{ "id": 8648923, "name": "L. C. LASSITER et al. v. CALEB ROPER et al.", "name_abbreviation": "Lassiter v. Roper", "decision_date": "1894-02", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "17", "last_page": "21", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "114 N.C. 17" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "100 N. C., 316", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8650664 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/100/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 N C., 642", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8651501 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/108/0642-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 N. C., 600", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8651883 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/104/0600-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 N. C., 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8683317 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/89/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 N. C., 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8695735 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/90/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 N. C., 535", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8696290 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/79/0535-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 N. C., 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11273464 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/98/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 N. C., 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8684380 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/91/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 N. C., 442", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11277600 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/66/0442-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 N. C., 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "14 N. C., 767", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 525, "char_count": 9032, "ocr_confidence": 0.367, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.9493871300617726e-07, "percentile": 0.8487427259272645 }, "sha256": "e9cbfa166af743ab80696486596bad0b56b6171262fc69825b6d20127773e543", "simhash": "1:a8b7fae8f1e9b4f9", "word_count": 1591 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:40:42.198773+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "L. C. LASSITER et al. v. CALEB ROPER et al." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Shepherd, C. J.:\nIn Bayard v. Malcolm, a case reported in 1 Johnson, 458, Chief Justice Kent remarked: \u201c1 entertain a decided opinion that the established principles of pleading, which compose what is called its science, are rational, concise, luminous and admirably adapted to the investigation of truth, and ought consequently to be very carefully touched by the hand of innovation.\u201d It was but in keeping with, the spirit of these views that our present system of civil procedure was framed and enacted, and we find this (hurt, very shortly after its adoption repudiating the idea that loose and uncertain pleading would be tolerated.\nIn Crump v. Mims, (14 N. C., 767, the Court said: \u201cWe take occasion here to suggest to pleaders that the rules of common law as to the pleading, which are only the rules of logic, have not been abolished bjr The Code.\u201d. In Parsley v. Nicholson, 65 N. C., 210, it was said : \u201cThe rules.'.(\u00bf\u00a1f pleading at common law have not been abrogated. Tire essential principles still remain, and have only been modified as to technicalities and matters of form.\u201d In Oates v. Gray, 66 N. C., 442, it was said that the object of The Code was \u201cto abolish the different forms of action and the technical and artificial modes of pleading used at common law, but not dispense with the certainty, regularity and uniformity which arc essential in every system adopted for the administration of justice.\u201d After other decisions To the same effect it again became necessary, as it now is, to emphasize these early declarations of the Court, and it was therefore remarked in Vass v. Building and Loan Association, 91 N. C., 55, that \u201cIt was a false notion entertained by some of the legal profession that the Code of Civil Procedure is without order or certainty, and that any pleading;, however loose and irregular, may be upheld; on the cout trary, while it is not perfect, it has both logical order, precision and certainty, when it is properly observed. Bad practice, too often tolerated and encouraged by the Courts* brings about confusion and unjust complaints against it.\u201d It is hardly necessary to say that it was one of the elemenr tary principles of the common law pleading that \u201cfacts only are to be stated and not arguments or inferences or. matters of law\u201d (1 Chitty PI., 214), and that it is still essential to state the facts (which, indeed, is the chief office of pleading) is apparent from the explicit language of The Code, \u00a7\u00a7233-243, which provides that \u201cthere must be a plain, concise statement of the facts constituting a cause of action,\u201d and the same rule of course applies to a defence set up in the answer. Rountree v. Robinson, 98 N. C., 107.\nIn accordance with the foregoing principles the Court held that a complaint \u201c which merely states a conclusion of law (that is, that the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff, and that the debt has not been paid) is demurrable both at common law and under The Code.\" Moore v. Hobbs, 79 N. C., 535. So in Rountree v. Robinson, supra, in which the defendant pleaded that \u201c the bond was executed by this defendant to the said R. II. Rountree for an illegal and usurious consideration/' it was held that the plea was bad because it did not set forth the facts constituting the defence of usury. In Rope v. Andrews, 90 N. C., 401, the plea that \u201c the plaintiff's alleged cause of action is barred by the statute .of limitations \u201d was held bad. The Court said: \u201c We have before adverted to this insufficient manner of setting up the effect of the lapse of time as an impediment to the suit. This averment that the demand is barred by the statute is but stating a conclusion of law, and not the facts from which it is deduced. This is neither in conformity to the former nor the present mode of pleading the defence.\u2019\u2019 In Humble v. Mebane, 89 N. C., 410, the i>lea of the statute of limitations was held to be defective, \u201c in that it failed to state when the cause of action accrued, and when the wards arrived at full age.\u201d See also, Love v. Ingram, 104 N. C., 600. In Turner v. Shuffler, 108 N C., 642, the language of the answer was that the defendants \u201cplead the statute of limitations of ten, seven, six and three years as prescribed in The Code to all said claims, and aver that they are unable to plead the same more definitely to each and all of said claims.\u201d This was held defective. The Court said : \u201cThis is clearly laid and insufficient pleading. The Court might, in its discretion, have allowed appropriate amendments, but it was not bound to do so, nor is the exercise of its discretion reversible here.\u201d In the case of Pemberton v. Simmons, 100 N. C., 316, cited by counsel for defendant'. the defence was the presumption of payment under the Revised Code, ch. 65, and the defective plea seems to have been aided by a reference to \u201cthe whole of the pleadings.\u201d Whatever may be the true ground of. the judgment, it cannot he considered as an authority against the principles laid down in the unbroken line of decisions to which we have referred, and especially in view of the more recent decision of Turner v. Shuffler, supra.\nIt must be manifest that according to the above authorities the plea in the present case is fatally defective. The plea is as follows: \u201c That since the final account and settlement of said estate and the institution of this suit the time elapsed is sufficient in law to bar' a recovery against these defendants or either of them, and they and each of them pleads the statute of limitations in bar of plaintiff\u2019s recovery in this action.\u201d This simply amounts to the plea in Pope v. Andreius, supra, which was held to he defective. It contains no facts whatever, but is a simple allegation of law, and nothing more. There are no facts in the other parts of the answer which lend any aid to the plea, and from which any legal conclusions can be deduced. Indeed, it is remarkable that there is but one date in the entire pleading, and that is simply as to the death of the intestate. It would introduce inestimable uncertainty and confusion and bring merited repr\u2019oaeb upon our present method of procedure were we to uphold the plea in this case, it is a. very simple requirement of The Code, as well as the common law, that the facts constituting a cause of action or defence shall be plainly set forth. This has not been done by the defendants, and we are therefore of the opinion that the ruling of his Honor must be\nAffirnn d.", "type": "majority", "author": "Shepherd, C. J.:" } ], "attorneys": [ "Messrs. Grandy & Aydlett, for defendants (appellants).", "No' counsel contra." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "L. C. LASSITER et al. v. CALEB ROPER et al.\nPleading \u2014 Statute of Limitations, defective plea of.\n1. ruder The Code, as well as at common law, the facts constituting1 a cause of action or defence must be plainly set forth in the pleading.\n2. A plea of the statute of limitations which contains no facts whatever, and which i'efers to no facts in the other parts of the pleading which lend any aid to the plea and from which any legal conclusions can be deduced, is defective.\nCivil action-,\"tried, at .January Special Term, 1894, of Pasquotank Superior Court, before Brown, J., and a jury.\nThe action was against the defendant Caleb Roper, administrator of PI. E. Lassiter, and the other defendants as his sureties, for a breach of the administration bond.\nThe defendants in their answer, after' denying the allegations of the complaint as to the breach of the bond, alleged as follows:\n\u201cThat since the final account and settlement of said estate and the institution of this suit the time elapsed is sufficient in law to bar a recovery agaiust these defendants or either of them, and they and each one of them pleads the statute of limitations in bar of plaintiffs\u2019 recovery in this action.\u201d\nThe following issues wore submitted to the jury:\n\u201c 1. Is defendant Roper, as administrator of PI. E. Lassi-ter, indebted to plaintiffs, and if so, in what sum ?\n\u201c 2. Is the cause of action as to said Caleb Roper barred by the statute of limitations?\n\u201c8. is the cause of action as to' said defendants, Henry Roper and T. I). Pendleton, sureties on the administration bond, barred'by the statute of limitations? \u201d\nThe plaintiffs objected to issues two and three, relating to the statute of limitations, upon the ground that they were not relevant and proper under the pleadings.\nThe defendants asked to amend their answer so as to plead the statute of limitations if it was not alread}r properly pleaded. This the Court refused, and defendants excepted.\nThe Court submitted the issues objected to, but reserved the right to set aside the verdict as to these and strike out the issues if he should hold with the plaintiffs. .\nThe jury responded to the first issue, \u201cSeventy-nine dollars and sixty cents and interest from February 3, 1884.\u201d To the second \u201c No,\u201d and to the third \u201c Yes.\u201d\nThe Court, before judgment was signed, set aside the verdict as to the issues objected to and withdrew them; to which defendants excepted, and upon judgment being rendered against all the defendants the defendants excepted and appealed.\nMessrs. Grandy & Aydlett, for defendants (appellants).\nNo' counsel contra." }, "file_name": "0017-01", "first_page_order": 45, "last_page_order": 49 }