{
  "id": 8650322,
  "name": "JAMES T. WHITE & CO. v. J. D. McMILLAN",
  "name_abbreviation": "James T. White & Co. v. McMillan",
  "decision_date": "1894-02",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "349",
  "last_page": "353",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "114 N.C. 349"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "112 N. C., 541",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8651443
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
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      ]
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    {
      "cite": "99 N. C., 332",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8650326
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/99/0332-01"
      ]
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:40:42.198773+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "JAMES T. WHITE & CO. v. J. D. McMILLAN."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "B\u00fckwell, J.:\nThe first and second sections of the plaintiffs\u2019 complaint are as follows:\n\u201c 1. That on or about the 17th of May, 1890, the defendant executed and delivered to plaintiffs a written contract or order (which is set out in the statement of the ease and made part of this allegation).\n\u201c 2. That by said contract or order the defendant requested plaintiffs to deliver for him, freight prepaid, at the Southern Express office in Lumberton, N. 0., one of White\u2019s Physiological Manikins,, medical edition, in consideration of which the defendant promised to pay the plaintiffs the sum of $32 upon delivery at said express office.\u201d\nThe answer does not controvert these allegations. The failure to deny t\u00edrese averments is equivalent, of course, to an admission of the facts alleged. Hence it seems to us that the sum to bo paid by defendant to plaintiffs for the article named in the contract was fixed bj\u201d the pleadings themselves, and, while it was competent for the plaintiffs to explain by parol testimony what was meant by the words and figures \u201cOr. by Obs. Hup., $10\u201d (Cumming v. Barber, 99 N. C., 332, and Simpson v. Pegram, 112 N. C., 541), if an explanation of them had been necessary for supporting their allegation that $32 was tlfe price agreed upon, the answer has relieved them from that necessity, if it ever existed.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 evidence showed that the \u201cmanikin\u201d was at the express office in Lumberton, the place specified in the contract as the place of delivery, on November 10,1890, consigned to defendant. The contract provided that it should bo shipped from New York \u201cabout November 1,1890.\u201d In respect to time, therefore, the plaintiffs complied with their contract. The package was marked, it is true, \u201c C. O. I),\u201d while the contract merely stipulated that tin1 defendant would pay for the article \u201c upon delivery,\u201d and authorized the plaintiffs to draw for the price when due. The letter of the defendant, introduced in evidence by the plaintiffs, seems to disclose the fact that he made no objections to this manner of deliver)7 and collection, but put his refusal to receive the property and pay for it solely upon the ground that \u201cmoney was scarce\u201d and that \u201cit cost so much.\u201d This letter, unexplained, seems to us to amount to a concession on the defendant\u2019s part that the plaintiffs had complied with their part of the' contract, and to a positive refusal on his part to receive or pa)7 for the property. It was no longer incumbent on plaintiffs to keep it at the place of delivery agreed upon, for the defendant had notified them that he would not accept it in any event. Thereafter no course was open to the plaintiffs but to recall the property and sue for damages for breach of the contract on defendant\u2019s part, as they have done in this action.\nThe judgment of nonsuit must- be set aside.\n\u2019 Kitov.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "B\u00fckwell, J.:"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Jiessrs. McNeill & McMillan, for plaintiffs (appellants).",
      "No counsel contra."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "JAMES T. WHITE & CO. v. J. D. McMILLAN.\nParol Evidence \u2014 Contract of Sale \u2014 Delivery Under Contract.\n1. Parol evidence is admissible in the trial of an action on a written contract to explain the meaning of abbreviations of words and figures contained therein.\n2. A contract for delivery of goods \u201cabout November 1\u201d is complied with by delivery on November 10th.\n3. A contract for the sale and delivery of an article provided for payment on delivery and authorized the seller to draw for the amount; the article was shipped \u201cC. O. I).\u201d and the purchaser in a letter to the seller made no objections to the mode of delivery, but refused to receive the property on the ground that he was unable to pay for the same, as \u201cmoney was scarce\u201d and it \u201c cost so much\u201d; the article remained in the express office three months when it was recalled by the seller: Held, in an action on the contract (1), that the fact that the article was shipped \u201c(\u2019. O. 1).\u201d was, under the circumstances, immaterial; (2), that .after the positive refusal of the defendant to receive and pay for the article it was not incumbent on plaintiffs to longer keep it at the place of delivery agreed upon.\nActioN, tried at October Term, 1893, of Rouksox Superior Court, before Connor, J.\nThe suit was to recover thirty-two dollars, and the plaintiffs appealed from a judgment rendered by a Justice of the Peace. The plaintiffs declared upon the following contract for the sale of a physiological manikin:\n\u201cAYhito\u2019s Physiological Manikin or Dissecting Cadaver, cabinet edition, $35. Obstetrical supplement, $10 extra.\n\u201cPlace and date: Lumberton, N. G., May 17, 1890. \u201cJames T. AYhite & Co., Publishers, New York.\n\u201cShip about November 1, 1890.\n\u201cGENTLEMEN: \u2014 Ploaso deliver, according to shipping directions given below, one AYhite\u2019s Physiological Manikin, medical edition \u2014 price $35. In consideration of its delivery for mo, freight prepaid, at the express office specified below, I promise to pay the sum of $35 upon delivery, for which the publishers are authorised to draw when due. \u201cC-r. by Obs. Sup., $10; Cr. by cash discount, $3.\n\u201c To whom sent, J. 1). McMillan; town, Lumberton; county, Robeson; State, North Carolina; express office, Lumberton; express, Southern.\n\u201c(Signed) J. D. McMillan. \u201cAgent: L. (1 Cowles.\n\u201cAny statement, verbal or otherwise, to be recognized must be written on the face of this certificate.\u201d\nPlaintiffs offered in evidence the original contract above set out and a letter written by defendant to plaintiffs as follows:\n\u201c.January 28, 1891.\n\u201cMessrs. James T. AYhite & Co.,\n, \u201cDear Sirs : \u2014 I am sorry that it is so that I cannot take the manikin; money is so scarce with me and it costs so much that it will be impossible for me to take it. So you can order it back when you get ready. I would take it if it was so that l could, but times are too hard with me now.\n\u201c Yours respectfully, J. D. McMillan.\u201d \u25a0\nThe plaintiffs offered in evidence a deposition taken in Now York City by which they proposed to show that the manikin had been shipped by express to the defendant, $32 C. O. D., at the time specified in the contract, and was received by the agent of the express company at Lumber-ton, and that the credit of $10 written on the face of the contract was not a credit on the $32.\nThe defendant objected to this evidence, for that its purpose was to change the terms of the written contract declared on by plaintiffs, and was not within the personal knowledge of the parties testifying. The objection was sustained by the Court. Plaintiffs excepted.\nThe plaintiffs offered to explain the entry on the face of the contract, \u201cOr. by Obs. Sup., $10,\u201d by the parol testimony of the defendant. LTpon objection by the defendant the evidence was excluded by the Court. Plaintiffs excepted.\nThe plaintiffs then introduced the agent of the express company at Lumberton, who testified that it was the custom of the company to return all uncalled for freight at the expiration of thirty days from its receipt by the company at the delivery office ; that the manikin was marked C. O. D., and was received at the express office at Lumber-ton November 40, 1890, and was returned February 11, 1891.-\nThe Court being of the opinion that the plaintiffs had failed to show a compliance with the contract and were not entitled to recover, the plaintiffs submitted to a non-suit and appealed.\nJiessrs. McNeill & McMillan, for plaintiffs (appellants).\nNo counsel contra."
  },
  "file_name": "0349-01",
  "first_page_order": 377,
  "last_page_order": 381
}