whether the writing fully integrated the parties\u2019 agreement, and, if it did not, whether parol evidence was inconsistent with the written contract. The parol evidence rule is defined as follows:\nIt appears to be well settled in this jurisdiction that parol testimony of prior or contemporaneous negotiations or conversations inconsistent with a written contract entered into between the parties, or which tends to substitute a new or different contract for the one evidenced by the writing, is incompetent. 2 Stansbury\u2019s N.C. Evidence \u00a7 253 (Brandis Rev. 1973). This rule applies where the writing totally integrates all the terms of a contract or supersedes all other agreements relating to the transaction. The rule is otherwise where it is shown that the writing is not a full integration of the terms of the contract. The terms not included in the writing may then be shown by parol. Id., \u00a7 252.\nCraig v. Kessing, 297 N.C. 32, 34-35, 253 S.E.2d 264, 265-66 (1979) (emphasis added).\nThe contract in question contains no integration or merger clause. Plaintiff offered no evidence that the parties intended the writing to be the full, exclusive expression of their agreement. Mr. Corey\u2019s testimony tends to suggest that plaintiff was informed of and agreed to comply with the \u201cLights On For Safety\u201d program before plaintiff signed the contract. Plaintiff\u2019s initial compliance with that program subsequent to signing the agreement is additional evidence that the parties did not intend the writing to be fully integrated, and we find that it was not integrated.\nThe test to determine whether evidence of the parties\u2019 oral agreement is admissible is as follows: \u201c \u2018If oral evidence does not contradict written it is admissible; otherwise, it is not admissible.\u2019 \u201d Craig v. Calloway, 68 N.C. App. 143, 147, 314 S.E.2d 823, 826 (1984) (quoting Mozingo v. Bank, 31 N.C. App. 157, 162, 229 S.E.2d 57, 61 (1976), cert. denied, 291 N.C. 711, 232 S.E.2d 204 (1977).\nWe find the evidence that plaintiff verbally agreed to comply and did comply with defendant\u2019s \u201cLights On For Safety\u201d program does not contradict the express language of the contract. First, the relevant language does not strictly limit plaintiff\u2019s compliance with safety regulations to loading and delivery places, \u201c(d) Contractor agrees to comply with all operational safety and conservation rules and regulations promulgated by Weyerhaeuser and in effect at various loading and delivery places, while upon or about such places.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Second, the contract does not limit the type of regulations with which plaintiff must comply only to those involving loading and delivery. It says plaintiff must comply \u201cwith all operational safety . . . rules and regulations.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Thus, the contract does not reflect an overall restrictive intent regarding plaintiff\u2019s safety compliance duty even though loading and delivery areas are specifically pointed out.\nPlaintiff\u2019s assent to defendant\u2019s request, for which there is unequivocal evidence, represents a supplemental or additional promise. We find nothing inconsistent between the written and the oral promises. Here the evidence was that plaintiff knew about the headlight safety program before signing the contract and was reminded numerous times after its execution. Moreover, a strict construction of the language, as plaintiff would have us apply, runs contrary to sound public policy. Efforts to improve highway safety should be encouraged.\nFinally, plaintiff\u2019s evidence established as a matter of law that he anticipatorily breached the contract.\nWhen the promisor to an executory agreement for the performance of an act in the future renounces its duty under the agreement and declares its intention not to perform it, the promisee may treat the renunciation as a breach and sue at once for damages. Pappas v. Crist, 223 N.C. 265, 25 S.E.2d 850 (1943). In order to maintain a claim for anticipatory breach, the words or conduct evidencing the renunciation or breach must be a \u201cpositive, distinct, unequivocal, and absolute refusal to perform the contract\u201d when the time fixed for it in the contract arrives. Edwards v. Proctor, 173 N.C. 41, 44, 91 S.E. 584, 585 (1917); 4 Corbin, Contracts \u00a7 973 (1951).\nMesser v. Laurel Hill Associates, 93 N.C. App. 439, \u2014, 378 S.E.2d 220, 223 (1989). Plaintiff told his supervisor, Mr. Corey, that he would no longer operate his truck with his headlights turned on and that Mr. Corey should go ahead and \u201cdo him a favor\u201d by firing him. We find that this conduct was unequivocal evidence of anticipatory repudiation.\nWe find that the trial court\u2019s grant of directed verdict should be\nAffirmed.\nJudges Johnson and Greene concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "COZORT, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Barker, Dunn & Mills, by James C. Mills, for plaintiff appellant.", "Ward and Smith, P.A., by John A. J. Ward, for defendant appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LARRY ALLEN v. WEYERHAEUSER, INC., a/k/a WEYERHAEUSER COMPANY\nNo. 883SC1202\n(Filed 15 August 1989)\nContracts \u00a7 26.1; Master and Servant \u00a7 8\u2014 safety program of employer-integration with written employment contract\u2014 termination for failure to comply with safety program\nThe trial court properly directed verdict for defendant in plaintiff\u2019s action for wrongful termination of his contract to haul defendant\u2019s timber where the parties\u2019 written contract did not fully integrate their agreement; though the contract did not mention defendant\u2019s \u201cLights On For Safety\u201d program, plaintiff was informed of and agreed to comply with the safety program before he signed the contract; plaintiff\u2019s initial compliance with that program subsequent to signing the agreement was additional evidence that the parties did not intend the writing to be fully integrated; evidence that plaintiff verbally agreed to comply and did comply with defendant\u2019s safety program did not contradict the express language of the contract; and plaintiff\u2019s evidence established as a matter of law that he anticipatorily breached the contract where plaintiff told his supervisor that he would no longer operate his truck with his headlights turned on and that the supervisor should go ahead and \u201cdo him a favor\u201d by firing him.\nAppeal by plaintiff from Judgment of Judge I. Beverly Lake, Jr., entered 28 June 1988 in CRAVEN County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 May 1989.\nBarker, Dunn & Mills, by James C. Mills, for plaintiff appellant.\nWard and Smith, P.A., by John A. J. Ward, for defendant appellee." }, "file_name": "0205-01", "first_page_order": 233, "last_page_order": 237 }