{ "id": 8519701, "name": "HARRIS-TEETER SUPER MARKETS, INC., Plaintiff v. JACK RANKIN WATTS, JR., CONNIE P. WALLACE, and RODNEY E. WALLACE, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Harris-Teeter Super Markets, Inc. v. Watts", "decision_date": "1990-01-16", "docket_number": "No. 8927SC724", "first_page": "101", "last_page": "104", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "97 N.C. App. 101" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "148 S.E.2d 117", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "267 N.C. 302", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559166 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/267/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 S.E. 305", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1905, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "306" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 N.C. 140", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8651628 ], "year": 1905, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/140/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 S.E.2d 841", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "843" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.C. App. 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358084 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/88/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 A.L.R.2d 500", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "502" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "374 S.E.2d 844", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "847" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2563588 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "534" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "32 S.E.2d 213", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1944, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "224 N.C. 677", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8612508 ], "year": 1944, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "683" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/224/0677-01" ] }, { "cite": "260 S.E.2d 611", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 715", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573981 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "719" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0715-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 S.E.2d 751", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 462528 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "753" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga-app/178/0821-01" ] }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 477", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4693716 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0477-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 463, "char_count": 7880, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.6586746734412607e-07, "percentile": 0.693921537510488 }, "sha256": "fed5a932a10cbe89546c04a5f4a475972b8d24863b1fc60d168310c0d0eb8a56", "simhash": "1:874377fa051a1efe", "word_count": 1283 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:09:00.422652+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges JOHNSON and Cozort concur." ], "parties": [ "HARRIS-TEETER SUPER MARKETS, INC., Plaintiff v. JACK RANKIN WATTS, JR., CONNIE P. WALLACE, and RODNEY E. WALLACE, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "LEWIS, Judge.\nPlaintiff asserts that \u201c[t]he defendant Watts is primarily liable for the medical expenses which were paid by the plaintiff, and those medical expenses are the defendant Watts\u2019 obligation.\u201d The plaintiff had already \u201cdemanded\u201d that defendants \u201cRodney and/or Connie P. Wallace assert a claim against the defendant Watts for recovery of the medical expenses\u201d which plaintiff paid but the Wallaces had \u201cfailed and refused\u201d to do so. This appeal does not address any claims which plaintiff may have against defendants Connie P. Wallace and Rodney E. Wallace.\nThis appeal challenges the granting of a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) which allows the dismissal of an action for \u201cfailure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.\u201d In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court \u201cmust take as true the facts alleged\u201d [Ladd v. Estate of Kellenberger, 314 N.C. 477, 479, 344 S.E.2d 751, 753 (1985)] and should not dismiss the complaint \u201cunless it affirmatively appears that plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be presented in support of the claim\u201d [Presnell v. Pell, 298 N.C. 715, 719, 260 S.E.2d 611, 613 (1979)].\nPlaintiff contends that \u201c[t]he trial court erred in dismissing the action as against the defendant Watts, because the complaint states a claim for relief against . . . him.\u201d Plaintiffs argument is based on (1) \u201cthe equitable principle of subrogation\u201d and (2) plaintiff\u2019s alleged lack of an alternate \u201cremedy for the losses it suffered as a result of defendant Watts\u2019 negligence.\u201d\nI: Equitable subrogation\nEquitable subrogation is \u201ca device adopted by equity to compel the ultimate discharge of an obligation by him who in good conscience ought to pay it\u201d and \u201carises when one person has been compelled to pay a debt which ought to have been paid by another and for which the other was primarily liable.\u201d Beam v. Wright, 224 N.C. 677, 683, 32 S.E.2d 213, 218 (1944). Defendant contends: \u201cTo allow plaintiff equitable subrogation rights against the defendant would in effect allow an assignment of rights arising out of an alleged cause of action for personal injury, which is contrary to the law of North Carolina.\u201d Since, in a subrogation action, the rights of the insurer succeed only to the rights of the insured and no new cause of action is created, then, in the case at bar, the alleged \u201cequitable subrogation\u201d can be regarded as an \u201cequitable assignment\u201d of the rights of Rodney and Connie Wallace, the insured defendants, against the tortfeasor defendant, Jack Rankin Watts, Jr. Therefore, defendant Watts says this action is based on an assignment of rights arising out of a cause of action for the personal injury of the insured\u2019s dependent. The law of North Carolina is clear in its statement \u201cthat few legal principles are as well settled, and as universally agreed upon, as the rule that the common law does not permit assignment of causes of action to recover for personal injuries.\u201d N.C. Baptist Hospitals, Inc. v. Mitchell, 323 N.C. 528, 534, 374 S.E.2d 844, 847 (1988), citing Annotation, Assignability of claim for personal injury or death, 40 A.L.R.2d 500, 502 (1955). Such an assignment is considered to be \u201cinvalid as contrary to public policy.\u201d N.C. Baptist Hospitals, Inc. v. Mitchell, 88 N.C. App. 263, 266, 362 S.E.2d 841, 843 (1987), aff'd, 323 N.C. 528, 374 S.E.2d 844 (1988). Plaintiff cites cases in its brief from \u201ca variety of circumstances\u201d to support its theory of equitable subrogation; however, none of these cases involve personal injury claims brought by the insurer against the tortfeasor, as here.\nPlaintiff further discusses the possibility that plaintiffs payment to the insured may not have covered the \u201centire loss\u201d of the insured. \u201cPresumably, the plaintiff did not pay the parents\u2019 entire loss, since their loss includes the expected services and earnings of the minor child, if any, and discovery may reveal that the parents incurred some out of pocket medical expenses.\u201d If an action for \u201cequitable subrogation\u201d were allowed in this case, and the insured brought an action against the tortfeasor for the above-mentioned expenses, then there would be two suits against the tortfeasor based on identical causes of action. Under North Carolina law, a plaintiff is entitled to \u201cone compensation for all loss and damage, past and prospective, which were the certain and proximate results of the single wrong or breach of duty,\u201d and \u201c[t]he demand cannot be split and several actions maintained for the separate items of damage.\u201d Eller v. Railroad, 140 N.C. 140, 142, 52 S.E. 305, 306 (1905). See also Security Fire & Indem. Co. v. Barnhardt, 267 N.C. 302, 148 S.E.2d 117 (1966). The trial court correctly dismissed this action against the defendant Watts.\nII: Alleged lack of an alternate remedy\nPlaintiff contends in its brief: \u201cIf the court affirms the dismissal of this action, the plaintiff will be left without a remedy for the loss it suffered as a result of the defendant Watts\u2019 negligence.\u201d This Court will not direct anyone as to how to pursue possible remedies at law. Plaintiff is pursuing an opportunity to recover its loss under contract principles, presumably, in plaintiff\u2019s employee benefit program. Plaintiff could have appealed from the denial of its attempt to intervene in the prior related suit. If plaintiff had chosen to appeal that decision, any rights which the plaintiff may have against the defendant Watts could have been determined in that prior suit. Plaintiff, however, failed to perfect its appeal in the earlier related action.\nAffirmed.\nJudges JOHNSON and Cozort concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "LEWIS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "James, McElroy & Diehl, P.A., by Judith E. Egan, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Stott, Hollowell, Palmer & Windham, by Lin B. Hollowell, Jr., for defendant-appellee Jack Rankin Watts, Jr." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "HARRIS-TEETER SUPER MARKETS, INC., Plaintiff v. JACK RANKIN WATTS, JR., CONNIE P. WALLACE, and RODNEY E. WALLACE, Defendants\nNo. 8927SC724\n(Filed 16 January 1990)\nAssignments \u00a7 1 (NCI3d)\u2014 personal injury action \u2014no assignment to insurer allowed\nThe trial court properly entered summary judgment for defendant tortfeasor in plaintiff insurer\u2019s action based on the theory of equitable subrogation, since there could be no assignment of rights arising out of a cause of action for the personal injury of insureds\u2019 dependent.\nAm Jur 2d, Assignments \u00a7 37; Insurance \u00a7 1902.\nAPPEAL by plaintiff from order entered 3 April 1988 by Judge James U. Downs in GASTON County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 December 1989.\nDefendant John Rankin Watts, Jr. drove a motor vehicle which struck Bradley James Wallace, the son of defendants Connie P. Wallace and Rodney E. Wallace. Bradley Wallace suffered bodily injuries and his parents incurred expenses for medical attention and hospitalization. At the request of Rodney E. Wallace, an employee of the plaintiff, the plaintiff provided, through a self-funded employee benefit program, benefits in excess of $10,000 for medical expenses related to Bradley\u2019s injuries.\nIn a separate action, Bradley Wallace, through his guardian ad litem Connie P. Wallace, seeks to recover damages from defendant Watts for personal injuries sustained by the minor child. The guardian ad litem failed and refused to assert a claim specifically for medical expenses related to the injury. The plaintiff was denied leave to intervene in that action when plaintiff attempted to assert its claim for reimbursement of medical expenses which plaintiff paid for the child\u2019s injuries.\nPlaintiff then filed this action and defendant Jack Rankin Watts, Jr. filed a motion to dismiss the action as to him pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Superior Court granted the motion to dismiss the action as to defendant Watts. Plaintiff appeals.\nJames, McElroy & Diehl, P.A., by Judith E. Egan, for plaintiff-appellant.\nStott, Hollowell, Palmer & Windham, by Lin B. Hollowell, Jr., for defendant-appellee Jack Rankin Watts, Jr." }, "file_name": "0101-01", "first_page_order": 129, "last_page_order": 132 }