{ "id": 8524368, "name": "CHERRY BEKAERT & HOLLAND, a North Carolina General Partnership v. J. CHARLES BROWN", "name_abbreviation": "Cherry Bekaert & Holland v. Brown", "decision_date": "1990-08-07", "docket_number": "No. 8926SC1074", "first_page": "626", "last_page": "635", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "99 N.C. App. 626" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "330 S.E.2d 612", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 604", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4726019, 4722090, 4724332, 4725677, 4720721 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0604-05", "/nc/313/0604-03", "/nc/313/0604-02", "/nc/313/0604-01", "/nc/313/0604-04" ] }, { "cite": "325 S.E.2d 300", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "304", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 N.C. App. 585", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527242 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "589", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/72/0585-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 S.E.2d 629", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 674", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558922 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "678" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0674-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 S.E.2d 663", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "665" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4724089 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "477" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "273 S.E.2d 513", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "516", "parenthetical": "defendant's participation in management of a resident business entity is a factor that shows that defendant's contacts with the forum state are continuous, purposeful and systematic" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "50 N.C. App. 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 2672949 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278", "parenthetical": "defendant's participation in management of a resident business entity is a factor that shows that defendant's contacts with the forum state are continuous, purposeful and systematic" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/50/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 S.E.2d 807", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "810", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.C. App. 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8357856 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "110", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/88/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 S.E.2d 737", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "741" }, { "page": "743", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "742" }, { "page": "743" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 N.C. App. 577", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526715 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "583" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/69/0577-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 S.E.2d 670", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "672" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 N.C. App. 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522364 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/60/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "444 U.S. 286", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11306135 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297" }, { "page": "501" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/444/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "3 L.Ed.2d 92", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 U.S. 858", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3656298 ], "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/358/0858-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 U.S. 235", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6162253 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" }, { "page": "1298" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/357/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "390 S.E.2d 137", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5304465 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0480-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 S.E.2d 156", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 N.C. App. 619", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527673 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "624", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/94/0619-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 S.E.2d 260", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "within the meaning of the long-arm statute, a money payment is a 'thing of value'" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 N.C. App. 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553662 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "within the meaning of the long-arm statute, a money payment is a 'thing of value'" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/38/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 S.E.2d 177", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "181", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 N.C. App. 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12169981 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "424", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/85/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 S.E.2d 782", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "785", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "786", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "785, 786" }, { "page": "787" }, { "parenthetical": "taking judicial notice that \"textile manufacturing is an important industry in North Carolina, giving North Carolina a special interest in [the] litigation\"" }, { "page": "787" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4734507 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "390 S.E.2d 766", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "767" }, { "page": "769", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 N.C. App. 299", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524153 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/98/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 S.E.2d 167", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169" }, { "page": "289-90" }, { "page": "169" }, { "page": "169" }, { "page": "171" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 N.C. App. 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527039 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "289" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/94/0286-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 960, "char_count": 22584, "ocr_confidence": 0.773, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.485855540187738e-07, "percentile": 0.8820083719166638 }, "sha256": "b63c17c364967e1f1b0123f8e04cccff00cfac85554e1ae802828a312296d2d6", "simhash": "1:39ad45f3146eb478", "word_count": 3474 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:38:52.620321+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WELLS and EAGLES concur." ], "parties": [ "CHERRY BEKAERT & HOLLAND, a North Carolina General Partnership v. J. CHARLES BROWN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GREENE, Judge.\nDefendant appeals the trial court\u2019s denial of his Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s breach of contract suit for lack of personal jurisdiction.\nThe record shows that defendant J. Charles Brown is a certified public accountant who now resides in Alabama. Plaintiff Cherry, Bekaert & Holland is a North Carolina partnership of certified public accountants with its principal place of business in Charlotte, North Carolina, since approximately 1974. Plaintiff first employed defendant in 1975 as a salaried accountant in Goldsboro, North Carolina. Defendant moved to plaintiff\u2019s Alabama office in 1977, where he drew a salary until 1979. In 1979, defendant became an \u201cincome partner\u201d with plaintiff partnership and in 1981, became an \u201cequity partner.\u201d Defendant signed the \u201cequity partner\u201d agreement on 9 January 1981, in Mobile, Alabama, and plaintiff\u2019s managing partner accepted and signed the agreement on behalf of the partnership on 14 January 1981, in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. The \u201cequity partnership\u201d agreement provided in pertinent part:\n15.7 . . . The withdrawing or expelled Partner\u2019s cash basis capital account shall be paid to him within ninety (90) days following the effective date of withdrawal or expulsion.\n15.9 . . . said withdrawing or expelled Partner shall pay to the Partnership, for the purchase of any client served . . . by said Partner within a three[-] (3) year period following the termination of his relationship with the Partnership, an amount not less than one hundred and fifty percent (150%) of the fees charged said client by the Partnership during the last twelvef-] (12) month period during which the Partnership served said client prior to said client being served by the said Partner plus an amount representing the excess, if any, of the fees charged by the said Partner for the twelve[-] (12) month period commencing with the time said Partner first served said client over the fees charged by the Partnership referred to above.\n18.1 This agreement is made in Charlotte, North Carolina, and its validity, construction and effect shall be governed by and construed under the laws of the State of North Carolina.\nDefendant gave notice that he was resigning from plaintiff\u2019s partnership effective 31 December 1987. After defendant\u2019s resignation from the partnership, he received his interest in the capital account from the partnership. Defendant continued to advise plaintiff\u2019s clients after his withdrawal from the partnership, and pursuant to section 15.9 of the partnership agreement plaintiff seeks monetary damages from defendant \u201cfor each client [defendant] serves within a three[-] (3) year period following his withdrawal from [plaintiff], an amount not less than one hundred fifty percent (150%) of the fees charged to the client by [plaintiff] during the last twelve (12) months during which [plaintiff] served with client.\u201d Defendant was personally served with process in Mobile, Alabama, and moved to dismiss this complaint in North Carolina according to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(2) (1983).\nIn summary form, the evidence adduced at the hearing of defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss indicates that during defendant\u2019s relationship with plaintiff partnership, the partnership held meetings which defendant attended in Charlotte, North Carolina. The North Carolina Association of Certified Public Accountants listed defendant as a \u201cnon-resident\u201d accountant and he paid dues to the North Carolina Association based on his nonresident status. Defendant maintained a public accounting license in the State of North Carolina as well as in the State of Alabama. Defendant provided accounting and tax services to some clients in North Carolina from his office in Alabama. He regularly received his \u201cbase-draw and his year-end draw\u201d from plaintiff\u2019s earnings and profits, which were distributed from funds deposited in a North Carolina bank. Plaintiff\u2019s payments of these funds were regularly processed out of plaintiff\u2019s computer center located in Gastonia, North Carolina, and mailed to defendant in Alabama. As a partner in the partnership, defendant traveled to North Carolina \u201cfrom time to time\u201d to report on the progress of the Mobile, Alabama, office, was involved in telephone conference calls from Alabama with other partners or employees of plaintiff in Charlotte, North Carolina, and regularly corresponded with the Charlotte office \u201cregarding the management and administrative concerns\u201d of plaintiff. In denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, the trial court entered an order which provided in pertinent part:\nIt Appearing to the Court from the facts set forth in the Motion of the defendant, and in the opposition papers filed by the plaintiffs[,] including the affidavits and exhibits attached thereto and the pleadings and papers filed herein, that the defendant\u2019s . . . [motion] should be denied . . .\nThe issues are whether the trial court should have denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction because (I) statutory \u201clong-arm\u201d jurisdiction (A) did not exist since defendant did not order or direct plaintiff to send him from North Carolina a \u2018thing of value\u2019 and (B) plaintiff\u2019s action does not relate to the \u2018thing of value\u2019 sent from North Carolina; and (II) defendant did not have the required minimum contacts with North Carolina.\nAlthough neither party states the basis for jurisdiction of this appeal, we note that \u201c[a]ny interested party shall have the right of immediate appeal from an adverse ruling as to the jurisdiction of the court over the person or property of the defendant . . .\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-277(b) (1983).\nWe make a two-part inquiry to determine whether in personam jurisdiction exists. Tompkins v. Tompkins, 98 N.C. App. 299, 301, 390 S.E.2d 766, 767 (1990). \u201cFirst, the transaction must fall within the language of the State\u2019s \u2018long arm\u2019 statute. Second, the exercise of jurisdiction must not violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment\" to the United States Constitution.\u201d Tom Togs, Inc. v. Ben Elias Industries Corp., 318 N.C. 361, 364, 348 S.E.2d 782, 785 (1986) (citation omitted). \u201c[When] jurisdiction is challenged, plaintiff has the burden of proving prima facie that a statutory-basis for jurisdiction exists.\u201d Williams v. Institute for Computational Studies, 85 N.C. App. 421, 424, 355 S.E.2d 177, 179 (1987) (citation omitted). \u201c[T]he failure to plead the particulars of personal jurisdiction is not necessarily fatal, so long as the facts alleged permit the reasonable inference that jurisdiction may be acquired.\u201d Tompkins, at 304, 390 S.E.2d at 769 (citation omitted).\nWe note that the trial court did not make any findings of fact to support his ruling denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss. However, when there is no request of the trial court to make such findings, \u201cwe presume that the judge found facts sufficient to support the judgment. . . .\u201d Church v. Carter, 94 N.C. App. 286, 289, 380 S.E.2d 167, 169 (1989). \u201c[If the] presumed findings are supported by competent evidence in the record, [they] are conclusive on appeal, notwithstanding other evidence in the record to the contrary.\u201d Id., at 289-90, 380 S.E.2d at 169.\nI\nLong-Arm Statute\nA court has jurisdiction over a person:\nserved in an action pursuant to Rule 4(j) or Rule 4(jl) of the Rules of Civil Procedure under any of the following circumstances: ... (5) Local Services, Goods or Contracts. \u2014 In any action which: . . . d. Relates to goods, documents of title, or other things of value shipped from this State by the plaintiff to defendant on his order or direction ...\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-75.4 (1983).\nA\nDefendant concedes that he received \u2018a thing of value,\u2019 money, while in Alabama and that the money came from plaintiff\u2019s checking account in North Carolina. See Pope v. Pope, 38 N.C. App. 328, 248 S.E.2d 260 (1978) (within the meaning of the long-arm statute, a money payment is a \u2018thing of value\u2019). However, defendant contends that plaintiff \u201ccould have maintained checking accounts in each of its many locales, [but t]here is no showing that [plaintiff] chose instead to process those checks [from North Carolina] because of any \u2018order or direction\u2019 [by defendant].\u201d We disagree.\nRecord evidence shows that when defendant withdrew from partnership, demanding payment of the sums, plaintiff actually paid such sums to defendant from its North Carolina account, facts which fulfill the statutory requirements for long-arm jurisdiction. Defendant argues a strict interpretation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 l-75.4(5)(d) which would require personal jurisdiction only if defendant\u2019s \u2018order or direction\u2019 specifies that plaintiff ship from this state a thing of value. Defendant\u2019s argument is untenable in light of our courts\u2019 policy of liberally and broadly construing statutory jurisdictional requirements in favor of finding personal jurisdiction. See Church, at 290, 380 S.E.2d at 169. Because defendant directed plaintiff to send his monies to him in Alabama and plaintiff distributed the money from North Carolina, the money paid is \u2018shipped from this State by the plaintiff to defendant on his order or direction.\u2019\nB\nDefendant also argues that long-arm jurisdiction does not exist because this action does not \u201crelate\u201d to plaintiff\u2019s payments to defendant of his monthly and yearly draws from the earnings and profits of the partnership and to the distribution by plaintiff to defendant of his capital account. We disagree.\nAdmittedly, this action for breach of contract does not \u201carise out of\u201d any dispute regarding payment by plaintiff to defendant of his monthly draws and his capital account, as these terms are used in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-75.4(5)(a-c) and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-75.4(6). There is no present controversy relating to these previous payments. However, both the present controversy and plaintiff\u2019s previous payments to defendant arise from a single contract into which these parties entered, and liberally construed, the present controversy is sufficiently related to the previous payments \u2018shipped from this State by the plaintiff to the defendant on his order or direction\u2019 to merit long-arm jurisdiction.\nII\nDue Process Requirements\nDefendant contends that while he did have contact with North Carolina, the contacts are so attenuated that maintaining the suit offends traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. We disagree.\nTo satisfy the requirements of the due process clause, there must exist \u201ccertain minimum contacts [between the non-resident defendant and the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend \u2018traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. . . \u201d In each case, there must be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its law . . . This relationship between the defendant and the forum must be \u201csuch that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.\u201d\nTom Togs, Inc., at 365, 348 S.E.2d at 786 (citations omitted). The forum state may exercise jurisdiction over a defendant if there are \u201csufficient \u2018continuous and systematic\u2019 contacts between the defendant and the forum state.\u201d Williams, at 427, 355 S.E.2d at 181 (citation omitted).\nFactors for determining existence of minimum contacts include \u201c \u2018(1) quantity of the contacts, (2) nature and quality of the contacts, (3) the source and connection of the cause of action to the contacts, (4) the interest of the forum state, and (5) convenience to the parties.\u2019 \u201d New Bern Pool & Supply Co. v. Graubart, 94 N.C. App. 619, 624, 381 S.E.2d 156, 159, affirmed per curiam, 326 N.C. 480, 390 S.E.2d 137 (1990) (citations omitted). In each case, it is essential that defendant purposely act to avail himself of \u201cthe privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the protections and benefits of its laws.\u201d Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283, 1298, reh\u2019g denied, 358 U.S. 858, 3 L.Ed.2d 92 (1958). Additionally, defendant\u2019s contacts with the forum state must be such that he or she \u201cshould reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.\u201d World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 62 L.Ed.2d 490, 501 (1980).\nDefendant\u2019s contacts with North Carolina are numerous and more than adequate for jurisdictional purposes, as set out below.\nFirst, the parties\u2019 execution of and conduct of business pursuant to a North Carolina partnership contract is sufficient for in personam jurisdiction.\n\u201c[A] single contract may be a sufficient basis for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction if it has a substantial connection with this state . . . [and] [u]nder North Carolina law, a contract is made in the place where the last act necessary to make it binding occurred.\u201d Tom Togs, Inc., at 365, 367, 348 S.E.2d at 785, 786. A \u2018substantial connection\u2019 occurs when the parties have a \u201clong[-] standing agreement\u201d whose \u201cpayment arrangements\u201d include the transfer of funds between the nonresident and the forum state. Park v. Sleepy Creek Turkeys, Inc., 60 N.C. App. 545, 549, 299 S.E.2d 670, 672 (1983). \u201c[A] continuing contractual business relationship, not one or two isolated transactions,\u201d is sufficient to establish in personam jurisdiction. Harrelson Rubber Co. v. Layne, 69 N.C. App. 577, 583, 317 S.E.2d 737, 741 (1984).\nHere, the parties entered into the partnership agreement executed in North Carolina, which has a substantial connection to this state because the agreement existed for several years, pursuant to which plaintiff transferred funds to defendant. Defendant received monthly and annual disbursements of earnings as well as his share of capital assets from North Carolina.\nSecond, defendant purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting business in this state. Entering into a contract made in this state which has a substantial connection with this state constitutes a defendant\u2019s purposeful act in availing himself of the privilege of conducting activities in North Carolina. Tom Togs, Inc., at 367, 348 S.E.2d at 787. Defendant\u2019s affirmative efforts to obtain and renew a certified public accountant\u2019s license from North Carolina and using the license to provide accounting services for North Carolina residents show defendant\u2019s purposeful acts obtaining and using this privilege.\nThird, North Carolina has a specific interest in exercising personal jurisdiction over defendant to determine whether his actions damaged plaintiff.\n\u201c[A] state has a \u2018manifest interest\u2019 in providing its residents with a convenient forum for redressing injuries inflicted by out-of-state actors.\u201d Id. (taking judicial notice that \u201ctextile manufacturing is an important industry in North Carolina, giving North Carolina a special interest in [the] litigation\u201d). When the state takes a \u2018special interest\u2019 in a particular subject of litigation, \u201cNorth Carolina law would be the law to be applied.\u201d Id., at 368, 348 S.E.2d at 787.\n\u2018North Carolina has a legitimate interest in the establishment and operation of enterprises and trade within its borders and the protection of its residents in the making of contracts with persons and agents who enter the state for that purpose.\u2019\nHarrelson Rubber Co., at 586, 317 S.E.2d at 743 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). An \u201centerprise\u201d is \u201c[a] venture or undertaking^] especially one involving financial commitment.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 476 (5th ed. 1976) (emphasis added). \u201cA partnership is a combination of two or more persons, their property, labor, or skill in a common business or venture under an agreement to share profits or losses, [in which] each party is an agent to the other and the business. G.R. Little Agency, Inc. v. Jennings, 88 N.C. App. 107, 110, 362 S.E.2d 807, 810 (1987) (emphasis added); N.C.G.S. \u00a7 59-36 (1989). North Carolina regulates the practice of certified public accounting in N.C.G.S. Chapter 93, \u00a7\u00a7 93-1 \u2014 13 (1985), and partnerships in the Uniform Partnership Act, N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 59-31-59-73 (1989).\nDefendant voluntarily associated with a business venture whose primary place of business is North Carolina, to derive profitable business from North Carolina, and participated in the venture by serving Alabama and North Carolina clients.\nFourth, defendant had a quantity of other \u2018systematic and continuous\u2019 contacts with North Carolina sufficient to show general jurisdiction. Johnston v. Gilley, 50 N.C. App. 274, 278, 273 S.E.2d 513, 516 (1981) (defendant\u2019s participation in management of a resident business entity is a factor that shows that defendant\u2019s contacts with the forum state are continuous, purposeful and systematic). Defendant returned to North Carolina for yearly corporate meetings, participated in partnership management decisions as managing partner of the Mobile office, consulted by telephone and corresponded with plaintiff in North Carolina concerning business matters on a continuous and prolonged basis. Each of these circumstances also illustrates that defendant sought, obtained and exercised the \u2018privilege of conducting activities in this state.\u2019\nFifth, defendant received benefits from the partnership contract, and could have enforced the contract against plaintiff in North Carolina courts. If defendant derives benefits from the agreement and could have enforced the agreement in forum courts, personal jurisdiction is proper. Harrelson Rubber Co., at 585, 317 S.E.2d at 742.\nSixth, location of witnesses and evidence in North Carolina does not suggest that defendant will be unfairly inconvenienced by litigating this claim in North Carolina.\n\u201cLitigation on interstate business transactions inevitably involves inconvenience to one of the parties.\u201d Id., at 587, 317 S.E.2d at 743. When \u201c[t]he inconvenience to defendant of litigating in North Carolina is no greater than would be the inconvenience of plaintiff of litigating in [defendant\u2019s state] ... no convenience factors ... are determinative of the jurisdictional issue.\u201d Id. \u201c[T]he location of crucial witnesses and material evidence . . . [are prohibitive concerns against granting jurisdiction in the forum state, but if nothing in the record] necessitates litigating this action in [defendant\u2019s home state there is] no untoward inconvenience on defendant. . . .\u201d Church, at 293, 380 S.E.2d at 171.\nFinally, defendant could reasonably foresee that partnership agreement disputes between plaintiff and him would be resolved in North Carolina courts, and it is fair to each party to resolve them in North Carolina.\nThe \u201ccrucial\u201d foreseeability of being subject to litigation in the forum court is whether defendant could reasonably anticipate being haled into court. Miller v. Kite, 313 N.C. 474, 477, 329 S.E.2d 663, 665 (1985). \u201cIn making this determination, the interests of, and fairness to, both the plaintiff and the defendant must be considered and weighed.\u201d Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp., 291 N.C. 674, 678, 231 S.E.2d 629, 632 (1977).\nA factor in determining fairness concerning a breach of contract cause of action is whether the contract expressly provides that the law of the forum state would apply to actions arising out of the contract. See Marion v. Long, 72 N.C. App. 585, 589, 325 S.E.2d 300, 304, review denied, appeal dismissed, 313 N.C. 604, 330 S.E.2d 612 (1985) (citation omitted). This partnership agreement specifically provides that North Carolina law governs the agreement.\nIn summary, we determine that competent record evidence supports the necessary presumed findings of fact sufficient to warrant the trial judge\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.\nAffirmed.\nJudges WELLS and EAGLES concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "GREENE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Parker, Poe, Thompson, Bernstein, Gage & Preston, by Irvin W. Hankins III and Frank A. Hirsch, Jr., for plaintiff-appellee.", "Moore & Van Allen, by Randel E. Phillips and Sharon L. Moylan, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CHERRY BEKAERT & HOLLAND, a North Carolina General Partnership v. J. CHARLES BROWN\nNo. 8926SC1074\n(Filed 7 August 1990)\n1. Process \u00a7 9 (NCI3d)\u2014 nonresident individual \u2014 monies sent from N.C. to defendant \u2014long-arm statute applicable\nBecause defendant, who withdrew from plaintiff partnership, directed plaintiff to send his monies to him in Alabama, and plaintiff distributed the money from N.C., the money paid was \u201cshipped from this State by the plaintiff to defendant on his order or direction\u201d within the meaning of the long-arm statute, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 l-75.4(5)(d); moreover, the present controversy over amounts owed by defendant to plaintiff for advising plaintiff\u2019s clients after defendant withdrew from the partnership was sufficiently related to previous payments by plaintiff in N.C. to defendant for his monthly draws and his capital account to merit long-arm jurisdiction.\nAm Jur 2d, Process \u00a7\u00a7 175, 178, 185.\n2. Process \u00a7 9.1 (NCI3d)\u2014 nonresident defendant \u2014 sufficiency of contacts with N.C. \u2014exercise of in personam jurisdiction proper\nDefendant\u2019s contacts with N.C. were sufficient to allow in personam jurisdiction over him in this breach of contract action where the parties executed and conducted business pursuant to an N.C. partnership contract; the agreement existed for several years; pursuant to the agreement defendant received monthly and annual disbursements of earnings as well as his share of capital assets from N.C.; defendant obtained and renewed a CPA license from N.C. and used the license to provide accounting services for N.C. residents; defendant voluntarily associated with a business venture, whose primary place of business was N.C., to derive profitable business from N.C. and participated in the venture by serving Alabama and N.C. clients; N.C. thus had a specific interest in exercising personal jurisdiction over defendant to determine whether his actions damaged plaintiff; defendant returned to N.C. for yearly corporate meetings, participated in partnership management decisions as managing partner of the Mobile office, and consulted by telephone and corresponded with plaintiff in N.C. concerning business matters on a continuous and prolonged basis; defendant received benefits from the partnership contract and could have enforced the contract against plaintiff in N.C. courts; and location of witnesses and evidence in N.C. did not suggest that defendant would be unfairly inconvenienced by litigating this claim in N.C.\nAm Jur 2d, Process \u00a7\u00a7 186-190.\nAPPEAL by defendant from order entered 2 August 1989 by Judge Frank W. Snepp, Jr. in MECKLENBURG County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 April 1990.\nParker, Poe, Thompson, Bernstein, Gage & Preston, by Irvin W. Hankins III and Frank A. Hirsch, Jr., for plaintiff-appellee.\nMoore & Van Allen, by Randel E. Phillips and Sharon L. Moylan, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0626-01", "first_page_order": 656, "last_page_order": 665 }