{
  "id": 8683687,
  "name": "Joab Alexander v. John B. Hutchinson",
  "name_abbreviation": "Alexander v. Hutchinson",
  "decision_date": "1826-12",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "13",
  "last_page": "15",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "nominative",
      "cite": "1 Dev. 13"
    },
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "12 N.C. 13"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 272,
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    "ocr_confidence": 0.387,
    "pagerank": {
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    "simhash": "1:a290540b3e788fd9",
    "word_count": 724
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:44:07.907129+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Joab Alexander v. John B. Hutchinson."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Taylor Chief Justice, and Henderson Judge,\ndelivered the opinion of the Court.\nTaylor, G: J.- \u2014 It should, I think, have been left to \u2022the Jury to determine whether they could infer, from the Defendant\u2019s behaviour, a clear and unequivocal assent to, and ratification of, the contract. Any act or conduct on his part, denoting a full assent of the mind, and leaving nothing to doubt or conjecture, without the utterance of any words, would be sufficient to warrant such an inference ; otherwise a man without the faculty of speech, would be incapable of ratifying a contract.\nIn this case, the inference was drawn by the Court, that if the evidence was believed by the jury, the Plaintiff was entitled to a verdict, whereas the intent of the Defendant entered into the very essence of his conduct, and could alone give it any effective meaning, and this was a matter of fact to be judged of by the Jury. There must be a new trial.\nHenderson, Judge. \u2014 When it is said, that an implied promise will take a case out of the statute of limitations, but that it requires an express promise, after full age, to bind a person to the performance of a contract, made during his minority \u2022, \u2014 all that is meant thereby is, that in the first case the law will make the promise, if there is an acknowledgment of a sufficient consideration} in the latter case, the party must make it himself: but the law has prescribed no form in which this promise Shall be made $ it may he by words, it may be by signs or acts 4 any thing which shews an acquiescence, or an assent of the party\u2019s mind, is sufficient. The Judge, therefore, mistook the meaning of the Judge of the Supreme Court, to whose opinion he referred in his charge; at least he mistook the law in saying to the Jury, that if they believed the aforesaid facts, (referring to the testimony of the witness,) they should find for the Plaintiff, lie should have told them, that if tiiey believed the facts, and inferred therefrom that the Defendant promised to pay, that is, in the manner before stated, yielded or gave his assent to pay, then they should find for the Plaintiff; for very dearly, from the facts deposed to, it was an inference of fact, and not of law, whether he promised or did not promise. He, therefore, undertook to draw an. inference of fact, when he gave these instructions.\nThe Judgment must be reversed, that the Jury may -act understandingly on the subject.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Taylor Chief Justice, and Henderson Judge,"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Wilson for the Defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Joab Alexander v. John B. Hutchinson.\nFrom Iredell,\nA promise, after arrival at full ag-e, to pay a debt contracted during' infancy, may be inferred ; it is however an inference of fact, and is to be drawn only by the Jury.\nAn implied promise to pay a debt barred by the statute of limitations, is an inference of law.\nAssumpsit for goods sold by the Plaintiff, as administrator of William Hutchinson. Plea infancy. Replication, that the Defendant promised after he came of age. On the trial, a witness, who had been the Guardian of the Defendant, proved that the Defendant, after he cameof age, together with the other distributees of Wm. Hutchinson, and the Plaintiff, requested him to settle their accounts ; that between the Plaintiff and Defendant a balance was struck in favor of the former, which was sought to be recovered in this action. The Defendant said he was not allowed all his credits, but was informed by the witness, that all had been allowed. The witness further said, that Defendant made no objections, neither admitting nor promising to pay the balance, and that the company separated in a friendly manner.\nHis honor Judge Paxton, charged the Jury that, as a general rule, the Plaintiff was bound to prove an express promise, to entitle him to recover. But, from the opinion of one of the Judges of the Supreme Court in this case, if they believed the witness, they ought to give the Plaintiff a verdict.\nThe Jury returned a verdict for the Plaintiff. A mo^.\u00a1on was nia(]e for a new trial for misdirection, which was overruled, and judgment rendered upon the verdict. Whereupon the Defendant appealed.\nWilson for the Defendant.\nThe case has before been reported \u2014 2 Hawks, $35."
  },
  "file_name": "0013-01",
  "first_page_order": 21,
  "last_page_order": 23
}