{
  "id": 8519814,
  "name": "CAROL A. WILLIAMS, Petitioner v. LAUREN R. WILLIAMS, Defendant",
  "name_abbreviation": "Williams v. Williams",
  "decision_date": "1990-01-16",
  "docket_number": "No. 896DC652",
  "first_page": "118",
  "last_page": "122",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "97 N.C. App. 118"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "136 S.E.2d 81",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1964,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "261 N.C. 764",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8575575
      ],
      "year": 1964,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/261/0764-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "244 S.E.2d 444",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1978,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "36 N.C. App. 586",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8554833
      ],
      "year": 1978,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/36/0586-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "178 S.E.2d 425",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1971,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "277 N.C. 623",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8567056
      ],
      "year": 1971,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/277/0623-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.4",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.",
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "(c)"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "374 S.E.2d 275",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1988,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "323 N.C. 617",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        2560957
      ],
      "year": 1988,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/323/0617-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "292 S.E.2d 159",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1982,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "57 N.C. App. 650",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8525570
      ],
      "year": 1982,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/57/0650-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 489,
    "char_count": 9523,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.755,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 1.591281695124211e-07,
      "percentile": 0.6821220078854018
    },
    "sha256": "e8919daa6a64aeec8481c5531fd8a1383cf1f044bd88fbf09c2cd76f3d122c0e",
    "simhash": "1:e3f0f820fc4ff6e0",
    "word_count": 1560
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:09:00.422652+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Chief Judge HEDRICK and Judge ARNOLD concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "CAROL A. WILLIAMS, Petitioner v. LAUREN R. WILLIAMS, Defendant"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "WELLS, Judge.\nDefendant\u2019s first and second assignments of error challenge the registration of plaintiff\u2019s Canadian decree. Defendant first assigns as error the trial court\u2019s denial of his 17 February 1988 motion to dismiss based on Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1) of the N.C. Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant argues that plaintiff failed to comply with the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 52A-29 for registration of a foreign decree and thus the court had no subject matter jurisdiction. In addition, defendant contends that the documents filed by plaintiff in order to register her Canadian decree failed to state a claim for relief.\nA primary function of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA), N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 52A-1 et seq. is to simplify and streamline the procedure by which an action to enforce a court order rendered in another jurisdiction can be instituted. In a URESA registration proceeding one is not required to file a complaint in the traditional sense. G.S. \u00a7 52A-29 requires only that certain documents be transmitted to the clerk of court. After submitting the required documents, an obligee seeking registration has no other duties under the statute. In this case plaintiff has met these requirements. For these reasons, we hold that the motion to dismiss was properly denied. This assignment is overruled.\nDefendant next assigns as error the trial court\u2019s conclusion of law that the Canadian decree was registered and due notice was served on respondent. We note for the record that the conclusion of law to which defendant excepts addresses only proper registration in the office of the clerk of court. (Emphasis supplied.) The trial court\u2019s order contains an uncontested finding of fact that \u201c[p]laintiff filed and registered the . . . Canadian decree in the Office of the Clerk of Superior Court of Hertford County on January 14, 1988 pursuant to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act and defendant was duly served with due notice on February 11, 1988.\u201d A finding of fact not excepted to is binding on appeal. Anderson v. Higgins, 57 N.C. App. 650, 292 S.E.2d 159 (1982). Therefore, the trial court\u2019s uncontested finding of fact that the plaintiff properly filed and registered the foreign decree alone adequately supports its conclusion of law that the decree was registered. For this reason and the reasons discussed, supra, we overrule this assignment of error.\nIn his third assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court did not have the authority under North Carolina law to order child support for a child who has attained the age of eighteen. Under North Carolina\u2019s version of URESA duties of support available are those \u201cimposed or imposable under the laws of any state where the obligor was present during the period or any part of the period for which support is sought. The obligor is presumed to have been present in the responding state during the period for which support is sought until otherwise shown.\u201d See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 52A-8. It is the law of the state where the obligor was present during the legally material times provided for in the statute that controls what duties of support may be enforced in North Carolina. Pieper v. Pieper, 323 N.C. 617, 374 S.E.2d 275 (1988). In this case no effort has been made to rebut the statutory presumption that the obligor was present in the responding state. Therefore, that presumption prevails and duties of support imposable under North Carolina law may be enforced through our URESA against this obligor. Id.\nDefendant relies on N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 48A-2 (1984), which defines a minor as \u201cany person who has not reached the age of 18 years,\u201d and N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.4(c) (1987 & Supp. 1989), which provides that parental support obligations terminate when a child reaches 18 except in two situations, neither of which is applicable here. We hold that on the facts of this case neither G.S. \u00a7 48A-2 nor G.S. \u00a7 5043.4(c) is controlling. We instead look to our case law which clearly establishes that a parent can assume contractual obligations to his child greater than the law otherwise imposes. See, e.g., Mullen v. Sawyer, 277 N.C. 623, 178 S.E.2d 425 (1971); Shaffner v. Shaffner, 36 N.C. App. 586, 244 S.E.2d 444 (1978). Thus, a parent may expressly agree to support his child after emancipation and beyond majority, and such agreements are binding and enforceable. Church v. Hancock, 261 N.C. 764, 136 S.E.2d 81 (1964); Shaffner, supra. In this case the defendant and plaintiff agreed that the age of majority could extend beyond age 18. The separation agreement defined the age of majority to mean when a child reaches the age of 18 years or more and ceases to be in normal full-time attendance at a university, college or accredited educational institution, reaches the age of 23, marries, dies, or ceases to reside with his [defendant\u2019s] wife. Defendant does not contend that the younger son was not enrolled in college, had reached age 23, or had married or ceased to reside with plaintiff. Defendant having bound himself to make support payments beyond the age of 18, the trial court properly validated the Canadian decree giving effect to defendant\u2019s continued obligation of support. This assignment of error is overruled.\nThe decision of the trial court is\nAffirmed.\nChief Judge HEDRICK and Judge ARNOLD concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "WELLS, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney General T. Byron Smith and Associate Attorney General Bertha Fields, for petitioner-appellee.",
      "Joseph J. Flythe for defendant-appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "CAROL A. WILLIAMS, Petitioner v. LAUREN R. WILLIAMS, Defendant\nNo. 896DC652\n(Filed 16 January 1990)\n1. Parent and Child \u00a7 10 (NCI3d)\u2014 URESA action \u2014proper documents submitted to clerk\nThe trial court properly denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s action instituted pursuant to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act when plaintiff submitted the proper documents to the clerk of court in Hertford County.\nAm Jur 2d, Desertion and Nonsupport \u00a7\u00a7 148, 149.\n2. Parent and Child \u00a7 10 (NCI3d)\u2014 plaintiff\u2019s filing and registering of foreign divorce decree proper \u2014 uncontested finding\nThe trial court\u2019s uncontested finding of fact that plaintiff properly filed and registered a foreign child support decree alone adequately supported the court\u2019s conclusion of law that the decree was registered.\nAm Jur 2d, Desertion and Nonsupport \u00a7\u00a7 148, 149.\n3. Parent and Child \u00a7 10 (NCI3d) \u2014 URESA action \u2014 duty of father to support child past 18 \u2014 father\u2019s contractual duty enforceable in North Carolina\nThere was no merit to defendant\u2019s argument that the trial court did not have the authority under North Carolina law to order child support for a child who had attained the age of 18, since defendant contractually bound himself to make support payments beyond the age of 18, and North Carolina recognizes the enforceability of such agreements.\nAm Jur 2d, Desertion and Nonsupport \u00a7 123.\nAPPEAL by defendant from Williford, Robert E., Judge. Order entered 1 March 1989 in HERTFORD County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 December 1989.\nIn 1985 defendant obtained a divorce from petitioner (plaintiff) in the Supreme Court of Ontario, Canada. In the decree issued by that court, it was also ordered and adjudged that certain paragraphs from a separation agreement dated 15 June 1984 be incorporated into the decree.\nThe portions of the separation agreement incorporated into the divorce decree concerned the support duties of defendant toward his two children, Christopher and Lawrence. In pertinent part the agreement provided:\n(b) The Husband shall pay to the Wife the sum of $300.00 per month upon the eldest child, CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS, reaching the \u201cage of majority\u201d (as such term is hereinafter defined) for the support, maintenance and benefit of the youngest child Lawrence Williams, until the said child reaches the age of majority.\n(c) The term \u201cage of majority\u201d as such herein shall be defined to mean:\n(I) When a child reaches the age of 18 years or more and ceases to be in normal full-time attendance at a university, college or accredited educational institution;\n(II) When a child reaches the age of 23 years while still in normal full-time attendance at a university, college or accredited educational institution;\n(III) When a child ceases to reside with the Wife.\n(IV) When a child marries; or\n(V) When a child dies.\nOn 14 January 1988, plaintiff, alleging defendant\u2019s nonpayment of support, instituted this action pursuant to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA), N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 52A-1 et seq. (1984). In December 1987 copies of the parties\u2019 Canadian decree, plaintiff\u2019s sworn statement, and a copy of the Reciprocal Enforcement Act of Ontario, Canada were transmitted to the Clerk of Court of Hertford County for registration in accordance with URESA as provided in G.S. \u00a7 52A-26 et seq. On 14 January 1988 the clerk of court issued a summons and notice and the defendant was served with the same on 11 February 1988. On 17 February 1988 defendant filed a motion to dismiss which was denied. After two continuances, a hearing was held on 16 February 1989. After the hearing, the trial court entered an order which affirmed the registration and enforcement of the Canadian decree. The order decreed that defendant owes plaintiff $19,350.00 in back due child support and that defendant shall pay plaintiff $300.00 per month child support until further ordered by the Court. From this order defendant appealed.\nAttorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney General T. Byron Smith and Associate Attorney General Bertha Fields, for petitioner-appellee.\nJoseph J. Flythe for defendant-appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0118-01",
  "first_page_order": 146,
  "last_page_order": 150
}