{ "id": 8521122, "name": "STEWART OFFICE SUPPLIERS, INC. v. FIRST UNION NATIONAL BANK; STEWART OFFICE SUPPLIERS, INC. v. SOUTHERN NATIONAL BANK OF NORTH CAROLINA", "name_abbreviation": "Stewart Office Suppliers, Inc. v. First Union National Bank", "decision_date": "1990-02-20", "docket_number": "Nos. 8926SC163; 8926SC289", "first_page": "353", "last_page": "363", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "97 N.C. App. 353" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "74 N.C. App. 719", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526054 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/74/0719-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 S.E. 2d 7", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 N.C. App. 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550836 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/40/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 S.E. 2d 867", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 738", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569637, 8569662 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0738-01", "/nc/295/0738-02" ] }, { "cite": "247 S.E. 2d 11", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 N.C. App. 718", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554794 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/37/0718-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 S.E. 2d 473", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 N.C. App. 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8359501 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "629" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/82/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 S.E. 2d 387", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "64 N.C. App. 347", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526809 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/64/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "658 F. Supp. 140", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7402697 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/658/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 S.E. 2d 814", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "820" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 N.C. App. 450", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550097 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "458" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/31/0450-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 S.E. 2d 728", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "728" }, { "page": "730" }, { "page": "730" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 N.C. App. 719", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526054 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/74/0719-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 S.E. 2d 7", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 1 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 823, "char_count": 22076, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.822377295720464e-07, "percentile": 0.8983768937880162 }, "sha256": "b05d5c35ea3f1aebee46b9a94e4424e1ec7b298f7f5ced7737c86756a07e02f3", "simhash": "1:32d8980a3d062876", "word_count": 3471 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:09:00.422652+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge JOHNSON concurs.", "Judge GREENE concurs in part and dissents in part.", "Judge GREENE concurring in part and dissenting in part." ], "parties": [ "STEWART OFFICE SUPPLIERS, INC. v. FIRST UNION NATIONAL BANK STEWART OFFICE SUPPLIERS, INC. v. SOUTHERN NATIONAL BANK OF NORTH CAROLINA" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "EAGLES, Judge.\nSummary judgment is appropriate \u201cif the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\u201d G.S. 1A-1, Rule 56(c). \u201cIf, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56.\u201d G.S. 1A-1, Rule 12(c).\nOn this record, we conclude that summary judgment in favor of defendant Southern National was erroneous on the conversion and breach of contract claims. We affirm the lower court\u2019s holding with respect to all other claims against Southern National and all claims against defendant First Union.\nI. Conversion and Breach of Restrictive Indorsement Claims\nA. Claims Against Defendant Southern National\nThe plaintiff first assigns as error the trial court\u2019s determination that defendant Southern National was not liable for conversion and breach of restrictive indorsement to plaintiff as a matter of law for paying checks inconsistent with the restrictive indorsement. Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for defendant Southern National based on the Bank\u2019s contention that there was not a material issue of fact in dispute. Plaintiff agrees that the facts were not in dispute but asserts that they warranted summary judgment in plaintiff\u2019s favor. Plaintiff asserts that the entry of summary judgment for the bank is contrary to an admission by defendant Southern National and the plain language of G.S. 25-3-205(c). Plaintiff points out that defendant admitted in its answer that it was \u201ca federally chartered Bank and received certain checks for deposit which were made payable to the order of the plaintiff and which bore varying restrictive indorsements.\u201d After careful review of the record, we agree with plaintiff and accordingly reverse the summary judgment for the defendant Southern National on the conversion and breach of contract claims.\nWe note initially that General Statutes Chapter 25, the Uniform Commercial Code, governs commercial transactions in North Carolina. Chapter 25 begins with these general guidelines: \u201c(1) This chapter shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies. (2) Underlying purposes and policies of this chapter are (a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions; (b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties; (c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.\u201d G.S. 25-1-102.\nG.S. 25-3-205(c) provides that an indorsement is restrictive if it includes inter alia the words \u201cfor deposit\u201d or \u201clike terms signifying a purpose of deposit or collection.\u201d G.S. 25-3-205. Also, G.S. 25-3-419(3) provides that:\nSubject to the provisions of this chapter concerning restrictive indorsements a representative, including a depository or collecting bank, who has in good faith and in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards applicable to the business of such representative dealt with an instrument or its proceeds on behalf of one who was not the true owner is not liable in conversion or otherwise to the true owner beyond the amount of any proceeds remaining in his hands.\nHere, the record from the Southern National case includes a photostatic copy of a check which does in fact bear varying stamped restrictive indorsements. On the back of a check made payable to S.O.S. the following stamped indorsements appear:\n(1) Stewart Office Suppliers For Deposit Only\n(2) For Deposit Only Acct.: Illegible\nSince both of the indorsements contain the language \u201cFor Deposit Only,\u201d under G.S. 25-3-205(e) they are restrictive indorsements. They are the \u201cvarying restrictions\u201d admitted by the defendant.\nHowever, in order to hold defendant Southern National liable for \u201cconversion or otherwise\u201d plaintiff must show that defendant did not act with good faith or failed to use reasonable commercial standards.\nG.S. 25-1-201(19) defines good faith as \u201chonesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.\u201d The defendant Southern National knew of the contractual arrangement between the parties and acted in reliance on the contractual arrangement. Scott Anderson, an officer of Southern National, stated that he was \u201caware of the business relationship and contractual agreement.\u201d He stated he knew that S.O.S. solicited orders for office products which LVP Corporation would fill and that S.O.S.\u2019s accounts receivable were assigned to LVP Corp. in return for a certain percentage of commission for sales. From that we conclude its transactions with Key were done in good faith.\nWith respect to the commercial reasonableness, this court held in Parks Chevrolet, Inc. v. Watkins, 74 N.C. App. 719, 329 S.E. 2d 728 (1985) that \u201ccommercial reasonableness presents a factual issue to be determined by the jury in light of the relevant circumstances of each case.\u201d Id. at 722, 329 S.E. 2d at 728, citing ITT-Industrial Credit Co. v. Milo Concrete Co., Inc., 31 N.C. App. 450, 458, 229 S.E. 2d 814, 820 (1976). In Parks the defendant appealed on the issue of whether the resale of his automobile was commercially reasonable citing G.S. 25-9-504(3) which provided that every aspect of the disposition of collateral after default \u201cincluding the method, manner, time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable.\u201d Id. at 721, 329 S.E. 2d at 730. While the test Parks articulated for commercial reasonableness was under Article 9, the same test should apply to all commercial transactions under Chapter 25. \u201cBecause reasonable minds may differ over the application of a standard such as commercial reasonableness, this determination is inherently a jury question which does not readily lend itself to summary judgment.\u201d Id. at 722, 329 S.E. 2d at 730.\nSecondly, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in allowing summary judgment for defendant Southern National on the issue of breach of restrictive indorsement. Our research discloses no North Carolina cases addressing whether an action exists for breach of restrictive indorsement in these circumstances. We hold that upon a proper showing, a plaintiff may recover for conversion and breach of restriction when a restrictive indorsement is violated. See Mid-Atlantic Tennis Courts, Inc. v. Citizens Bank and Trust Co., 658 F. Supp. 140 (D. Md. 1987). However, we note that G.S. 25-3-419(3) provides liability for conversion or otherwise will not exist beyond the amount of any proceeds remaining in his hands if the depository.bank acted in \u201cgood faith and in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards applicable to the business.\u201d\nAccordingly, we reverse the trial court\u2019s entry of summary judgment for defendant Southern National and remand the cause for further proceedings on the issues of conversion and breach of restrictive indorsement.\nB. Claims Against Defendant First Union\nInitially, we note that the same principles of law would apply to plaintiff\u2019s claim of wrongful negotiation of instrument against defendant First Union. However, the record before us does not include the reverse sides of the checks found in Exhibit One that were made payable to S.O.S. The record does not contain evidence to indicate the indorsements appearing on those checks. There is nothing in the First Union record to dispute the trial court\u2019s findings that the indorsements there were not restrictive. Where there is no evidence of record that the indorsements are restrictive, the jury determination of commercial reasonableness required to resolve the claim against Southern National is not necessary here. Accordingly, on the issues of conversion and wrongful negotiation of an instrument, we affirm the court below with respect to defendant First Union.\nII. Holder in Due Course\nNext, plaintiff contends that the trial court committed reversible error in denying its motion for summary judgment because as payee it is a holder in due course and this status cuts off any defenses raised by defendant bank First Union and defendant bank Southern National. We disagree.\n\u201cTo qualify as a holder in due course, plaintiff . . . must have been a holder who took the check for value, in good faith, and without notice that it was overdue, had been dishonored, or of any defense against or claim to it.\u201d City National Bank v. Rojas, 64 N.C. App. 347, 349, 307 S.E. 2d 387, 389 (1983), citing G.S. 25-3-302. If the plaintiff is a holder in due course, he takes a check free from all claims to it or all defenses against it by any party. Id., citing G.S. 25-3-305. In order to show that summary judgment was improperly granted for the defendant Bank, plaintiff is required to produce a forecast of evidence to show that no genuine issue of fact exists to plaintiffs status as a holder in due course.\nHere, plaintiff was not responsible, for filling its customers\u2019 orders. Instead, Key had this responsibility and in return was assigned plaintiff\u2019s accounts receivable as compensation. Here Key, not plaintiff, gave value for the checks. Even if plaintiff\u2019s role as a solicitor of orders could be considered value, plaintiff fails to meet another criterion of the holder in due course test. Since plaintiff and Key had executed a binding agreement which gave Key a claim against plaintiff\u2019s accounts receivable, plaintiff could not be a holder in due course because it had notice of adverse claims as to its accounts receivable.\nBecause plaintiff has failed to produce a forecast of evidence establishing its status as holder in due course, this assignment of error must fail.\nIII. Motion to Amend\nFinally, plaintiff assigns as error the trial court\u2019s denial of a motion to amend its complaint in each separate action. Plaintiff contends that it filed its motion to amend in a timely fashion. The proposed amendment alleged a claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices. Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion. We disagree.\nWe note that \u201cRule 15(a) gives the trial court broad discretion in determining whether leave to amend will be granted after the time for amending as a matter of course has expired.\u201d Tyson v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 82 N.C. App. 626, 629, 347 S.E. 2d 473, 476 (1986), citing Willow Mountain Corp. v. Parker, 37 N.C. App. 718, 247 S.E. 2d 11, disc. rev. denied, 295 N.C. 738, 248 S.E. 2d 867 (1978). \u201cThe denial of such a motion is not reviewable absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion.\u201d Id., citing Carolina Garbage, Inc. v. Holston, 40 N.C. App. 400, 253 S.E. 2d 7 (1979).\nHere, plaintiff has attempted to amend its complaint to bring an allegation of unfair and deceptive trade practices. These allegations were not brought in the initial complaint and plaintiff made no showing of excuse for the delay in pleading them. We find no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, this assignment of error must fail.\nFor the foregoing reasons the summary judgment in favor of defendant First Union National Bank is affirmed. The summary judgment in favor of defendant Southern National Bank is reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.\nAs to First Union \u2014 affirmed.\nAs to Southern National \u2014 reversed and remanded.\nJudge JOHNSON concurs.\nJudge GREENE concurs in part and dissents in part.", "type": "majority", "author": "EAGLES, Judge." }, { "text": "Judge JOHNSON\nconcurring.\nI concur with all of the majority opinion, but write separately to add to and advance the conclusion that the order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant Southern National Bank must be reversed.\nG.S. sec. 25-3-205 provides that \u201can indorsement is restrictive [if it] includes the words . . . \u2018for deposit.\u2019 \u201d The statute does not, however, specify additional words which must accompany the restrictive indorsement nor does it specify a particular order for such wording.\nThe restrictive indorsement\nStewart Office Suppliers\nFor Deposit Only\nwas stamped on the back of each check received by Stewart Office Suppliers, Inc. (\u201cS.O.S.\u201d) from its customers. Key Office Products (\u201cKey\u201d) thereafter stamped its bank account number on the back of each check, directly under the aforementioned restrictive in-dorsement. Southern National Bank (\u201cSouthern National\u201d) subsequently negotiated the checks for Key despite the stamped restrictive language which appeared above Key\u2019s indorsement.\nI am of the opinion that both the unambiguous language used by S.O.S. and the use of the company stamp to create the indorsement placed Southern National on notice of the restrictive indorsement. The checks should have been negotiated only for deposit on behalf of S.O.S. Accordingly, Southern National paid the checks in a manner that was inconsistent with the restrictive indorsement.\nJudge GREENE concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nI first doubt whether the indorsement\nStewart Office Suppliers\nFor Deposit Only\nwas a restrictive indorsement as that term is used in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 25-3-205(c) (1986). The mere use of the words \u201cFor Deposit Only\u201d after \u201cStewart Office Suppliers\u201d is not a term, without more, which signifies a specific \u201cpurpose\u201d as required by the statute. Id. The vagueness of the indorsement in question is reflected when contrasted with an indorsement reflecting a clear, specific purpose: For deposit only to account of Stewart Office Suppliers. In any event, as noted in Comment 5 to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 25-3-206, an indorsement \u201cfor deposit\u201d \u201cmay be either special or blank.\u201d As the indorsement in question did not specify \u201cto whom or to whose order\u201d the instrument was payable, it was a blank indorsement. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 25-3-204(1) (1986). Therefore, while the check could be negotiated only for deposit, there was no restriction that it be deposited to the account of Stewart Office Suppliers. Accordingly, I find no error in granting summary judgment for Southern National Bank who paid the check consistent with the second indorsement on the check which was clearly a special indorsement directing payment to a certain account.\nAs I fully concur with the majority in all other aspects of the opinion, I would vote to affirm the trial court in every respect.", "type": "concurrence", "author": null } ], "attorneys": [ "Lawrence U. Davidson, III for plaintiff-appellant.", "Perry, Patrick, Farmer & Michaux, by Roy H. Michaux, Jr., for defendant-appellee First Union National Bank.", "Parker, Poe, Thompson, Bernstein, Gage & Preston, by Gaston H. Gage and Craig T. Lynch, for defendant-appellee Southern National Bank." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STEWART OFFICE SUPPLIERS, INC. v. FIRST UNION NATIONAL BANK STEWART OFFICE SUPPLIERS, INC. v. SOUTHERN NATIONAL BANK OF NORTH CAROLINA\nNos. 8926SC163\n8926SC289\n(Filed 20 February 1990)\n1. Uniform Commercial Code \u00a7 36 (NCI3d)\u2014 conversion of checks \u2014 restrictive endorsements \u2014 summary judgment for defendants\nThe trial court erred by granting summary judgment for defendant Southern National in an action for conversion for paying checks inconsistent with a restrictive endorsement where both endorsements contained the language \u201cFor Deposit Only\u201d and were restrictive endorsements under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 25-3-205(c). Defendant\u2019s transactions were done in good faith, but determination of commercial reasonableness is inherently a jury question which does not readily lend itself to summary judgment. While the test for commercial reasonableness in Parks Chevrolet, Inc. v. Watkins, 74 N.C. App. 719, was under Art. 9, the same test should apply to all commercial transactions under Chapter 25.\nAm Jur 2d, Bills and Notes \u00a7\u00a7 362, 408.\n2. Uniform Commercial Code \u00a7 36 (NCI3d)\u2014 breach of restrictive endorsement \u2014 summary judgment for defendant bank \u2014 improper\nThe trial court erred by granting summary judgment for defendant Southern National for breach of restrictive endorsements; upon a proper showing, a plaintiff may recover for conversion and breach of restriction when a restrictive endorsement is violated. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 25-3-419(3).\nAm Jur 2d, Bills and Notes \u00a7\u00a7 362, 408.\n3. Uniform Commercial Code \u00a7 36 (NCI3d)\u2014 wrongful negotiation of instrument \u2014 conversion\u2014restrictive endorsement\u2014 evidence insufficient\nThe trial court did not err by granting summary judgment for defendant First Union on an action for wrongful negotiation of instrument and conversion where the record did not contain the endorsements appearing on those checks and there was nothing in the record to dispute the trial court\u2019s findings that the endorsements were not restrictive.\nAm Jur 2d, Bills and Notes \u00a7\u00a7 362, 408.\n4. Uniform Commercial Code \u00a7 31 (NCI3d(\u2014 conversion \u2014 breach of restrictive endorsement \u2014holder in due course doctrine \u2014 not applicable\nThe trial court did not err by granting summary judgment for defendants Southern National and First Union in an action seeking the proceeds from negotiated instruments where plaintiff claimed status as the holder in due course but Key had the responsibility for filling plaintiff\u2019s customers\u2019 orders and was assigned plaintiff\u2019s accounts receivable as compensation, so that Key, not plaintiff, gave value for the checks. Moreover, plaintiff had executed a binding agreement which gave Key a claim against plaintiff\u2019s accounts receivable so that plaintiff had notice of adverse claims against its accounts receivable.\nAm Jur 2d, Bills and Notes \u00a7\u00a7 334, 345.\n5. Rules of Civil Procedure \u00a7 15.1 (NCI3d)\u2014 amendment of complaint \u2014 denied\u2014no abuse of discretion\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in an action seeking the proceeds from negotiated instruments by denying plaintiff\u2019s motion to amend its complaint to add claims for unfair or deceptive trade practices where those allegations were not made in the initial complaint and plaintiff made no showing of excuse for the delay in pleading them.\nAm Jur 2d, Pleading \u00a7\u00a7 310, 311, 312.\nJudge JOHNSON concurring.\nJudge GREENE concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order entered 6 December 1988 by Judge Frank Snepp in MECKLENBURG County Superior Court granting defendant First Union\u2019s motion, and order entered 7 December 1988 granting defendant Southern National\u2019s motion. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 September 1989.\nThis is an appeal from orders granting defendants\u2019 motions for summary judgment in two separate cases involving identical issues. Since the actions involve the same issues, plaintiffs appeals have been consolidated here.\nPlaintiff Stewart Office Suppliers, Inc. (hereinafter S.O.S.), a minority owned corporation in Charlotte, North Carolina, sells and distributes office supplies. On 11 August 1986 plaintiff entered into an agreement with T & S Office Supplies, Inc. d/b/a Key Office Products (hereinafter Key) whereby Key was authorized to \u201cnegotiate any check, draft or other commercial paper given by third parties in satisfaction of debits on such third party\u2019s account attributable to orders received by Stewart.\u201d\nIn his deposition, Frederick Stewart, plaintiffs President, admitted that plaintiff had given Key authority to negotiate checks in the agreement, but asserted that the agreement had been can-celled on the next day. Despite this cancellation, Stewart said plaintiff continued to operate under the agreement because it had no other choice and had products to move. After entering this agreement plaintiff physically relocated its bookkeeper and warehouseman to offices operated by Key. After this, no checks from plaintiffs accounts receivable were deposited in plaintiffs account at Mechanics and Farmer\u2019s Bank until November and December 1986. In Stewart\u2019s deposition, he explained that the only reason the accounts receivable checks were deposited in the S.O.S. account in Mechanics & Farmers Bank during November and December 1986 was because at that time S.O.S. had stopped dealing with Key altogether and was involved in litigation with Key. Stewart also stated that he did not know where the checks were being deposited during the months other than November and December 1986 since the bills sent to customers instructed them to mail payment to Key.\nPlaintiff then entered into another contract with Key on 5 January 1987 and the pending litigation was dismissed. This contract provided that \u201c[ajll accounts receivable after 9 January 1987 are to be assigned to and received by T & S Office Supplies.\u201d The agreement also provided that Key would be \u201cresponsible for all expenses related to the purchase and delivery of orders for Stewart Office Supplies and office activities.\u201d Plaintiff stated that following execution of this agreement Key and S.O.S. each paid some expenses.\nDuring the spring of 1987 plaintiff discovered that defendant First Union National Bank (hereinafter First Union) was negotiating some of the accounts receivable checks. Plaintiff then had its attorney write a letter dated 11 February 1988 informing First Union that plaintiff had learned that First Union had negotiated checks without authority.\nPlaintiff brought a separate action against each defendant seeking the proceeds from the negotiated instruments. After defendants answered, plaintiff moved for judgment on the pleadings or in the alternative summary judgment. In the action against First Union the trial court denied plaintiffs motion and granted defendant First Union\u2019s motion for summary judgment. The trial court did so on the grounds that the checks payable to plaintiff and deposited in the account of T & S Office Supplies at First Union National Bank did not contain restrictive indorsements, that the indorsement and deposit of the checks were fully authorized by the plaintiff and that the defendant acted in a commercially reasonable manner. The trial court also granted defendant Southern National\u2019s motion for summary judgment in the second action on the grounds that the \u201cpleadings, answers to interrogatories, and the admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\u201d Plaintiff appeals in each case.\nLawrence U. Davidson, III for plaintiff-appellant.\nPerry, Patrick, Farmer & Michaux, by Roy H. Michaux, Jr., for defendant-appellee First Union National Bank.\nParker, Poe, Thompson, Bernstein, Gage & Preston, by Gaston H. Gage and Craig T. Lynch, for defendant-appellee Southern National Bank." }, "file_name": "0353-01", "first_page_order": 381, "last_page_order": 391 }