{
  "id": 8524310,
  "name": "BOBELLA BLALOCK GLATZ v. FRANK ROBERT GLATZ, JR.",
  "name_abbreviation": "Glatz v. Glatz",
  "decision_date": "1990-05-01",
  "docket_number": "No. 8917DC835",
  "first_page": "324",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:26:07.401162+00:00",
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    "judges": [
      "Judges Phillips and Duncan concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "BOBELLA BLALOCK GLATZ v. FRANK ROBERT GLATZ, JR."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "HEDRICK, Chief Judge.\nIn her fourth assignment of error, plaintiff contends \u201c[t]he trial court committed error in denying the plaintiff\u2019s motion for attorney\u2019s fees.\u201d We disagree. Plaintiff argues that G.S. 110-136.6(a) \u201cclearly authorizes the award of [attorney\u2019s] fees in income withholding cases.\u201d G.S. 110-136.6(a) provides in pertinent part:\nThe amount withheld may also include court costs and attorneys fees as may be awarded by the Court in non-IV-D cases . . . (emphasis added).\nIn denying plaintiff\u2019s motion for an award of attorney\u2019s fees, the trial judge found that \u201c[t]he plaintiff\u2019s claim for relief did not allege any arrearages under the order of [the] Illinois court for attorney\u2019s fees and/or court costs.\u201d The record on appeal supports Judge Martin\u2019s finding and further demonstrates that plaintiff first asserted a claim for attorney\u2019s fees in her motion filed on 31 January 1989; this motion being filed three months after the entry of the income withholding order on 18 October 1988.\nWe find the language in G.S. 110436.6(a) allowing court costs and attorney\u2019s fees to be included in the amount withheld by the court clearly contemplates that such claims should be asserted prior to the entry of the withholding order. Therefore, we hold the trial judge had no authority to allow plaintiffs motion for an award of attorney\u2019s fees in the present case, and his order denying plaintiff\u2019s motion will be affirmed.\nPlaintiff\u2019s fifth assignment of error states \u201c[t]he District Court committed error by refusing to consider the income of the defendant\u2019s professional association when calculating the defendant\u2019s disposable income.\u201d In granting the income withholding order on 18 October 1988, Judge Martin made the following finding with respect to defendant\u2019s disposable income:\n32. The Court finds that the defendant has a disposable income of Fifty Two Thousand Dollars ($52,000.00) annually, or Four Thousand Three Hundred Thirty Three Dollars ($4,333.00) per month.\nAlthough plaintiff questions the trial judge\u2019s findings with respect to defendant\u2019s disposable income in her \u201cMotion to Amend Judgment and Motion For a New Trial,\u201d no exceptions are noted in the record on appeal to any of the trial judge\u2019s findings on this issue. \u201cWhen findings of fact are not challenged by exceptions in the record, they are presumed to be supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal.\u201d Tinkham v. Hall, 47 N.C. App. 651, 652-653, 267 S.E.2d 588, 590 (1980). Thus, this assignment of error has no merit.\nFinally, in assignments of error Nos. 1, 2, and 3, plaintiff contends the trial court erred by (1) refusing to enforce the automatic adjustment provisions contained in the Illinois child support judgment, (2) allowing defendant a credit against his child support obligation for items purchased for the minor children, and (3) refusing to award prejudgment interest on defendant\u2019s child support arrearage. In support of each of these contentions, plaintiff argues the trial court erred in failing to fully enforce the child support provisions included in the Illinois divorce judgment because such provisions would be unenforceable under North Carolina law. We agree.\nIn the present case, plaintiff and defendant entered into a separation agreement which, among other things, provided for the support of the minor children and contained the provisions cited above. This agreement was made part of the Illinois divorce decree with both parties\u2019 knowledge and consent. In making the agreement part of the divorce judgment, the Illinois court found: \u201c[the agreement] is not unconscionable and ought to receive the approval of this Court. . . .\u201d\n\u201cThe full faith and credit clause in the United States Constitution, Article IV, Sec. 1, requires that the judgment of the court of one state must be given the same effect in a sister state that it has in the state where it was rendered.\u201d Fleming v. Fleming, 49 N.C. App. 345, 349, 271 S.E.2d 584, 587 (1980). In the case sub judice, the Illinois judgment incorporating the parties\u2019 separation agreement was never registered in North Carolina and remained a valid and fully enforceable judgment of another state entitled to enforcement according to its terms in this state. Therefore, the trial judge erred in not extending full faith and credit to the Illinois judgment by (1) refusing to enforce the automatic adjustment provisions, (2) allowing defendant a credit against his child support obligation, and (3) refusing to award prejudgment interest to plaintiff.\nThus, this cause must be remanded to the District Court, Stokes County, for an entry of an order awarding plaintiff interest on the judgment and adjusting the payments on the judgment in accordance with the Wholesale Price Index, and deleting any credits for defendant for items purchased for the minor children.\nAffirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part.\nJudges Phillips and Duncan concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "HEDRICK, Chief Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Elliot & Pishko, P.A., by David C. Pishko, for plaintiff, appellant.",
      "Morrow, Alexander, Task, Long & Black, by John F. Morrow and Clifton R. Long, Jr., for defendant, appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "BOBELLA BLALOCK GLATZ v. FRANK ROBERT GLATZ, JR.\nNo. 8917DC835\n(Filed 1 May 1990)\n1. Divorce and Alimony \u00a7 16.11 (NCI3d)\u2014 alimony \u2014 income withholding \u2014 attorney\u2019s fees\nThe trial court correctly denied plaintiff\u2019s motion for attorney\u2019s fees and expenses pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 110436.6(b) and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-13.6 because plaintiff first asserted her claim for attorney\u2019s fees in a motion filed three months after entry of the income withholding order. Language in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 110436.6(a) allowing court costs and attorney\u2019s fees to be included in the amount withheld clearly contemplates that such claims should be asserted prior to the entry of the withholding order.\nAm Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation \u00a7\u00a7 613, 614.\n2. Appeal and Error \u00a7 28.1 (NCI3d)\u2014 alimony \u2014 findings as to disposable income \u2014 no exceptions\nAlthough plaintiff questioned the trial judge\u2019s findings with regard to defendant\u2019s disposable income in her motion to amend judgment and motion for a new trial, no exceptions were noted in the record on appeal to any of the trial judge\u2019s findings on this issue and the assignment of error has no merit.\nAm Jur 2d, Appeal and Error \u00a7 558.\n3. Divorce and Alimony \u00a7 28 (NCI3d)\u2014 child support \u2014 Illinois judgment \u2014full faith and credit\nThe trial judge erred by not extending full faith and credit to an Illinois judgment by refusing to enforce automatic adjustment provisions, allowing defendant a credit against his child support obligation, and refusing to award prejudgment interest to plaintiff where the trial judge concluded that those provisions would be unenforceable under North Carolina law. The Illinois judgment was never registered in North Carolina and remained a valid and fully enforceable judgment of another state entitled to enforcement according to its terms in this state under the full faith and credit clause in the United States Constitution. U.S. Constitution Art. IV, Sec. 1.\nAm Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation \u00a7\u00a7 1102, 1103, 1130, 1131.\nAPPEAL by plaintiff from Martin (Jerry Cash), Judge. Orders entered 4 May 1989 in District Court, STOKES County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 February 1990.\nThis is a civil action wherein plaintiff seeks to have the court enter an order enforcing an Illinois judgment in which defendant agreed to pay child support to plaintiff by requiring the withholding of child support payments from defendant\u2019s income pursuant to G.S. 110-136.5.\nPlaintiff and defendant were married on 24 August 1968 in Springfield, Illinois. Two children were born of the marriage: Frank Robert Glatz, III, born 2 December 1970, and Kristen Lynn Glatz, born 25 February 1975.\nPlaintiff and defendant were granted an absolute divorce on 29 January 1979 in Sangamon County, Springfield, Illinois. In entering the divorce judgment, the Illinois court found that:\nJ. The parties have entered into an agreement concerning the question of custody, visitation and support of the minor children . .. which agreement has been presented to this Court ... it is not unconscionable and ought to receive the approval of this Court; that the separation agreement between the Petitioner and the Respondent referred to hereinabove is made a part of this Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage as set forth hereinafter.\nPursuant to the parties\u2019 separation agreement as incorporated into the Illinois divorce decree, defendant consented to pay child support to plaintiff in the amount of $300.00 per month per child for 36 months from the date of entry of the judgment, and then beginning with the 37th calendar month, to pay a base amount of $500.00 per month per child to be adjusted in relation to deviations in the average Wholesale Price Index (now called the Producer Price Index).\nOn 28 August 1987, plaintiff filed a complaint in the District Court, Forsyth County, alleging defendant to be in arrears for payment of child support and medical expenses in the amount of $116,366.65 and seeking to have the court order that $1,500.00 per month be withheld from defendant\u2019s income to pay current child support, and an additional $3,000.00 per month to be withheld and applied toward the liquidation of the arrearages. On 9 November 1988 \u201cnunc pro tunc for 18 October 1988,\u201d Judge Martin entered an order in the District Court, Stokes County, finding that \u201cthe plaintiff is entitled to an order of income withholding in the amount of... ($1,733.20) per month from the defendant, through his employer, F.R. Glatz, M.D., P.A.\u201d\nPlaintiff then filed a \u201cMotion to Amend Judgment and Motion For a New Trial\u201d pursuant to Rules 55(b) and 59 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure on 27 October 1988, contending in part that:\n1. . . . The Court failed to consider the total earnings of the defendant\u2019s professional association, F.R. Glatz, Jr., M.D.P.A., notwithstanding the fact that the defendant is the sole shareholder of said association and enjoys the full benefit of its earnings. . . .\n2. The Court\u2019s finding that the automatic adjustment provisions contained in the Illinois Judgment were unenforceable in North Carolina is contrary to applicable law.\n3. The Court\u2019s ruling that the plaintiff is not entitled to interest on each child support payment as it became due is contrary to applicable law.\nPlaintiff filed a second motion on 31 January 1989, asking the court to enter an order requiring defendant to pay her reasonable attorney\u2019s fees and expenses pursuant to G.S. 110-136.6(b) and 50-13.6.\nA hearing was conducted on 25 April 1989 to consider both motions. The court heard arguments from counsel representing both parties, but plaintiff presented no additional evidence at the hearing. Based upon the evidence presented, Judge Martin made the following pertinent findings of fact:\n(3) The evidence presented at the hearing as to the defendant\u2019s earnings and disposable income was consistent with and convincing to the Court as to the earnings and disposable income of the defendant as found by the Court in its order of November 9, 1988.\n(4) The Court\u2019s rulings and findings of fact concerning the \u201cautomatic adjustment\u201d provisions and \u201cinterest\u201d were made by the Court after extensive research by the Court and counsel for the parties and arguments by counsel as to the applicable law in the instant case; that after further argument, the Court is still convinced that its conclusions of laws applied in the order of November 9, 1988, are the appropriate laws to be \u25a0 applied in the instant case.\nJudge Martin also concluded as a matter of law that G.S. 110-136.6 does not grant plaintiff a substantive right to attorney\u2019s fees incurred at the hearing to obtain a \u201cwithholding order.\u201d\nBased upon these findings of fact and conclusions of law, Judge Martin entered orders denying both plaintiff\u2019s \u201cMotion to Amend Judgment and Motion For a New Trial\u201d under Rules 55(b) and 59 and her motion for an award of attorney\u2019s fees. Plaintiff appealed.\nElliot & Pishko, P.A., by David C. Pishko, for plaintiff, appellant.\nMorrow, Alexander, Task, Long & Black, by John F. Morrow and Clifton R. Long, Jr., for defendant, appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0324-01",
  "first_page_order": 352,
  "last_page_order": 357
}
