{ "id": 8521754, "name": "LAUCRESTA REYNOLDS v. ERVIN JUNIOR MOTLEY", "name_abbreviation": "Reynolds v. Motley", "decision_date": "1989-11-21", "docket_number": "No. 8910DC178", "first_page": "299", "last_page": "306", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "96 N.C. App. 299" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "336 S.E.2d 664", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 N.C. App. 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520422 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/78/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "277 S.E.2d 865", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 N.C. App. 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12170036 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/52/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 S.E.2d 882", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 N.C. App. 14", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519327 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/95/0014-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 S.E.2d 816", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 N.C. 98", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560631 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/290/0098-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 49-15", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "374 S.E.2d 275", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 617", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2560957 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0617-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 S.E.2d 706", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "outlining the history of URESA" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "240 N.C. 641", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8607935 ], "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "outlining the history of URESA" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/240/0641-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 S.E.2d 908", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 89", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4757859, 4758663, 4750349, 4757427, 4754523 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0089-03", "/nc/312/0089-05", "/nc/312/0089-02", "/nc/312/0089-04", "/nc/312/0089-01" ] }, { "cite": "314 S.E.2d 786", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 N.C. App. 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526934 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/68/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 S.E.2d 662", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 N.C. App. 145", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548117 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/31/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 110-137", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "acceptance of public assistance constitutes an assignment of rights to the state or county" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Va. Code Ann. \u00a7 20-88.19", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Va. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "269 S.E.2d 678", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 N.C. App. 621", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552341 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/48/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 S.E.2d 288", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 616", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4765995 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0616-01" ] }, { "cite": "Va. Code Ann. \u00a7 20-88.22", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Va. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 52-11", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Va. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 20-88.13", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Va. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(8)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 676, "char_count": 16434, "ocr_confidence": 0.733, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.659323324249081e-08, "percentile": 0.4916935311672611 }, "sha256": "e90430dd185491cbcc46fdaa07d0057a9ca5835ff39f1092d437752104d17d97", "simhash": "1:e7ebf467e0de7d84", "word_count": 2607 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:28:35.242103+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Johnson and ORR concur." ], "parties": [ "LAUCRESTA REYNOLDS v. ERVIN JUNIOR MOTLEY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WELLS, Judge.\nAt the outset, we consider ex mero motu whether plaintiff is the proper party to prosecute this URESA action in North Carolina. URESA is a procedural device, adopted in every state, which provides a mechanism for the expedited enforcement of duties of child support. See N.C. Gen. Stat. ch. 52A (1984 and Supp. 1988); 23 Am. Jur. 2d 966, et seq. Under URESA, an obligee (i.e., one \u201cto whom a duty of support is owed\u201d) who seeks to enforce child support obligations against an out-of-state obligor must file a verified complaint in the initiating state. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 52A-3(6), -10; accord, Va. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 20-88.13(8), -88.21 (1983 and Supp. 1989). The court in the initiating state must then determine whether the complaint \u201csets forth facts from which it may be determined that the defendant owes a duty of support and [whether] a court of the responding state may obtain jurisdiction of the defendant^]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 52-11; accord, Va. Code Ann. \u00a7 20-88.22. If it finds these requirements to be satisfied, the initiating court transmits certified copies of the complaint to the court of the responding state for prosecution of the action. Id. When a court of North Carolina, acting as responding state, receives such copies from the court of the initiating state, it must, inter alia, docket the cause and notify the district attorney, who appears \u201con behalf of the obligee.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 52A-10.1, -12.\nThe record discloses that the present action was instituted in Virginia by the DCSE, which filed a verified petition in the initiating court. That court, upon making the required findings, transmitted certified copies of the petition to the Wake County District Court, the jurisdiction of defendant\u2019s residence. In docketing the action, it appears that the name of the alleged mother, Laucresta Reynolds, was improperly substituted as plaintiff for that of DCSE. Laucresta Reynolds is neither an obligee as defined by URESA, nor did she file a verified complaint in the initiating state as required by URESA. We need not, however, dismiss the appeal for this technical defect, inasmuch as the record clearly shows that the action was prosecuted on behalf of DCSE, the real party in interest. Settle v. Beasley, 309 N.C. 616, 308 S.E.2d 288 (1983); N.C. R. Civ. P., Rule 17 (1983). Accordingly, we turn to addressing the merits of the arguments brought forward by defendant.\nDefendant first contends that the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss in that DCSE, because it did not have custody of the alleged children-obligees, had no standing to bring this action. We disagree.\nG.S. \u00a7 52A-8.1 controls this issue. It provides:\nWhenever a county of this State furnishes support to an obligee, it has the same right to invoke the provisions [of URESA] as the obligee to whom the support was furnished for the purpose of securing reimbursement for such support and of obtaining continuing supportf.]\nOur courts have held that an out-of-state governmental entity has standing to bring an action under this provision when (1) such entity has furnished support to an obligee via public assistance funds and (2) the obligee to whom such support was provided has assigned the right of enforcement under URESA to that governmental entity. Dept. of Social Services v. Skinner, 48 N.C. App. 621, 269 S.E.2d 678 (1980). Under URESA, such an assignment occurs by operation of law immediately upon the obligee\u2019s receipt of public assistance funds. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 52A-8.1; accord, Va. Code Ann. \u00a7 20-88.19; cf., N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 110-137 (1988) (acceptance of public assistance constitutes an assignment of rights to the state or county). In this case the alleged children-obligees, by receiving public assistance in Virginia, effected an assignment of their rights of enforcement under URESA to DCSE by operation of law. Thus, DCSE has standing to bring this action. Dept. of Social Services, supra.\nDefendant next contends that the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in that his paternity and thus his duty of support under URESA was not established.\nIt is well settled that \u201cpaternity must be judicially established to warrant relief [under URESA].\u201d Smith v. Burden, 31 N.C. App. 145, 228 S.E.2d 662 (1976). The record discloses that no judicial determination of defendant\u2019s paternity with respect to the alleged children-obligees had been made at the time this action was initiated. This, however, is not fatal, inasmuch as North Carolina courts are expressly granted the authority to \u201cadjudicate the paternity issue\u201d in actions brought under URESA. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 52A-8.2. Nevertheless, URESA, being a procedural mechanism for the enforcement of duties of support, does not provide additional substantive grounds for determining the existence of the duty of support. Stevens v. Stevens, 68 N.C. App. 234, 314 S.E.2d 786, cert. denied, 312 N.C. 89, 321 S.E.2d 908 (1984); see also Mahan v. Read, 240 N.C. 641, 83 S.E.2d 706 (1954) (outlining the history of URESA). A fortiori, URESA does not provide additional grounds for determining paternity. Consequently, a North Carolina court adjudicating the issue of paternity in a URESA action must look to the applicable substantive law governing the determination of paternity. This, in turn, must be determined by reference to the statutory choice of law directive pertaining to URESA actions. Pieper v. Pieper, 323 N.C. 617, 374 S.E.2d 275 (1988).\nThe statutory choice of law directive pertaining to URESA actions is found at G.S. \u00a7 52A-8 which provides that\n[d]uties of support applicable under [URESA] are those imposed or imposable under the laws of any state where the obligor was present during the period or any part of the period for which support is sought. The obligor is presumed to have been present in the responding state during the period for which support is sought until otherwise shown.\nBecause there has been no showing to the contrary, defendant is presumed to have been present in North Carolina, the responding state, and thus our State\u2019s substantive laws apply to determine defendant\u2019s duties of support. Pieper, supra.\nUnder North Carolina law, the duty of a putative father to support his illegitimate child is predicated on the judicial establishment of his paternity with respect to such child \u201cpursuant to G.S. 49-14.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 49-15 (1984); Tidwell v. Booker, 290 N.C. 98, 225 S.E.2d 816 (1976); see also Napowsa v. Langston, 95 N.C. App. 14, 381 S.E.2d 882 (1989). G.S. \u00a7 49-14(a) provides, in pertinent part, that \u201c[a] certified copy of a certificate of birth of the child shall be attached to the complaint.\u201d In the instant case, the record discloses that no such certified copies of the birth certificates of the alleged children-obligees were attached to the DCSE petition. Because this statutory prerequisite was not complied with, we are compelled to conclude that the North Carolina court was without subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate defendant\u2019s paternity. See Dept. of Social Services v. Williams, infra. Since there was neither a prior judicial determination of defendant\u2019s paternity nor jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue of paternity, defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should have been granted by the court.\nThe State counters that a judicial determination of paternity is unnecessary in that defendant executed a written acknowledgment of paternity which was appended to DCSE\u2019s verified petition. The State urges that this acknowledgment, coupled with defendant\u2019s actions in paying support in the past, constitutes sufficient evidence that defendant is the responsible party. We are not persuaded.\nIt is true that G.S. \u00a7 110-132 allows a written acknowledgment of paternity \u201c[i]n lieu of . . . any legal proceeding instituted to establish paternity\u201d in actions to enforce duties of support under G.S. ch. 110. Such an acknowledgment must, however, be \u201csworn to before a certifying officer or notary public\u201d and \u201caccompanied by a written affirmation of paternity executed and sworn to by the mother of the dependent child\u201d for whom support is sought. Id. G.S. \u00a7 110-132 also provides that \u201ca written agreement to support [a] child by periodic payments\u201d is enforceable as an order of support, if such an agreement complies with the enumerated statutory requirements.\nAssuming arguendo that this statute applies in actions under URESA to enforce duties of support as against a putative father, its requirements clearly have not been satisfied in this case. The so-called \u201cacknowledgment\u201d of paternity was neither executed in accordance with the above statutory requirements nor accompanied by a written affirmation of paternity executed by the mother of the alleged children-obligees. Moreover, the record fails to disclose that a written agreement to support the children was ever executed by defendant. Where the requirements of G.S. \u00a7 110-132 are not complied with, the court has no jurisdiction to enforce child support duties under G.S. ch. 110. Dept. of Social Services v. Williams, 52 N.C. App. 112, 277 S.E.2d 865 (1981).\nFinally, with respect to defendant\u2019s actions in paying child support to the alleged children-obligees in the past, we do not deny that such actions may constitute some evidence that defendant owes a duty of support, once the jurisdictional barrier has been surmounted through compliance with the statutory requirements. The mere fact that defendant made such payments, however, cannot of itself be dispositive of the jurisdictional question, in view of the clear statutory prerequisites to maintaining actions under either G.S. \u00a7 49-14 or G.S. \u00a7 110-132.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment is\nReversed.\nJudges Johnson and ORR concur.\n. The State\u2019s assertion at oral argument that, notwithstanding plaintiffs failure to comply with the statutory requirements, the court had subject matter jurisdiction under URESA to adjudicate defendant\u2019s paternity in that, pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 52A-19, the verified petition of DCSE constituted prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein is unavailing. Careful reading of G.S. \u00a7 52A-19 persuades us that the Legislature did not intend for that statute, as part of the expedited procedures applying under URESA, to obviate the requirements of G.S. \u00a7 49-14 in a paternity adjudication incident to an URESA action. To hold otherwise would create a clear disparity in the procedural protections afforded to putative fathers defending paternity actions under G.S. \u00a7 49-14 and those afforded to putative fathers defending paternity actions incident to the \u201ctypically open-and-shut\u201d proceedings under URESA. See 2 Lee on North Carolina Family Law \u00a7 169 at 350 (1980). This we cannot do.\n. Because our holding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction is dispositive, we do not address defendant\u2019s second argument challenging the court\u2019s denial of his motion for directed verdict or his third argument challenging the court\u2019s order on the grounds that it failed to include findings of fact. With respect to the latter, however, we note that under Grimes v. Grimes, 78 N.C. App. 208, 336 S.E.2d 664 (1986), such findings must be present in a support order entered under URESA.", "type": "majority", "author": "WELLS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney General T. Byron Smith and Associate Attorney General Bertha Fields, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Sally H. Scherer for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LAUCRESTA REYNOLDS v. ERVIN JUNIOR MOTLEY\nNo. 8910DC178\n(Filed 21 November 1989)\n1. Parent and Child \u00a7 10 (NCI3d); Bastards \u00a7 10 (NCI3d)- URESA action \u2014 filed in name of mother \u2014 Social Services real party in interest\nAlthough the name of the mother, Laucresta Reynolds, was improperly substituted for that of the Virginia District Division of Child Support Enforcement (DCSE) when the action was docketed, it was not necessary to dismiss the appeal because the record clearly shows that the action was prosecuted on behalf of DCSE, the real party in interest. N.C.G.S. Chapter 52A, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 17.\nAm Jur 2d, Bastards \u00a7 85.\n2. Parent and Child \u00a7 10 (NCI3d)\u2014 URESA action \u2014 standing of Social Services to bring action\nThe Virginia District Division of Child Support Enforcement had standing under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 52A-8.1 to bring an URESA action, even though it did not have custody of the alleged children-obligees, because the children-obligees had, by receiving public assistance in Virginia, effected an assignment of their rights of enforcement under URESA to DCSE by operation of law.\nAm Jur 2d, Bastards \u00a7 85.\n3. Parent and Child \u00a7 10 (NCI3d)\u2014 URESA action \u2014determination of paternity \u2014 subject matter jurisdiction lacking\nThe trial court erred in an URESA action by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction where defendant was presumed to have been present in North Carolina during the period or part of the period for which support was sought because there was no showing to the contrary; North Carolina\u2019s substantive laws thus apply to determine defendant\u2019s duties of support; no certified copy of the certificate of birth was attached to the DCSE petition as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 4944(a); North Carolina was therefore without subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate defendant\u2019s paternity; and there was no prior judicial determination of defendant\u2019s paternity. Defendant\u2019s so-called \u201cacknowledgment\u201d of paternity was neither executed in accordance with the requirements of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 110-132 nor accompanied by written affirmation of paternity executed by the mother of the alleged children-obligees, and the mere fact that defendant made child support payments cannot of itself be dispositive of the jurisdictional question.\nAm Jur 2d, Bastards \u00a7\u00a7 76, 104, 112.\nAPPEAL by defendant from Bullock, Stafford G., Judge. Order entered 7 October 1988 in WAKE County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals on 10 October 1989.\nThe record discloses that on 6 May 1988, the Danville, Virginia District Division of Child Support Enforcement (\u201cDCSE\u201d) brought an action against defendant, a North Carolina resident, under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (\u201cURESA\u201d). The verified petition, filed in the Danville, Virginia Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court alleged, inter alia, that defendant and Laucresta Reynolds, never married, were the parents of the dependents Michael, Marie, and Tamela Reynolds, and that pursuant to an \u201cacknowledgment of paternity\u201d and \u201cadministrative determination\u201d by the Danville Department of Social Services, defendant was responsible for the children\u2019s support. The petition further alleged that defendant had been making child support payments under a voluntary wage assignment, that such payments were in arrears, and that DCSE was an obligee as defined by URESA, by virtue of the children\u2019s receipt of public assistance in Virginia. The relief sought by DCSE was an order requiring defendant to pay arrears and reimbursement for the period of 1 January 1979 to 1 April 1988, and to pay continuing child support. An incomplete, undated form purporting to be defendant\u2019s acknowledgment of paternity and a document purporting to be defendant\u2019s record of child support payments were appended to the petition. No written agreement to support the children, executed by defendant, was produced, and no prior judicial proceedings to determine defendant\u2019s paternity and duty to support was shown to have ever been instituted.\nThe Virginia court certified the petition and ordered that the action be transmitted to the Wake County, North Carolina District Court for enforcement pursuant to URESA. Upon receipt, the cause was docketed and summons was issued naming Laucresta Reynolds as plaintiff. Defendant answered, denying both his paternity and any obligation to support the children. He admitted, however, having paid child support in the past. Defendant\u2019s motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction were denied, and a hearing was held at the 30 September 1988 civil session of the Wake County District Court. At the close of plaintiff\u2019s evidence, defendant moved for directed verdict. This motion was also denied. The court thereafter entered an order containing no findings of fact and requiring defendant to pay both arrearage and continuing child support to DCSE. From this order, defendant appeals.\nAttorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney General T. Byron Smith and Associate Attorney General Bertha Fields, for plaintiff-appellee.\nSally H. Scherer for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0299-01", "first_page_order": 331, "last_page_order": 338 }