{ "id": 8521015, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOHN ALVIN HAIRE", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Haire", "decision_date": "1989-11-07", "docket_number": "No. 8926SC266", "first_page": "209", "last_page": "214", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "96 N.C. App. 209" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "313 S.E.2d 560", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "563" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 574", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2400117 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0574-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 S.E.2d 380", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 N.C. 432", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558865 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "438" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/275/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 S.E.2d 433", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "435" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "14 N.C. App. 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8547075 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/14/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 S.E.2d 91", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "93" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 643", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4738291 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "645" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0643-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 539, "char_count": 10690, "ocr_confidence": 0.777, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1011900981159953e-07, "percentile": 0.7618417135516395 }, "sha256": "7a4a4922a6595fa320dce415887331c9e1fd4ab73d40ab15b07a5c885b4ae9cc", "simhash": "1:80384abb743fd203", "word_count": 1935 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:28:35.242103+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Phillips and Cozort concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOHN ALVIN HAIRE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "LEWIS, Judge.\nDefendant first argues that the trial court erred in failing to submit to the jury the lesser included offense of misdemeanor larceny. He asserts that the jury should have been allowed to consider whether the items stolen had a fair market value of $400.00 or less. Larceny of goods with a value of more than 400 dollars is a felony while larceny of goods where the value is 400 dollars or less is a misdemeanor. G.S. 14-72(a). The term \u201cvalue\u201d in this section means fair market value and not the replacement cost of the goods. State v. Morris, 318 N.C. 643, 645, 350 S.E.2d 91, 93 (1986). The appropriate measure of value is \u201cthe price which the subject of the larceny would bring in the open market \u2014 its \u2018market value\u2019 or its \u2018reasonable selling price\u2019 at the time and place of the theft, and in the condition in which it was when the thief commenced the acts culminating in the larceny. . . .\u201d State v. Dees, 14 N.C. App. 110, 112, 187 S.E.2d 433, 435 (1972).\nIn the present case, the subject property included a miter box, two circular saws, a jigsaw, two portable drills, battery drills, a half-inch reversible drill, and a large hammer drill. At trial, the owner of these tools was asked to express his opinion as to the fair market value of each of the stolen items. The following exchange occurred:\nQ. When you came back to your vehicle and after you talked to Ms. McManimen, what things did you observe at that time that were missing from the vehicle that had been there when you parked it?\nA. Well, the first thing I noticed was my miter box.\nQ. Would you tell us what the fair market value of that particular instrument was at that time and in that condition?\nA. I\u2019d say about Two Fifty, something like that, for sure.\nQ. Two Hundred and Fifty Dollars?\nA. Yes.\nQ. What else did you notice at that point in time that was missing from the vehicle from the time you parked it until you came back?\nA. Well, I noticed my circular saw was gone, regular saw. Run about a Hundred and Sixty dollars.\nQ. Fair market value would be about a Hundred and Sixty Dollars?\nA. Well, that\u2019s wht [sic] it would cost to buy them.\nMr. Towler: \u2014 Objection and I Move to Strike that.\nA. I don\u2019t know\u2014\nTHE COURT:-well, Sustained. Members of the Jury, you\u2019re not to consider that. He asked you what the fair market value was at the time in its condition, if you have an opinion.\nA. In the condition it was in? I don\u2019t really know. I don\u2019t have no opinion, because I don\u2019t know. I don\u2019t know. . . .\nQ. I want to go back to the items that you noticed initially. The jigsaw, could you give us a fair market value on that particular item at that time?\nA. No, I cannot. I don\u2019t know \u2014 I just know what I paid for \u2019em. I don\u2019t know what the market value is if I tried to sell \u2019em. Never tried to sell no tools.\nQ. Do you have any idea of the fair market value of the two circular saws?\nA. No, I don\u2019t.\nQ. All of these items that you listed, did they have some value, were they usable in the construction trade?\nA. Right. That\u2019s what I used them for.\nQ. But you have no idea of the individual fair market value.\nA. I\u2019m \u2014 no, sir. I\u2019m a layperson as far as selling tools. It\u2019s hard for me to get the tools; so, I never try to sell no tools. I try to keep all I can get.\nShortly after hearing this testimony, the court called a brief recess in which the witness conversed with the prosecutor. After the recess the witness returned to the stand and was prepared to testify as to the fair market value of the tools. Defense counsel objected, and the court questioned the witness as to the basis of his conversation with the prosecutor:\nThe COURT: \u2014 During the break what conversation did you have with Mr. Driver or with anybody concerning the fair market value?\nA. I just asked him, I told him I didn\u2019t know what that was, what does he mean by that?\nThe COURT: \u2014 Did he explain what he meant by it?\nA. Yeah. He just said, just whatever you thought that they were worth in the condition that they\u2019re in, and what somebody would pay for \u2019em, what you would pay for \u2019em, this type of thing. It works hand in hand. I said well, I know how much I paid for them, and I know\u2014\nThe COURT: \u2014 do you understand that fair market value is what a person who is willing to buy, or desires to buy, though is not compelled to do so, would sell it for, or what somebody would pay for it.\nA. Now, just like this is where we get screwed up, \u2019cause if you say it like that, I don\u2019t know what you\u2019re talking about. The only thing I know is, if a person in business, been in business like I am, and they are another contractor, I would know just about what they would pay for it, you know.\nTHE COURT: \u2014 If they were wanting to buy the tools?\nA. Right.\nTHE COURT: \u2014 But did not have to buy them from you.\nA. Oh, right. Right. Yeah.\nTHE COURT: \u2014 And if you were willing to sell the tools, but didn\u2019t have to sell them.\nA. Right, right.\nThe COURT: \u2014 Is that what you\u2019re saying?\nA. Right, yeah. Nobody had to.\nThe COURT: \u2014 The objection is OVERRULED. Bring the Jury back, please, sir.\nBack before the jury, the witness testified that he had been in the contracting area for about 21 years, that he had purchased all his tools himself, that he was familiar with some of the prices paid for used tools, and that he had opinions on the fair market value of the tools. He then proceeded to testify as to his opinion as to the fair market value of each of the tools individually; the aggregate value was between $885 and $1,030.\nOn cross-examination he stated that he was familiar with new tool prices and the prices of rebuilt tools from shops as well as what other people talk about paying for tools. When defense counsel suggested that the basis for his testimony was really the purchase price or replacement cost of the stolen items, the witness replied, \u201cNo, it cost more than that to replace \u2019em. Cost way more than that to replace \u2019em. That\u2019s why I didn\u2019t understand what the fair market value meant. Can\u2019t buy another car, you know, in 1989 for what you paid in 1987. Still need a car.\u201d The defendant argues that this testimony is \u201cequivocal and susceptible of diverse inferences,\u201d citing State v. Jones, 275 N.C. 432, 438, 168 S.E.2d 380, 384 (1969). We disagree. Once the State explained to the witness what the term \u201cfair market value\u201d meant, he was able to give testimony as to the value of the tools at the time they were stolen. The questions from the bench expeditiously clarified the basis and meaning of the witness\u2019 testimony. He confirmed his understanding when he was further questioned on redirect examination about a tool in which he had expressed his opinion as to its fair market value before that term was explained to him:\nQ. Previously, when I asked you about the miter box, before you testified that you understood the concept of fair market value, you said Two Hundred and Fifty on the miter box? Now, with additional understanding, do you have an opinion as to the fair market value of that particular item?\nA. I\u2019d say in the condition, about a Hundred Seventy-Five to Two Hundred Dollars.\nBased upon this exchange it is clear that the witness\u2019 testimony as to the fair market value was not \u201cequivocal\u201d once he understood the meaning of the term.\nWe distinguish State v. Morris, 318 N.C. 643, 350 S.E.2d 91 (1986), relied upon in defendant\u2019s brief. In that case, the owner of the property testified that the approximate value of the edger and mower taken was $500.00. On cross-examination it was revealed that this figure represented the replacement cost of the items. The Supreme Court held that the jury could have inferred from the evidence that the fair market value of the tools was less than the replacement cost testified to and that it was less than $400.00. Holding it was error under these circumstances for the trial court to refuse to instruct on misdemeanor larceny, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial. Here, by contrast, the witness did not testify as to the replacement cost of the stolen tools. In fact, he denied that that was the basis of his valuation. When asked on cross-examination if he was really stating how much it would cost to replace the tools, he replied, \u201cNo, it cost more than that to replace \u2019em. Cost way more than that to replace \u2019em.\u201d We find that once the witness understood the meaning of the term he was able to give clear, cogent testimony as to the \u201cfair market value\u201d of his tools at the time they were taken.\nDefendant also contends that his motion to dismiss the charge of felonious larceny should have been granted because the owner\u2019s testimony regarding the value of the stolen tools was not credible. Allowing the State every reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence, State v. Johnson, 310 N.C. 574, 577, 313 S.E.2d 560, 563 (1984), we find that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant\u2019s motion. The total fair market value of the stolen tools was over twice the statutory monetary threshold for felonious larceny. The evidence was sufficient to go to the jury and accordingly we find\nNo error.\nJudges Phillips and Cozort concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "LEWIS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Special Deputy Attorney General Jo Anne Sanford, for the State.", "Public Defender Isabel Scott Day, by Assistant Public Defender Marc D. Towler, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOHN ALVIN HAIRE\nNo. 8926SC266\n(Filed 7 November 1989)\nLarceny \u00a7 7.2 (NCI3d)\u2014 felonious larceny of tools \u2014evidence of value sufficient\nThe trial court in a felonious larceny prosecution did not err in failing to submit to the jury the lesser included offense of misdemeanor larceny where the owner of the stolen tools, after being instructed as to the meaning of fair market value, gave unequivocal testimony that his tools were valued between $885 and $1,030, and the basis for his testimony was not the purchase price or replacement cost of the stolen items, but was instead his knowledge of prices paid for used tools in the construction industry.\nAm Jur 2d, Larceny \u00a7\u00a7 45, 46.\nAppeal by defendant from Lamm (Charles C., Jr.), Judge. Judgment entered at the 12 September 1988 session of Criminal Superior Court, MECKLENBURG County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 October 1989.\nOn 15 September 1988, a jury returned verdicts of guilty against the defendant for breaking and entering a motor vehicle and felonious larceny.. The Honorable Charles C. Lamm, Superior Court Judge presiding, imposed a sentence of ten years imprisonment on the charge of felonious larceny and a consecutive three year sentence on the charge of breaking and entering a motor vehicle. Defendant entered notice of appeal only as to the larceny conviction on 20 September 1988.\nAttorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Special Deputy Attorney General Jo Anne Sanford, for the State.\nPublic Defender Isabel Scott Day, by Assistant Public Defender Marc D. Towler, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0209-01", "first_page_order": 241, "last_page_order": 246 }