{ "id": 8522410, "name": "DONALD GRANTHAM, Plaintiff v. CHERRY HOSPITAL, Employer, Self-Insured, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Grantham v. Cherry Hospital", "decision_date": "1990-04-03", "docket_number": "No. 8910IC867", "first_page": "34", "last_page": "41", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "98 N.C. App. 34" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "99 S.E.2d 862", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "246 N.C. 581", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627497 ], "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/246/0581-01" ] }, { "cite": "458 So. 2d 1218", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7643108 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/458/1218-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 So. 2d 958", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9559241 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/411/0958-01" ] }, { "cite": "494 A.2d 313", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 N.J. 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J.", "case_ids": [ 1351584 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj/99/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 S.E.2d 94", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 N.C. App. 67", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526587 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/76/0067-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 S.E.2d 407", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Wells, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "408" }, { "page": "409" }, { "page": "409" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 N.C. App. 753", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525263 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Wells, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "756" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/77/0753-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 S.E.2d 157", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "270 N.C. 690", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570183 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/270/0690-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 814", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "822", "parenthetical": "Billings, J., dissenting in part" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4738158 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205-06", "parenthetical": "Billings, J., dissenting in part" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 S.E.2d 321", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561636 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0417-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 S.E.2d 204", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 206", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4778695 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0206-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-29", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 8, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 880, "char_count": 16318, "ocr_confidence": 0.701, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.549478296269856e-07, "percentile": 0.8141930282421871 }, "sha256": "8392834d41d54d1e5adcd52e94bec605a09a397128ce7ff2646b37bb61dafbc1", "simhash": "1:e9a5e247a42a677a", "word_count": 2584 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:26:07.401162+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges JOHNSON and ORR concur." ], "parties": [ "DONALD GRANTHAM, Plaintiff v. CHERRY HOSPITAL, Employer, Self-Insured, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ARNOLD, Judge.\nIn this case we must decide if N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-29 of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act authorizes the Industrial Commission to order an employer to pay an employee\u2019s common consumer debts as a \u201crehabilitative service.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-29 requires that \u201c[i]n cases of total and permanent disability, compensation, including reasonable and necessary nursing services, medicines, sick travel, medical, hospital, and other treatment or care or rehabilitative services shall be paid for by the employer during the lifetime of the injured employee\u201d (emphasis added). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-29 (Supp. 1989). (In the original statute, the word between care and rehabilitative services is \u201cof.\u201d This is a misprint. It should be \u201cor.\u201d See 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 1308, \u00a7 2. The mistake has been corrected in the statutory supplement that we cited.)\nA decision of the Industrial Commission will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. \u201cThe test for abuse of discretion is whether a decision \u2018is manifestly unsupported by reason,\u2019 or \u2018so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision\u2019 (citations omitted).\u201d Little v. Penn Ventilator Co., 317 N.C. 206, 218, 345 S.E.2d 204, 212 (1986). The purpose of the reviewing court is not to substitute its judgment in place of the decision maker, but rather to insure that the decision, in light of the factual context in which it is made, could be the product of reason. Id.\nWe recognize the general principle that the provisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act should be construed liberally so that benefits are not denied to an employee based on a narrow or strict interpretation of the statute\u2019s provisions. See Petty v. Transport, Inc., 276 N.C. 417, 173 S.E.2d 321 (1970). We also realize that this case arises in an important and dynamic area of workers\u2019 compensation law \u2014 defining the parameters of employer responsibility for employee rehabilitation. As one commentator has noted:\nIt is too obvious for argument that rehabilitation, where possible, is the most satisfactory disposition of industrial injury cases, from the point of view of the insurer, employer and public as well as of the claimant. Apart from the incalculable gain to the worker himself, the cost to insurers and employers of permanent disability claims under a properly adjusted system is reduced; and, so far as the public is concerned, it has been said on good authority that for every dollar spent on rehabilitation by the Federal Government it has received back ten in the form of income taxes on the earnings of the persons rehabilitated, (citation omitted) It is probably no exaggeration to say that in this field lies the greatest single opportunity for significant improvement in the benefits afforded by the workmen\u2019s compensation system.\nLarson, 2 Workmen\u2019s Compensation Law \u00a7 61.25 (1987). Furthermore, Mr. Grantham\u2019s request falls into one of the most controversial corners of rehabilitation compensation \u2014 providing services of a non-medical nature that somehow might be relevant to the employee\u2019s rehabilitation. See id. at \u00a7 61.13(a).\nIt may be true in this case that the most cost-effective decision would be to uphold the Commission\u2019s award. Such a determination might stave off the much more expensive possibility of placing Mr. Grantham in an inpatient rehabilitation program. Nevertheless, cost-effectiveness is not the sole goal of our Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, and as the Act is presently written, we hold that it is not a reasonable interpretation of the statute to classify the payment of consumer debt as a rehabilitative service. We believe that any other decision undermines the integrity of the Act.\nWe base our conclusion on an analysis of the structure of the Act, case law that develops the relevant provisions, and also on common sense. We simply fail to see how the term \u201cservices,\u201d in the context of medical rehabilitative services, can reasonably be read to encompass a monetary payment for basic necessities.\nFurthermore, the structure of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act indicates the decision below is incorrect. The Act provides a dual approach to employee compensation. Derebery v. Pitt County Fire Marshall, 318 N.C. 192, 205-06, 347 S.E.2d 814, 822 (1986) (Billings, J., dissenting in part). First, disability compensation, which is calculated based upon the individual employee\u2019s earning power, is provided as a substitute for the wages lost due to the injury. This compensation is the employer\u2019s contribution for items that wages ordinarily purchase \u2014 the basic necessities of life such as food, clothing and shelter. Id. The Act, however, also requires employers to compensate injured employees for medical costs related to their injuries; specifically, employers must pay a permanently disabled employee such as Mr. Grantham for \u201cnecessary nursing services, medicines, sick travel, medical, hospital, and other treatment or care or rehabilitative services . . . . \u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-29. In the case before us, we believe the Commission erroneously attempted to engraft one prong of the Act onto the other. By ordering a payment to cover the injured employee\u2019s expenses for basic necessities under the guise of \u201crehabilitative services,\u201d the Commission has turned the statute on its head.\nIn two limited situations, our Supreme Court has upheld payments under the language of \u201cother treatment or care or rehabilitative services\u201d to claimants for medically related expenses that are not listed in the statute. But neither of these cases attempts to stretch the language of the statute as far as the plaintiff here, and we see no conflict between those holdings and our decision in this case. In all, three North Carolina cases have interpreted the questioned language of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-29. In Godwin v. Swift & Co., 270 N.C. 690, 155 S.E.2d 157 (1967), the Supreme Court held that the phrase \u201cother treatment or care\u201d covered compensation to pay in-laws of a claimant who needed around-the-clock attention and care. Id.\nIn McDonald v. Brunswick Electric Membership Corp., 77 N.C. App. 753, 336 S.E.2d 407 (1985) (Wells, J., dissenting), this Court held that the statute could not be interpreted to include compensation for a specially equipped van for a wheelchair-bound claimant. The employee in McDonald sustained an employment-related injury which resulted in amputation of both of his legs and left arm. Although the employee could drive a specially adapted car that could carry a regular wheelchair, he wanted the van to transport himself and his motorized wheelchair. Claimant\u2019s employer agreed to pay for the special adaptive equipment installed in the van, but balked at paying for the van itself. Id. at 754, 336 S.E.2d at 408. At the hearing before the deputy commissioner, the employee\u2019s rehabilitation nurse testified it was important for the claimant\u2019s rehabilitation that he learn to do things independently and therefore the specially equipped van was necessary to fully rehabilitate the employee. His physician also testified that the van was an important and necessary part of his rehabilitation. The deputy commissioner concluded that the specially equipped van was a rehabilitative service within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-29 and ordered the employer to reimburse the claimant for the cost of the van itself. Id. On appeal, the Full Commission affirmed and adopted the Opinion and Award of the deputy commissioner. In reversing the Commission, we stated in McDonald:\n[Njeither the phrase \u201cother treatment or care\u201d nor the term \u201crehabilitative services\u201d in G.S. 97-29 can reasonably be interpreted to include a specially-equipped van. This language in the statute plainly refers to services or treatment, rather than tangible, non-medieally related items such as van; thus, it would be contrary to the ordinary meaning of the statute to hold that it includes the van purchased by plaintiff.\nMcDonald, at 756-57, 336 S.E.2d at 409. Our decision in McDonald, which follows the majority rule in this country, was not appealed.\nIn McDonald, we relied in part on another Court of Appeals decision, the third case in our jurisdiction to interpret this section of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-29, Derebery v. Pitt County Fire Marshall, 76 N.C. App. 67, 332 S.E.2d 94 (1985). In Derebery, this Court held that an employer\u2019s statutory duty to provide \u201cother treatment or care\u201d did not extend to furnishing a wheelchair-accessible mobile home for an injured employee. However, with three justices dissenting, the Supreme Court overturned that opinion and ordered the employer to pay for the residence. Derebery, 318 N.C. 192, 347 S.E.2d 814; accord Squeo v. Comfort Control Corp., 99 N.J. 588, 494 A.2d 313 (1985). Nevertheless, Derebery does not control on the facts before us, and we believe that the holding of the Industrial Commission in this case strays far beyond the boundaries of the statute as outlined by Derebery and Godwin.\nWhether or not specially adaptive vehicles and wheelchair-accessible housing are compensable under the statute are debatable issues, as the four dissents in Derebery and McDonald indicate. We can see a strong nexus between the words \u201cother treatment or care or rehabilitative service\u201d and requiring adaptive vehicles and housing for wheelchair-bound persons. The connection between that language and paying compensation for consumer debt, on the other hand, is much more tenuous, and we believe not reasonable.\nA survey of holdings from other jurisdictions reinforces our determination here. To our knowledge no other court has come close to holding that \u201crehabilitative services\u201d could encompass consumer debt. The outer limits of this concept are much narrower than the plaintiff before us argues. The Florida Court of Appeals, which has been one of the most generous courts in interpreting the scope of medical services, ordered an employer to pay the nursery school costs for the child of a woman who had to spend much of the day in traction. Doctors Hosp. of Lake Worth v. Robinson, 411 So. 2d 958 (1982). The court cautioned, however, that child care expenses would not be construed as a medical necessity in cases involving \u201cless extreme\u201d circumstances. Id. Even Florida, however, refused to provide compensation for paying workplace assistants to perform the part of a job that a claimant was unable to do because of her work-induced disability. Ulmer v. Jon David Coiffures, 458 So. 2d 1218 (1984). The court recognized that under certain circumstances medical allowances had been made for vehicles, pools, child care and the like, but that no cases authorized compensation for the cost of aid in performing the job functions of a disabled worker. Id.\nOne purpose of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act is to insure a limited and determinate liability for employers. To this end, courts must not legislate expanded liability under the guise of construing a statute liberally. McDonald, 77 N.C. App. at 756, 336 S.E.2d at 409. While the Act should be liberally construed to benefit the employee, the plain and unmistakable language of the statute must be followed. Hardy v. Small, 246 N.C. 581, 99 S.E.2d 862 (1957). We do not believe that the'General Assembly intended to include compensation for an employee\u2019s consumer debt within the meaning of \u201crehabilitative services.\u201d The Industrial Commission, therefore, was without authority to require the defendant to bear that responsibility. Accordingly, we reverse the opinion and award below.\nReversed.\nJudges JOHNSON and ORR concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "ARNOLD, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "James T. Bryan, III, for employee-appellee.", "Attorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney General Victor H. E. Morgan, Jr., for the appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DONALD GRANTHAM, Plaintiff v. CHERRY HOSPITAL, Employer, Self-Insured, Defendant\nNo. 8910IC867\n(Filed 3 April 1990)\nMaster and Servant \u00a7 69 (NCI3d)\u2014 workers\u2019 compensation \u2014 payment of consumer debt not rehabilitative service\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-29 of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act does not authorize the Industrial Commission to order an employer to pay a totally disabled employee\u2019s common consumer debts as a \u201crehabilitative service.\u201d\nAm Jur 2d, Workmen\u2019s Compensation \u00a7\u00a7 340, 363.\nAPPEAL by defendant from award filed on 1 June 1989 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals on 6 March 1990.\nThis workers\u2019 compensation case was first tried on 3 March 1988 with Deputy Commissioner Richard B. Ford presiding. An opinion and award for the plaintiff were filed on 24 August 1988. Defendant appealed in timely fashion to the Full Commission, which affirmed and adopted as its own the deputy commissioner\u2019s opinion and award with one commissioner dissenting. Defendant appealed to this court.\nIt is undisputed that on 25 November 1984 Donald Grantham suffered a closed-head injury, an accident that arose out of and occurred in the course of his employment with Cherry Hospital. Mr. Grantham is now permanently and totally disabled from his injuries. He suffers from expressive dysphasia (extreme difficulty in speaking), hemiparesis (weakness) of his upper and lower right extremities, attention and memory lapses, depression and \u201cpersistent cognitive, psychological and behavioral difficulties.\u201d\nThe plaintiff claims that prior to his injury he worked two jobs, and that as a result of his injury and disability, his and his wife\u2019s combined income fell for over two years by nearly $1,100 a month. Mr. Grantham did not begin receiving disability retirement income until December 1987. The record indicates that as a consequence of his injuries, certain family debts were incurred totaling $27,865.07. These debts were as follows:\n1. Wayne Oil Company $969.69\n2. Wayne County Tax Collector\u2019s Office $267.80\n3. Howard Brothers Food $83.87\n4. Heilig-Meyers (furniture) $3,469.00\n5. State Employee\u2019s Credit Unit $16,592.82\n6. Musgrave Tire and Gas $428.30\n7. Pate\u2019s Service Station and Garage $533.59\n8. Babysitter (138 wks. @ $40/wk) $5,520.00\nTOTAL $27,865.07\nNone of this debt involved medical expenses attributable to the plaintiff\u2019s injuries.\nIt is also clear from the record that through his own highly commendable efforts and the work of his neuropsychiatrist, Dr. Thomas Gualtieri, Mr. Grantham has begun to rehabilitate himself. These efforts at self-help probably have saved the State of North Carolina the expense of placing Mr. Grantham in a rehabilitation residence, which could cost as much as $30,000 a month. The doctors who treated Mr. Grantham immediately after his injury recommended his placement in an inpatient unit.\nAt the hearing before the deputy commissioner, Dr. Gualtieri testified that payment of the debts and relief from the burden and worry of the indebtedness would be \u201cthe best thing for Donald\u2019s rehabilitation that we could do.\u201d The debt and resulting depression were interfering with Mr. Grantham\u2019s rehabilitation, Dr. Gualtieri said.\nAfter the hearing, Deputy Commissioner Ford made the following findings and conclusions of law:\n9. The Plaintiff, as of the date of the hearing on March 3, 1988 had incurred a family indebtedness of $27,865.07 as the result of his injury, his inability to earn income and the mental, psychological and physical disabilities which he suffers.\n10. This indebtedness is of great concern to the Plaintiff, causes him stress, and effects his mental and emotional well-being and is efficient in preventing his recovery from the mental and psychological depression and illness from which he suffers as a result of the injury on November 24, 1984.\n12. While there is no cure for the Plaintiff\u2019s physical condition, the payment of his indebtedness will tend to effect a cure and give him relief from the mental and emotional depression and illness from which he suffers as a result of this injury on November 25, 1984 and the resulting indebtedness; and is a reasonable and necessary rehabilitative service and care for the Plaintiffs wellbeing.\n14. Further the Plaintiff is entitled to be relieved from the indebtedness ... in an amount not to exceed $27,865.07 as a rehabilitation service which may reasonably be required to effect ... a cure or give the Plaintiff relief from the injury related psychological and emotional problems caused by the brain damage resulting from the injury occurring on November 25, 1984.\nJames T. Bryan, III, for employee-appellee.\nAttorney General Lacy H. Thornburg, by Assistant Attorney General Victor H. E. Morgan, Jr., for the appellant." }, "file_name": "0034-01", "first_page_order": 62, "last_page_order": 69 }