{
  "id": 8650045,
  "name": "THE STATE v. ALEXANDER CAMPBELL",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Campbell",
  "decision_date": "1889-02",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "344",
  "last_page": "348",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "103 N.C. 344"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "7 Phila., 2",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Phila.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    }
  ],
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:40:09.785450+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE STATE v. ALEXANDER CAMPBELL."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Merrimon, J.\n(after stating the case). The defendant is not indicted for the common law offence of larceny, but for larceny as prescribed by the statute ( The Code, \u00a7 1064), which, among other things, declares that, \u201cif any person shall feloniously steal, take and carry away, or take by robbery, * * * any order, bill of exchange, promissory note, or other obligation, either for the payment of money or for the delivery of specific articles, being the property of any other person, or of any corporation (notwithstanding any of the said particulars may be termed in law a chose in action), such felonious stealing, taking and carrying away, or taking by robbery, shall be felony of the same nature and degree, and in the same manner, as it would have been if the offender had feloniously stolen, or taken by robbery, money, goods or property of any value, and such offender for any such offence shall suffer,\u201d &c. The dioses in action, thus made the subjects of larceny, are not deemed such subjects at the common law. They are very important instrumentalities, employed constantly in trade and commerce, and are valuable as species of property to the owners of them. They are susceptible of being stolen easily, and such things, as in the absence of protection of them against larceny by the principles of the common law, require to be so protected by criminal enactments. Hence, the statutory provision partly recited above. They are regarded and treated as certain written evidence of valuable and useful orders, promises or obligations to pay money, or for the delivery of specific arti--, c\u00edes ; they are valuable and useful as such evidence, and, for the purposes of the statute cited, have no other property or quality of value; however, the paper or other thing on which they may be written might possibly be treated as bits of personal property of trifling value, and, therefore, the subject of larceny at common law. Indeed, in cases similar to the present one, it has been not uncommon, as a measure of caution, to put two or more count's in the indictment, charging-in the first one the larceny of a note, bond or other thing mentioned in the statute, and also, in a second one, the larceny of the paper on which they were written. State v. Banks, Phil., 577 ; Whar. Cr. Law, \u00a7\u00a7 349, 350, 1759, 1838; Rex v. Vyse, 1 Moody, 218.\nWhen, however, the indictment charges the larceny of one of the several species of choses in action specified in the statute, and there is no count for larceny at common law, as suggested, the State, must prove the larceny of the chose in action as charged, else the prosecution must fail, because the charge is, not for the larceny merely of a piece of paper on which the note or other thing is written, but of the valuable written evidence of the chose in actmn as charged and as designated in the statute. It is the latter embodied and evidenced by the writing that is charged to have been stolen. It would-not comport with just and settled criminal procedure to indict a person for the larceny of a promissory note, and allow him to be convicted upon such charge of stealing a piece of paper. Stealing the latter, if an offence at all, is a common law offence, and essentially different from ihe statutory offence of stealing a promissory note. The former is not necessarily a part of, or embraced by, the latter. The note might be written on parchment, linen, silk or cotton cloth, or the like. Neither principle nor statutory provision requires promissory notes and like things to be written on paper, though ordinarily, for the greater convenience, they are so written.\nThe defendant is charged with the larceny of a \u201c due-bill,\u201d and he contends that it is not within the terms or meaning of the statute which, by its terms, embraces any order, bill of exchange, bond, promissory note, or other obligation,\u201d &c. A \u201cdue-bill\u201d is really a simple acknowledgment by the maker thereof of a debt due to the person named in it, without any promise therein to pay the same, and such an acknowledgment is not a promissory note, nor negotiable by indorsement. It might be such note if it contained words of promise. Story on Prom. Notes, \u00a7 14, and note; Chit, on Bills, 129, 526 (12 Am. Ed.).\nThe \u201cdue-bill\u201d charged to have been stolen is not specified with as much precision and fullness as it should have been. We must take it to be simply a \u201c due-bill,\u201d and, therefore, it does not come within the meaning of the words \u201c any order, bill of exchange, bond, promissory note;\u201d but we think it is embraced by the other words, \u201c or other obligation.\u201d The word obligation, in its most technical meaning, implies, ram termini, a sealed instrument; but it certainly has, also, a very broad and comprehensive legal signification, and embraces all instruments in writing, however informal, whereby one party contracts with another \u201cfor the payment of money, or for the delivery of specified articles,\u201d whether the same be under seal or not. The words, \u201cor other obligation,\u201d are used in a remedial and comprehensive sense, as appears from the purpose of the statute, and the enumeration of the several classes of obligations made the subject of larceny by it \u2014 they imply like or similar obligations \u2014 some under seal, and others not. A \u201cdue-bill\u201d is evidence of an obligation to pay money; the maker, by it, acknowledges the indebtedness, and the law implies and raises the obligation to pay it. Plence, it is the subject of larceny as prescribed by the statute.\nThe defendant further contended that the evidence in connection with the \u201cdue-bill,\u201d put in evidence on the trial, went directly to prove that it had been paid and absolutely discharged; that it was, therefore, without force or value, and not the subject of larceny. There was evidence that it had been so paid, but the Court declined to give the instruction asked for by the defendant, and instructed the jury that \u201c if the defendant took the due-bill with a felonious intent, notwithstanding it had been paid off and taken up, the defendant would be guilty.\u201d This is assigned as error.\nWe think the Court should have given the instruction asked for or the substance of it. The \u201c due-bill,\u201d such as we must take that charged in the indictment to have been, was not negotiable by indorsement; the evidence went to prove\u2014 indeed, it was not denied \u2014 that it had been paid. It. had therefore ceased to have force or effect as an obligation, it was no longer an obligation such as contemplated by the statute, it no longer had any value as such, and, therefore, it was not within the purpose of the statute, nor the subject of larceny, as a \u201c due-bill \u201d or an \u201c obligation.\u201d It may be that, if the indictment had contained a count for larceny at common law of the paper on which.the \u201c due-bill \u201d was written, the defendant might, upon the evidence, have been properly convicted; but it contained no such count, and we do not decide that it could or could not. Whar. Cr. Law, \u00a7 1749 ; Ros. Cr. Law, 624 (4 Am. Ed.); Rex, 7 Phila., 2; Leach\u2019s Cr. Com., 673; Reginav. Mumps, 88 Eng. Com. Law, 148.\nThis case is very different from a class of cases cited and commented upon by the Attorney General, in which the promissory notes or other instruments charged to have been stolen had been taken up in the course of business, and might be reissued, or put in circulation again, and used from time to time. In all such cases, the promissory note, or other obligation, had not become extinct, and had not lost its value for the purposes contemplated by it.\nThere is error. The defendant is entitled to a new trial, and we so adjudge.\nError. New trial.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Merrimon, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "The Attorney General, for the State.",
      "Mr. A. E. Holton, for the defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE STATE v. ALEXANDER CAMPBELL.\nLarceny of \u201c Due-Bill,,\u201d under \u00a7 1064 of The Code \u2014 Indictment.\n1. While a \u201cdue-bill\u201d is not a promissory note, and negotiable by indorsement, it is within the meaning of the words, \u201cor other obligation,\u201d in \u00a7 1061 of The Code. The larceny of such a paper is indictable under that section.\n2. But if such \u201c due-bill \u201d had been paid before the alleged felonious taking, an indictment for such taking cannot be sustained under said section ; however, it might possibly have been, if the indictment had contained a count charging the larceny of a piece of paper on which the due-bill was written.\nIndictment for larcenjq tried before Philips, J, at Spring-Term, 1889, of the Superior Court of Yadkin.\nThe defendant is charged with the larceny of \u201c one due-bill of the value of fifty-four cents-, of the goods, chattels and moneys,\u201d &c. The indictment contains but a single count, and concludes \u201c against the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State.\u201d The defendant pleaded not guilty.\nOn the trial, the State produced evidence tending to prove \u201c that the due-bill alleged to have been stolen was given by I. W. Windsor to-one Bud Morgan, for fifty-four cents, and afterwards taken up and paid off by said Windsor and laid by him on a counter or shelf in his store, for the purpose of showing his wife how to date a due-bill, from where it was taken by the defendant a few days thereafter.\u201d\nIt was contended for the defendant, that if he \u201c took the due-bill after it had been paid off and taken up \u201d by the prosecutor, and was worthless, that it was not the subject of larceny, and he requested the Court to so instruct the jury. The Court declined to give them such instruction, but told them \u201c that if the defendant took the due-bill with a felo-nions intent, notwithstanding it had been paid off and taken up, the defendant would be guilty.\u201d The defendant excepted. There was a verdict and judgment against him, and he appealed to this Court.\nThe Attorney General, for the State.\nMr. A. E. Holton, for the defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0344-01",
  "first_page_order": 368,
  "last_page_order": 372
}