{
  "id": 8653852,
  "name": "STATE v. JOHN V. SHERRARD",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Sherrard",
  "decision_date": "1895-09",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "716",
  "last_page": "720",
  "citations": [
    {
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      "cite": "117 N.C. 716"
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
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    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
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      "reporter": "N.C.",
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        8683921
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    {
      "cite": "113 N. C., 683",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8653865
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      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/113/0683-01"
      ]
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    {
      "cite": "94 N. C., 880",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8652323
      ],
      "weight": 3,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/94/0880-01"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:25:58.395701+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "STATE v. JOHN V. SHERRARD."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Clark, J.:\nThe defendant was tried for breach of the following city ordinance: \u201cSec. 2. That all disorderly con-duct_within the city limits shall subject the offender to a fine of $10 for each offence.\u201d \u201cSec. 3. That if any person shall commit a breach of the peace or engage in any riotous or disprderly conduct within the limits of the city he shall pay a fine of $50 \\ provided, that this section shall not be construed to relieve the Mayor from the duty of binding over the offender, according to law, if the offence-is one properly triable before a higher court.\u201d\nThe ordinances are valid under the ruling in several cases that the town may forbid- by ordinance \u201cdisorderly conduct\u201d which from the evidence did not amount to an indictable nuisance or other offence forbidden by the general law of the State. State v. Cainan, 94 N. C., 880; State v. Debnam, 98 N. C.,\u201c 712; State v. Warren, 113 N. C., 683; State v. Horne, 115. N. C., 739. Disorderly conduct per se is not forbidden, by the general State law. There are acts amounting to disorderly conduct which come under the ban of the general law and there are other acts not amounting to criminal offences against the State which would also be disorderly conduct. To this latter class of cases do the city ordinances against disorderly conduct apply.\nIn State v. Cainan, supra, MerribioN, J., says of a somewhat similar ordinance : \u201cThe ordinance has reference to and forbids such acts and conduct of persons as are offensive and deleterious to society, particularly in dense populations, as in cities or towns, but which do not se constitute criminal offences under the general law of the State.\u201d The same is repeated and elaborated in State v. Debnam. The court told the jury that if they were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used the language testified to by the witness Burnett (the only witness for the State as to the language used) in a public restaurant in a violent and abusive manner and in a voice so loud that it could have been heard on the street, the defendant was guilty and that it made no difference if he uttered a profane expression but a single time provided it was uttered in the manner described. This brings the present cas\u00e9 so exactly under the ruling in State v. Debnam and State v. Cainan, supra, the facts in those cases being very similar to those in this, that no further discussion is needed. His Honor charged that, if the facts were as testified to by the defendant, he was not guilty.- Both the prosecuting witness and the defendant testified that the latter called the witness \u201ca damned highway robber.\u201d His Honor correctly held that this and the other language testified to by Burnett, if used in the loud and boisterous' manner he stated, would make the defendant guilty. Such conduct is not amenable to the State law, for the language was not so repeated and so public as to become a nuisance to the public. State v. Jones, 31 N. C., 38. It was not properly cognizable only under the town ordinance. Such conduct as that testified to by the prosecuting witness is not prohibited by the general State law, yet it would, if it could not be punished by the city ordinance, become a serious annoyance to the public passing along the streets hearing such loud, boisterous and unseemly language and threats of violence.\nNo Error.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Clark, J.:"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "The Attorney General, for the State.",
      "Mr. T. R. Purnell, for defendant (appellant)."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE v. JOHN V. SHERRARD.\nCity Ordinance \u2014 Disorderly Oonduet \u2014 Profane Language.\n1. City ordinances are valid which, forbid \u201cdisorderly conduct\u201d not amounting to an indictable nuisance or other offence forbidden by the general law of the State.\n2. To call one a \u201cdamned highway robber,\u201d in a public restaurant, in a voice so loud as to be heard on the street, is properly punishable under a city ordinance prohibiting disorderly conduct.\nCRIMINAL action for violation of an ordinance of the town of G-oldsboro, tried on appeal from a judgment of the mayor, before JSiarhuek, Judge, \"and a jury, at the April Term of Wayne Superior Court: W. E. Burnett, a witness for the State, testified : \u201cDefendant came to Agnes Cox\u2019s place and asked \u2018Where is the Professor\u2019 (meaning witness) \u2018doesn\u2019t he board here?\u2019 She answered yes.. Defendant then said \u2018-him, his throat ought to be cut,\u2019 and kept cursing three or four minutes; anybody going along the street could have heard him ; it was in a loud manner. He also said I was a-highway robber. Agnes Cox\u2019s place is a public restaurant. I was in .the adjoining room.\u201d Agnes Cox testified that the \u25a0 defendant came into her restaurant and cursed Burnett; she couldn\u2019t remember the words he said or how long he cursed. Witness said it was loud enough to have been heard on the street. Jno. Y. Sherrard, the defendant, testified : \u201cI told Agnes to tell Burnett to pay the rent or he would have to get out. I was the collecting agent for a house which Burnett rented. I did say Burnett was a-highway robber, but never used the word \u2018God\u2019, said it in an ordinary tone and could not have been heard outside. The doors and windows of the restaurant were shut; nobody was present except Agnes and a child.\u201d\nThe defendant requested the court to charge that if the defendant did not use the word \u201cGod,\u201d what he said was not profanity and the jury should find him not guilty. The court declined to give this instruction, the warrant charging the defendant not with profanity but with disorderly conduct. Defendant excepted.\nThe court charged the jury that if they were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used the language, as testified to by the witness Burnett, in a public restaurant, in a violent and abusive manner, and in a voice so loud that it could have been heard on the street, the defendant was guilty, and that he would be guilty if he uttered a profane expression but a single time, provided it was uttered in the manner just described.\nBut if what the defendant said and the manner in which he said it was as testified to by him, he was not guilty.\nThe defendant excepted to that part of the charge in regard to using a single profane expression. Yerdict of guilty.\nDefendant moved'in arrest of judgment on the grounds that the ordinance is unconstitutional and that the warrant does not charge a criminal offence.\nMotion denied ; exception. The court fined the defendant a penny and from this judgment the defendant appealed.\nThe Attorney General, for the State.\nMr. T. R. Purnell, for defendant (appellant)."
  },
  "file_name": "0716-01",
  "first_page_order": 744,
  "last_page_order": 748
}