{ "id": 8652183, "name": "THE STATE v. J. W. PRICE et al.", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Price", "decision_date": "1892-09", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "703", "last_page": "705", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "111 N.C. 703" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "108 N. C., 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8651704 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/108/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 N. C., 587", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12117547 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/89/0587-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 N. C., 876", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11275388 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/107/0876-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 N. C., 780", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8698771 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/84/0780-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 268, "char_count": 3965, "ocr_confidence": 0.569, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.871964132982943e-08, "percentile": 0.45965305313166904 }, "sha256": "dbc6a29910df5e7f272cdd4f02e71cded06453424aea834d815451cee519d946", "simhash": "1:bd95d328021d7ac3", "word_count": 709 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:01:29.703665+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE STATE v. J. W. PRICE et al." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Clark, J.:\nThe Court instructed the jury that the plea of \u201cformer acquittal\u201d could not be sustained because the warrant issued by the Justice of the Peace contained no charge. The words used therein that the defendants did \u201c assault and strike \u201d the prosecutor are sufficient. We learn, however, that the ruling was made upon the ground that the warrant did not recite that it was issued upon a \u201csworn\u201d complaint.\nIn State v. Bryson, 84 N. C., 780 it is held: \u201c An appellate Court, in reviewing the judgment of a Justice\u2019s Court in a criminal action can only look at the warrant, which is the complaint, and if that sufficiently sets out a criminal off\u00e9nce within its jurisdiction, it must be sustained. It cannot loek behind the warrant for objections lying in the defects or irregularities of the preliminary evidence.\u201d The same principle applies when the sufficiency of the judgment is brought in question by a plea of former acquittal or conviction. The Code, \u00a7 1133 provides that the Justice shall examine the complainant on oath, but section 1134 does not require that the warrant shall recite that the complaint was made on oath. State v. Bryson was cited with approval in State v. Peters, 107 N. C., 876, and it is said : \u201c The jurisdiction depends, not upon the affidavit preliminary to issuing the warrant, but on the nature of the offence charged in the warrant.\u201d The indictment charges the use of. a deadly weapon, but on the trial the Court found that the stick used was not a deadly weapon. Hence the Justice had final jurisdiction and the plea should have been sustained. This differs, of course, from cases tried in the Superior Court in the first instance, where, if a deadly weapon or serious injury is sufficiently charged in the indictment, the Court retains jurisdiction, although on the trial only a simple assault may be shown. State v. Ray, 89 N. C., 587; State v. Fesperman, 108 N. C., 770.\nThe Court also erred in charging that \u201cif J. M. Price, the other defendant, started towards Austin with the nail-puller in his hands, and Austin saw him and was thereby put in fear, then J. M. Price was guilty,\u201d for this withdraws from the jury J. M. Price\u2019s testimony that he took no part in the fight, but when he saw his father and Austin engaged he started towards them to separate them and with no purpose to take any part in the difficulty; that he did not draw the nail-puller in a striking attitude, and neither threw it nor attempted to do so, and was not conscious of having it in his hand until his attention was called to it, when he immediately dropped it. Though J. M. Price started towards Austin with the nail-puller in his hands, if he neither assaulted with it nor attempted to do so, he would not be guilty, even though the prosecutor may have been put in fear by the sight of the nail-puller which the defendant unconsciously had in his hands without any intention of using it. The defendant\u2019s guilt depends upon what he did, and not upon an erroneous impression of the prosecutor as to what his intentions were.\nError.", "type": "majority", "author": "Clark, J.:" } ], "attorneys": [ "The Attorney General, for the State.", "Mr. R. H. Battle, for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE STATE v. J. W. PRICE et al.\nAssault and Battery \u2014 Indictment\u2014Former Acquittal \u2014 Charge.\n1. The words \u201c assault and strike\u201d in a warrant are sufficient to charge a simple assault, and such a warrant will support a plea of former acquittal.\n2. It is not necessary that a warrant for assault should charge that it was issued upon a sworn complaint.\n3. An instruction to the jury in an indictment for assault that if J. M. P., one of the defendants, started toward A., the prosecutor, with a nail-puller in his hand, and A. saw him and was thereby put in fear, then J. M. P. is guilty, is error, there being evidence that J. M. P. did not attempt to take any part in the fight.\nThis was an indictment for assault and battery, tried at the February Term, 1892, of Union Superior Court, before Bynum, J.\nThe facts are stated in the opinion.\nThe Attorney General, for the State.\nMr. R. H. Battle, for defendant." }, "file_name": "0703-01", "first_page_order": 735, "last_page_order": 737 }