{ "id": 8521671, "name": "MILFORD R. BALLANCE and wife, DOROTHY MAE BALLANCE, and WAYNE BALLANCE v. NORRIS DUNN, RONNIE CULEYS, S. B. SEYMOUR and JOE SEYMOUR", "name_abbreviation": "Ballance v. Dunn", "decision_date": "1989-11-21", "docket_number": "No. 881DC1418", "first_page": "286", "last_page": "293", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "96 N.C. App. 286" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "294 S.E.2d 224", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 558", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572362, 8572333, 8572399, 8572305, 8572253 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0558-04", "/nc/306/0558-03", "/nc/306/0558-05", "/nc/306/0558-02", "/nc/306/0558-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 880", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "882-83" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 N.C. App. 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524879 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "471" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/57/0467-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 S.E.2d 161", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "163" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 94", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561932 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "101" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0094-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 S.E.2d 120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "249 N.C. 602", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8619678 ], "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "606" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/249/0602-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 S.E.2d 612", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613", "parenthetical": "quoting Mica Industries v. Penland, 249 N.C. 602, 606, 107 S.E.2d 120, 124 (1959)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "267 N.C. 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558601 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120-21", "parenthetical": "quoting Mica Industries v. Penland, 249 N.C. 602, 606, 107 S.E.2d 120, 124 (1959)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/267/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 U.S. 842", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6181096, 6180264, 6181289, 6180911, 6180754, 6180571, 6180412 ], "year": 1956, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/352/0842-06", "/us/352/0842-01", "/us/352/0842-07", "/us/352/0842-05", "/us/352/0842-04", "/us/352/0842-03", "/us/352/0842-02" ] }, { "cite": "89 S.E.2d 595", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "597" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "242 N.C. 711", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8621997 ], "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "714" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/242/0711-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 S.E.2d 282", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2 N.C. App. 484", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554002 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/2/0484-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 S.E. 164", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1908, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 N.C. 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11269635 ], "year": 1908, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/150/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 S.E.2d 765", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "768", "parenthetical": "quoting Land Co. v. Lange, 150 N.C. 26, 30, 63 S.E. 164, 166 (1908)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "243 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8619533 ], "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "5", "parenthetical": "quoting Land Co. v. Lange, 150 N.C. 26, 30, 63 S.E. 164, 166 (1908)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/243/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 S.E.2d 63", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 N.C. 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558288 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "196" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/275/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 41-10", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "193 S.E.2d 402", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "17 N.C. App. 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554104 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/17/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 S.E.2d 172", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 552", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565400 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0552-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 590", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4715201, 4718241, 4716523, 4717616, 4717112 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0590-04", "/nc/315/0590-05", "/nc/315/0590-01", "/nc/315/0590-02", "/nc/315/0590-03" ] }, { "cite": "331 S.E.2d 726", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 N.C. App. 16", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526532 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/76/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 412", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4740336 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "428" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 S.E.2d 32", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "36-37" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 N.C. App. 168", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527938 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/93/0168-01" ] }, { "cite": "6 S.E.2d 822", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1940, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "826" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "217 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8597345 ], "year": 1940, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/217/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 S.E.2d 552", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556" }, { "page": "556" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4736107 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "428" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 S.E. 228", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1911, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "231" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 N.C. 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8654727 ], "year": 1911, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/158/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 S.E.2d 655", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "249 N.C. 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8611364 ], "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/249/0167-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 780, "char_count": 15318, "ocr_confidence": 0.744, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1752261203153244e-07, "percentile": 0.587369958634654 }, "sha256": "b487a97ab3addeaccc72dcac405aad873329ae86cf038fdcd82409bb9fed73f0", "simhash": "1:13624c78b05cd8fa", "word_count": 2556 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:28:35.242103+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ARNOLD and BECTON concur." ], "parties": [ "MILFORD R. BALLANCE and wife, DOROTHY MAE BALLANCE, and WAYNE BALLANCE v. NORRIS DUNN, RONNIE CULEYS, S. B. SEYMOUR and JOE SEYMOUR" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "COZORT, Judge.\nPlaintiffs appeal from an order granting defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment. We affirm.\nI\nThis case involved two legal actions alleging trespass to land claimed by the plaintiffs. In the second action (No. 86CVD44), the defendants, citing the judgment in the first action (No. 84CVD41), pled res judicata as an affirmative defense and moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. To understand the court\u2019s ruling it is necessary to review the procedural history of both actions in some detail.\nThe parcel of land at issue, approximately 255 feet in length and 25 feet in width, is known as \u201cOld Sawyer Road\u201d or \u201cSawyer Road\u201d and adjoins North Carolina Road 1139 in Camden County. On 22 August 1984, plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that defendants, on the day before, had destroyed fences and trees on Sawyer Road. The plaintiffs claimed title to this property by virtue of two warranty deeds. The first deed was acquired in September 1947 and recorded the following month; the second deed was acquired in September 1948 and recorded in January 1949. The plaintiffs sought damages and an injunction to prevent defendants from entering the property.\nOn 23 October 1984, before, defendants had answered, plaintiffs, pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the N.C. Rules of Civil Procedure, amended their complaint by alleging, as an alternative basis of title, that they had acquired ownership of Sawyer Road by adverse possession for twenty years. They also alleged, more particularly, that the \u201cproperty known as Sawyer Road had been abandoned by the public and plaintiffs fenced all of Sawyer Road and have claimed all of said road since September of 1948.\u201d\nOn 23 October 1984, the defendants answered the original complaint. On 16 April 1985, the defendants answered the amended complaint and asserted a counterclaim for damages resulting from the \u201cRestraining Order denying The Chesapeake Corporation of Virginia . . . [and] the defendants\u201d the use of Sawyer Road, \u201cthe nearest right of way to the public road.\u201d On 8 May 1985 the plaintiffs replied to the defendants\u2019 counterclaim.\nOn 29 September 1986, the first action was tried before a jury. At the close of all the evidence, the trial court ruled that there was insufficient evidence to send to the jury the issue of whether the public had acquired a right of way in Sawyer Road. The only issue submitted to the jury was whether the plaintiffs had acquired title to Sawyer Road by adverse possession. After the jury\u2019s verdict against the plaintiffs on that issue, the trial court entered judgment on 2 October 1986 as follows: the plaintiffs did not acquire title to Sawyer Road by adverse possession; the defendants did not commit a trespass as alleged; and the defendants failed to prove that Sawyer Road was a public right of way.\nBetween the time the plaintiffs filed suit in case No. 84CVD41, and the time the case came on for trial, the plaintiffs acquired two quitclaim deeds purportedly conveying title to Sawyer Road. Plaintiffs obtained the first quitclaim deed on 26 November 1984 and recorded it two days later; they obtained the second on 23 October 1985 and recorded it the same day. E.H.P. Land Co. was the grantor of both deeds, and both deeds recited consideration of one dollar. These quitclaim deeds were not raised in the first lawsuit; however, they formed the basis for the second action in which the plaintiffs again alleged trespass.\nPlaintiffs initiated case No. 86CVD44, the action at issue here, on 14 November 1986. Their complaint included an allegation of battery (subsequently referred to by the trial court and the plaintiffs as an alleged assault) and an allegation that the defendants had committed trespass by installing culverts and destroying fences and shrubs within the boundaries of Sawyer Road. Plaintiffs claim record ownership of Sawyer Road based on the quitclaim deeds described above.. They requested compensatory and punitive damages as well as injunctive relief. As an affirmative defense the defendants pleaded the final judgment in case No. 84CVD41 \u201cin bar of plaintiff\u2019s right to maintain this action ... [in that] all matters in this action, either fact or law, were or should have been . . . adjudicated in . . . [the] former action.\u201d\nOn 14 November 1986 the trial court issued the temporary restraining order requested by the plaintiffs. On 22 January 1987, because of the violence and threat of violence associated with the dispute over ownership and use of Sawyer Road, the court entered a preliminary injunction restraining both plaintiffs and defendants \u201cuntil further Order of the Court or final decision on the merits from entering on the lands described ... as \u2018Old Sawyer Road.\u2019 \u201d\nOn 7 April 1988, the defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims. After considering memoranda from both parties and hearing oral argument from counsel on 9 May 1988, the trial court .on 24 July 1988 granted the defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment \u201cas to all allegations and matters pertaining to claim or claims relating to ownership of land,\u201d denied the defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment on the \u201calleged assault,\u201d and dissolved the preliminary injunction. On 4 August 1988, the plaintiffs gave notice of appeal; on the next day they voluntarily dismissed their claim of assault. Thus, the trial court\u2019s order of 24 July 1988 as it related to title to Sawyer Road is before this Court.\nII\nWe turn now to the issue on appeal. Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in accepting the judgment in the first case as a bar to the second because distinct causes of action were involved. The first action, alleging a trespass committed on 21 August 1984, was grounded alternatively on title acquired by warranty deeds in 1947 and 1948 or on title acquired by adverse possession. The second action, alleging a trespass committed on 13 November 1986, was grounded on title acquired by quitclaim deeds in 1984 and 1985. Plaintiffs assert that the set of facts surrounding each alleged trespass and the cause of action arising from each alleged trespass are separate and independent. Premised on that assertion, plaintiffs contend that the doctrine of res judicata was improperly invoked.\nThe purpose of res judicata is \u201cto strike a delicate balance between, on the one hand, the interests of the defendant and of the courts in bringing litigation to a close and, on the other, the interests of the plaintiff in the vindication of a just claim.\u201d Restatement (Second) of Judgments \u00a7 24 Comment b (1982). Our case law has long recognized the balancing function performed by res judicata:\nPublic policy demands that every person be given an opportunity to have a judicial investigation of the asserted invasion of complainant\u2019s rights. . . . But public policy is equally as adamant in its demand for an end to litigation when complainant has exercised his right and a court of competent jurisdiction has ascertained that the asserted invasion has not occurred.\nCrosland-Cullen Co. v. Crosland, 249 N.C. 167, 170, 105 S.E.2d 655, 656 (1958); see also Ludwick v. Penny, 158 N.C. 104, 109, 73 S.E. 228, 231 (1911).\nIn North Carolina a \u201cfinal judgment on the merits in a prior action will prevent a second suit based on the same cause of action between the same parties and those in privity with them.\u201d Thomas M. McInnis & Assoc., Inc. v. Hall, 318 N.C. 421, 428, 349 S.E.2d 552, 556 (1986). Res judicata operates as a bar not only against matters litigated or determined in the prior proceeding but also against \u201call material and relevant matters within the scope of the pleadings, which the parties, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could and should have brought forward.\u201d Bruton v. Light Co., 217 N.C. 1, 7, 6 S.E.2d 822, 826 (1940); accord Crump v. Bd. of Education, 93 N.C. App. 168, 177, 378 S.E.2d 32, 36-37 (1989); Thomas M. McInnis & Assoc., Inc. v. Hall, 318 N.C. 412, 428, 349 S.E.2d 552, 556 (1986). Therefore, in the case below the issue is whether all of plaintiffs\u2019 claims of title could and should have been adjudicated in the prior case.\nIn setting the limits of a cause of action, or claim, the Restatement provides that when res judicata bars the plaintiff\u2019s claim,\nthe claim extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arises.\n(2) What factual grouping constitutes a \u201ctransaction,\u201d and what groupings constitute a \u201cseries,\u201d are to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties\u2019 expectations or business understanding or usage.\nRestatement (Second) of Judgments \u00a7 24 (1982). Because the same transaction test produces a broad res judicata effect, it is appropriately applied only when the procedural rules afford parties ample opportunity to litigate, in a single lawsuit, all claims arising from a transaction or series of transactions. Thus, \u201cwhen the Federal Rules or comparable rules are in force, it is appropriate to define cause of action broadly,\u201d as is the current trend. Friedenthal, Kane, and Miller, Civil Procedure \u00a7 14.4 (1985). On appropriate facts our courts have applied the same transaction test. See Rodgers Builders v. McQueen, 76 N.C. App. 16, 331 S.E.2d 726 (1985), disc. rev. denied, 315 N.C. 590 (1986); In re Trucking Co., 285 N.C. 552, 206 S.E.2d 172 (1974); and Taylor v. Electric Membership Corp., 17 N.C. App. 143, 193 S.E.2d 402 (1972).\nWe hold the case below arose from a single transaction. In both case No. 84CVD41 and case No. 86CVD44 the plaintiffs brought an action in trespass to try title; the same parties and the same parcel of land were involved. The alleged trespasses were distinct in time, but the purpose of plaintiffs\u2019 claims was to establish title to Sawyer Road in themselves.\nTo this end plaintiffs initially alleged record ownership based on warranty deeds of 1948 and 1949; two months later they amended their complaint to allege, in the alternative, ownership by adverse possession. Approximately one month later, in November 1984, plaintiffs bargained for and received a quitclaim deed that purported to convey title to the parcel of land at issue. Approximately eleven months later, in October 1985, plaintiffs acquired another quitclaim deed to the same property. The plaintiffs\u2019 first action (case No. 84CVD41) did not come to trial for nearly two years after they obtained the November 1984 deed and nearly one year after they obtained the October 1985 deed. Yet plaintiffs made no attempt to bring forward this evidence of ownership. Instead the quitclaim deeds became the basis for plaintiffs\u2019 second action.\nIt is true, of course, that plaintiffs could not base the first trespass action, filed in August 1984, on record ownership acquired after that date. But plaintiffs, who had already sought equitable relief in the form of an injunction, could have added to their pending lawsuit a claim to quiet title based on the quitclaim deeds.\nAny suit to remove a cloud upon title or to quiet title may be brought under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 41-10, which is designed \u201cto establish an easy method of quieting titles of land against adverse claims,\u201d Newman Machine Co. v. Newman, 275 N.C. 189, 196, 166 S.E.2d 63, 68 (1969), and is \u201cliberally construed \u2018to advance the remedy and permit the courts to bring the parties to an issue.\u2019 \u201d Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Miller, 243 N.C. 1, 5, 89 S.E.2d 765, 768 (1955) (quoting Land Co. v. Lange, 150 N.C. 26, 30, 63 S.E. 164, 166 (1908)); see also York v. Newman, 2 N.C. App. 484, 488, 163 S.E.2d 282, 285 (1968). Where a defendant, as in the case below, claims a right of way over land, the plaintiff may proceed under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 41-10. Cannon v. City of Wilmington, 242 N.C. 711, 714, 89 S.E.2d 595, 597 (1955), cert. denied sub nom., Cannon v. N.C. State Highway Commission, 352 U.S. 842 (1956).\nIn the first action plaintiffs amended their complaint once as a matter of course pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the N.C. Rules of Civil Procedure. At the least they could and should have attempted another amendment to add a quiet title claim. Even before the adoption of our current rules it was permissible \u201c \u2018to introduce a new cause of action by way of amendment if the facts constituting the new cause of action arise out of or are connected with the transactions upon which the original complaint is based.\u2019 \u201d Furniture Co. v. Bentwood Co., 267 N.C. 119, 120-21, 147 S.E.2d 612, 613 (1966) (quoting Mica Industries v. Penland, 249 N.C. 602, 606, 107 S.E.2d 120, 124 (1959)). Our rules, modeled on the federal rules, now provide that, in addition to amendments of right, a \u201cparty may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.\u201d Sutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94, 101, 176 S.E.2d 161, 163 (1970); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 15(a) (1988). \u201cLeave to amend should be freely'given pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 15. The burden is on the party objecting to the amendment to satisfy the trial court that he would be prejudiced thereby.\u201d Saintsing v. Taylor, 57 N.C. App. 467, 471, 291 S.E.2d 880, 882-83, cert. denied, 306 N.C. 558, 294 S.E.2d 224 (1982).\nThe procedural history of the case below demonstrates that plaintiffs chose not to have all their claims adjudicated in the prior lawsuit. The doctrine of res judicata estops them from litigating any of those claims in a second lawsuit.\nThe trial court\u2019s order of 24 July 1988 is\nAffirmed.\nJudges ARNOLD and BECTON concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "COZORT, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Twiford, 0 \u2019Neal & Vincent, by Edward A. 0 \u2019Neal, for plaintiff appellants Milford R. and Dorothy Mae Ballance.", "E. Ray Etheridge; and White, Hall & Morgan, by Gerald F. White, for defendant appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MILFORD R. BALLANCE and wife, DOROTHY MAE BALLANCE, and WAYNE BALLANCE v. NORRIS DUNN, RONNIE CULEYS, S. B. SEYMOUR and JOE SEYMOUR\nNo. 881DC1418\n(Filed 21 November 1989)\nJudgments \u00a7 37.5 (NCI3d)\u2014 title to land \u2014 trespass action \u2014 warranty deeds or adverse possession \u2014 judgment res judicata in action based on quitclaim deeds\nJudgment entered in plaintiffs\u2019 prior trespass action against defendants based on title to land acquired by warranty deeds in 1947 and 1948 or title by adverse possession was res judicata in plaintiffs\u2019 second trespass action based on title to the same land acquired by quitclaim deeds in 1984 and 1985 because (1) both cases arose from a single transaction in that the same parties and same parcel of land were involved and, although the alleged trespasses...w-ere distinct in time, the purpose of ^^plaintiffs\u2019 claims Was\"to establish title in themselves, and (2) the first action did not come to trial until a year after plaintiffs obtained the last quitclaim deed, and plaintiffs could have added to their pending lawsuit a claim to quiet title based on the quitclaim deeds. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 41-10.\nAm Jur 2d, Judgments \u00a7\u00a7 415, 421, 422, 428.\nAPPEAL by plaintiffs from Judgment of Judge Grafton G. Beaman entered 24 July 1988 in CAMDEN County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 August 1989.\nTwiford, 0 \u2019Neal & Vincent, by Edward A. 0 \u2019Neal, for plaintiff appellants Milford R. and Dorothy Mae Ballance.\nE. Ray Etheridge; and White, Hall & Morgan, by Gerald F. White, for defendant appellees." }, "file_name": "0286-01", "first_page_order": 318, "last_page_order": 325 }