{
  "id": 8522668,
  "name": "GABRIEL CELIS, Petitioner/Appellant v. NORTH CAROLINA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION and YATES MOTOR CO., INC., Respondents/Appellees",
  "name_abbreviation": "Celis v. North Carolina Employment Security Commission",
  "decision_date": "1990-03-20",
  "docket_number": "No. 8915SC420",
  "first_page": "636",
  "last_page": "640",
  "citations": [
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      "cite": "97 N.C. App. 636"
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    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
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      "cite": "92 N.C. App. 581",
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      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
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      "year": 1986,
      "pin_cites": [
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          "page": "847",
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      "cite": "318 N.C. 441",
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  "analysis": {
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    "char_count": 9233,
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:09:00.422652+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges PARKER and ORR concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "GABRIEL CELIS, Petitioner/Appellant v. NORTH CAROLINA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION and YATES MOTOR CO., INC., Respondents/Appellees"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "EAGLES, Judge.\nPetitioner makes three arguments on appeal. First, petitioner argues that the Commission\u2019s finding that he left work voluntarily is a conclusion of law that is fully re viewable by this court. Second, petitioner asserts that the appropriate standard of review for decisions of the Commission is \u201csubstantial evidence on the whole record,\u201d not the \u201cany competent evidence\u201d standard. Finally, petitioner argues that if we determine that the evidence shows he was discharged, there is no evidence of misconduct or substantial fault on his part to disqualify him from receiving unemployment compensation benefits. After reviewing the record, petitioner\u2019s arguments, and the applicable statutory provisions and case law, we affirm.\nPetitioner\u2019s first argument is that the Commission\u2019s determination that he voluntarily left work was erroneous as a matter of law. Petitioner relies on two decisions from other states in support of his argument that the determination of whether a person voluntarily leaves employment is a question of law. In Torsky v. Com., Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 81 Pa. Cmwlth. 642, 474 A.2d 1207 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 1984) and State ex rel. Dept. of Labor v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 297 A.2d 412 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972), the courts held that the issue of whether a separation from employment is a discharge or a voluntary quit is a question of law. Additionally, petitioner cites In re Vaughn, Precedent Decision #15, Commission Decision #84(H)1379 (Aug. 18, 1984) in which the Commission stated that \u201c[w]hether an employee voluntarily terminates her employment or is discharged is a question of law.\u201d\nPetitioner argues that the discussion he had with the service manager constituted a constructive discharge. Petitioner testified that the service manager said \u201c[s]eems to me that you don\u2019t care about your job,\u201d \u201cit [would] be better ... if [you] pick up [your] tools and leave,\u201d and when petitioner asked \u201cdoes that mean that I, I shall be leavingf?],\u201d the service manager said \u201c[Y]eah.\u201d However, there was also evidence to the contrary to the effect that petitioner left the job of his own free will. The Commission\u2019s findings of fact, if supported by evidence, are conclusive on appeal. Here, the Commission heard the witnesses and was in the best position to judge their credibility. The conclusion that petitioner voluntarily left his employment is supported by the findings of fact. Additionally, there was no evidence that the conditions of petitioner\u2019s employment were so intolerable as to constitute \u201cgood cause attributable to the employer.\u201d Petitioner\u2019s arguments are without merit.\nPetitioner\u2019s second argument is that the Commission applied an improper standard of review. Petitioner argues that the standard of review applicable to this type case has not been determined and the \u201csubstantial evidence\u201d test should apply (as opposed to \u201cany competent evidence\u201d standard). Petitioner relies on language from Williams v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 318 N.C. 441, 349 S.E.2d 842 (1986), a case in which the Supreme Court declined to decide which standard controls:\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 96-15 does not specify which test should be employed; it merely provides that the Commission\u2019s findings shall be conclusive \u201cif there is evidence to support them. . . .\u201d Where the word \u201cevidence\u201d appears, and its meaning is not otherwise qualified, \u201cevidence\u201d has been read to mean \u201csubstantial evidence.\u201d Moreover we note that the \u201cwhole record\u201d test is the test normally preferred.\nId. at 448, 349 S.E.2d at 847 (citations omitted). Petitioner argues that upon review of the record as a whole the only reasonable conclusion here is that he was discharged. The Commission argues that the appropriate standard of review is \u201cany competent evidence.\u201d There is evidence in the record to support the findings and the findings support the conclusions.\nThe version of G.S. 96-15(i) applicable to this case provides that\n[i]n any judicial proceeding under this section, the findings of fact by the Commission, if there is evidence to support them and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of the court shall be confined to questions of law.\nThis court has stated that the standard of review from decisions of the Commission is whether there is \u201cany competent evidence\u201d to support the findings. See Dunlap v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 92 N.C. App. 581, 583, 375 S.E.2d 171, 173 (1989). See also State ex rel. Employment Security Commission v. Smith, 235 N.C. 104, 106, 69 S.E.2d 32, 33 (1952) (citing G.S. 96-4(m)).\nWe note that effective 5 July 1989 the General Assembly changed the language of G.S. 96-15(i). That statute now provides explicitly that \u201cif there is any competent evidence\u201d (emphasis ours) to support the Commission\u2019s findings of fact they are conclusive on appeal. There is no statutory provision that requires that the Commission\u2019s findings of fact be supported by \u201csubstantial evidence\u201d as petitioner argues. Petitioner\u2019s argument is without merit and his assignment of error is overruled.\nPetitioner\u2019s final argument is that his discharge was not due to misconduct or substantial fault on his part. Because of our disposition of the other issues in this case, we need not address petitioner\u2019s final argument.\nFor the reasons stated above, the decision below is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJudges PARKER and ORR concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "EAGLES, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "North State Legal Services, Inc., by John L. Saxon and Karen Murphy, for petitioner-appellant.",
      "No brief for Yates Motor Company, Inc., respondent-appellee.",
      "Chief Counsel T. S. Whitaker, Alfreda Williamson and C. Coleman Billingsley, Jr., staff attorneys, for Employment Security Commission of North Carolina, respondent-appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "GABRIEL CELIS, Petitioner/Appellant v. NORTH CAROLINA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION and YATES MOTOR CO., INC., Respondents/Appellees\nNo. 8915SC420\n(Filed 20 March 1990)\n1. Master and Servant \u00a7 108 (NCI3d)\u2014 unemployment compensation-voluntary quit \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nEvidence was sufficient to support a finding by respondent that petitioner voluntarily quit his job where the evidence tended to show that petitioner was absent for two days while serving on a jury; he did not inform his supervisor that he would be absent; and although there was evidence that when he returned to work, he had a discussion with the supervisor which constituted a constructive discharge, there was also evidence to the contrary that petitioner left the job of his own free will.\nAm Jur 2d, Unemployment Compensation \u00a7\u00a7 59, 61, 93, 94.\n2. Master and Servant \u00a7 111 (NCI3d)\u2014 unemployment .compensation \u2014 voluntary quit issue \u2014any competent evidence standard for judicial review\nIn a proceeding to recover unemployment benefits where the issue was whether petitioner was fired or voluntarily quit his job, the appropriate standard of judicial review was whether there was any competent evidence to support the Commission\u2019s findings, not whether there was substantial evidence to support them. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 96-15(i).\nAm Jur 2d, Unemployment Compensation \u00a7\u00a7 59, 61, 93, 94.\nAPPEAL by petitioner from judgment entered 30 December 1988 by Judge Robert L. Farmer in ORANGE County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 November 1989.\nThis is an appeal from denial of unemployment claims. Gabriel Celis (petitioner) was a mechanic employed by Yates Motor Company (Yates). Petitioner was summoned to report for jury duty on 26 April 1988 but mistakenly thought that he would be disqualified and excused from jury service because he was a resident alien. Petitioner testified that he told his supervisor, Yates\u2019 assistant parts and service manager, that he had been called for jury service but expected to be back at work at approximately 1:00 p.m. on the 26th. The service manager was also informed of the summons. Petitioner was chosen to sit on a jury and, without contacting his employer, did not return to work until the trial ended, two days later.\nWhen petitioner arrived at work, he and the service manager had a brief conversation, the content of which is disputed. The service manager testified that petitioner walked off the job. Petitioner testified that in their conversation the service manager discharged him.\nOn 17 May 1988 an Employment Security Commission (Commission) adjudicator denied petitioner\u2019s application for unemployment compensation benefits. Claimant appealed and on 27 June 1988 an appeals referee determined that petitioner voluntarily left his employment without good cause attributable to his employer. Petitioner appealed to the Commission.\nAfter making findings of fact the Commission concluded that petitioner was disqualified for benefits because he voluntarily left work without good cause attributable to the employer. Additionally, the Commission concluded that \u201c[e]ven were claimant\u2019s separation . . . the result of a discharge as he alleges, he would be disqualified\u201d because he was \u201cjustifiably discharged by the employer\u201d for misconduct. The superior court determined that the facts found by the Commission were supported by competent evidence and the findings of fact supported the conclusions of law. Therefore, the superior court affirmed the decision of the Commission. Petitioner appeals.\nNorth State Legal Services, Inc., by John L. Saxon and Karen Murphy, for petitioner-appellant.\nNo brief for Yates Motor Company, Inc., respondent-appellee.\nChief Counsel T. S. Whitaker, Alfreda Williamson and C. Coleman Billingsley, Jr., staff attorneys, for Employment Security Commission of North Carolina, respondent-appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0636-01",
  "first_page_order": 664,
  "last_page_order": 668
}