PUGH v. BAKER.

(October 9, 1900.)

1. Liens — 0 rops — A dministrator — Lab over.

A laborer may enforce his lien on crops in hands of a wrongdoer, after death of employer, without bringing in the administrator.

2. Lien — Laborer—Employer,

A laborer’s lien filed after the employer’s death, is valid, though the employer is named, in the caption instead of the administrator.

3. Executor and Administrator — Employe.

A contract by which a landowner hires another to make crops is binding on personal representatives of landowner, even where part of service is after death of employer.

*3Civil Action by Augustus Pugh against George W. Baker, heard by Judge H. B. Stavrbuclc,a,t Spring Term, 1900,Beetie Superior Court.

A jury trial was waived and the case submitted upon following facts, agreed to by counsel:

“That on January 1, 1898, Wiley Carter, deceased, hired Augustus Pugh to cultivate his home tract of land, do general menial service and work thereon, for the year 1898, at $10 per month. This action was commenced December 5, 1898, and there was due said Pugh, up to November 1, 1898, $100. Wiley Carter died April 5, 1898, and no administration was taken out on his estate until May, 1899. Said Pugh filed a lien with H. P. Harrell, the nearest Justice of the Peace to said Wiley Carter’s home tract of land. No actual notice of the filing of lien was given to defendant Baker, until the commencement of this action. Said Baker knew that Pugh was a laborer on said farm. Baker, in September, 1898, seized and converted to his own use $219 of the crops raised on said farm, and cultivated by Pugh’s labor. This was all the crops raised. The seizure was in an action of claim and delivery brought by said Baker against Henrietta Carter and Wiley P. Carter, widow and son of Wiley Carter. Pugh was no party to said action. No action has been commenced to enforce the lien, the notice whereof was filed November 10, 1898, unless this be such an action.”

Lien: “The said Augustus Pugh hereby files his lien on the crops of cotton, corn and fodder raised during the year 1898 on the tract of land situate in Bertie County, North Carolina, on which said Wiley Carter lived on the 1st day of January, 1898, adjoining the lands of Mrs. M. L. Wood, S. C. Doughty, and the road from Roxobel to Lewiston, for his labor on said farm from the 1st day of January, 1898, to *4November 1, 1898, under a special contract with, said Wiley Carter entered into on tbe 1st day of January, 1898, whereby said Augustus Pugb contracted with said Carter to wort as a laborer on said farm, in cultivating tbe same, from tbe 1st day of January, 1898, to tbe 1st day of January, 1899, at tbe rate of $10 per month, to be paid at tbe end of each month, making $3 00. There was raised on said land a crop of cotton and corn, both of which were worked and cultivated by said Augustus Pugb. That the fodder and corn have been gathered. That nothing has been paid on said contract, and there is now due thereon $100. That H. P. .Harrell is the nearest Justice of the Peace to said farm. This, November 10, 1898. Augustus Pugh. Sworn to,” etc.

The foregoing facts were agreed to, subject to the following motion of defendant to dismiss plaintiff’s action upon the pleadings: “The undersigned moves to vacate and dismiss the lien filed in this proceeding for that: (1) Because the same is filed without making the administrator of Wiley Carter, who is now’ dead, a party to said proceedings in lien, and there is no authority in law for filing same; (2) for that the plaintiff cultivated the said land on which the crops covered by said lien were raised after the death of Wiley Carter, in the early Spring of the year 1898, and without a contract with the administrator of the said Wiley; (3) for that a lien can not be validly filed against a dead man, Wiley Carter, defendant in said lien, being dead. Wherefore, he prays that said lien be vacated and dismissed.”

Judgment: “This cause coming on for hearing upon the record, and upon an agreed statement of facts to be found on file,” etc., “the Court having considered the record and the facts submitted, it is, on motion of., attorneys for defendant, ordered and adjudged that the plaintiff recover nothing in this action, and that this action be dismissed, and *5defendant recover of plaintiff Ms costs,” etc. “H. B. Star-buch, Judge,” etc.

From this judgment plaintiff appealed.

Francis D. Winston, B. B. Winborne and St. Leon Scull, for plaintiff.

Bobert B. Peebles, for defendant.

MoNTg-omeky, J.

TMs case is before ns upon tbe following facts agreed: On January 1, 1898, Wiley Carter, now deceased, hired Augustus Pugh to cultivate his home tract of land, do general menial service and work thereon, for the year 1898, at $10 per month. This action was commenced on December 5, 1898, and there was due to Pugh ixp to November 1, 1898, $100. Wiley Carter died on April 5, 1898, and no administration was taken out on Wiley Carter’s estate until May, 1899. Pugh filed a lien with W. T. Harrell, the nearest Justice of the Peace to the tract of land. No actual notice of the filing of the lien was given to the defendant Baker, until the commencement of this action. Baker knew that Pugh was a laborer on the Carter farm. Baker, in September, 1899, seized and converted to his own use all the crops raised on the farm and cultivated by Pugh’s labor, of the value of $219. The seizure was made in an action for the recovery of personal property against the widow and son of Wiley Carter. No action has been commenced to enforce said lien, the notice whereof was filed November 10, 1898, unless this proceeding be such an action. His Honor, upon the record and the agreed facts, adjudged that the plaintiff could not recover, and dismissed the action. The defendant contended here that this action could not be maintained against him for the reasons — First, that the paper-writing filed before the Justice of the Peace was not sufficient *6in law to constitute a lien; and, second, that, if such, paper did constitute a lien, yet it can not be enforced against the defendant, because the debt was not proved and reduced to a judgment against the administrator of Wiley Carter; and, third, because the plaintiff worked on the farm and crops after the death of Carter without a contract with the administrator, and therefore was entitled to recover nothing for his services.

We have examined the lien with care, and we are of the opinion that it constitutes a good and valid lien against the crops mentioned therein. The fault which the defendant finds with it is that it was entitled in the Justice’s Court, "Augustus Pugh v. Wiley Carter," when the fact was that Carter was dead at the time of the filing of the lien. But that is not a valid objection. The object of the law, in requiring it to be filed with so much particularity, is to give public notice of the plaintiff’s claim, and especially to give notice with certainty as to details to those who may be interested in the property upon which the lien is filed. Every reasonable requirement was met by the plaintiff, and the use of the name of the deceased c mploj er in the capti- n of tie pro_ cecding did not affect the force and virtue of the lien. If the caption had been stricken out, or never used, the body of the lien set forth every necessary requirement, and gave a reasonable notice to every person as to the object of the plaintiff, including the contract with the deceased employer, a proper location and description of the land upon which the plaintiff performed his services, and a particular description of the crops cultivated by him thereon. The filing of a lien, then, for work and labor done upon crops or buildings, is a proceeding in rem, and, if sufficient in form and substance under the statutes, would be good and valid, even though it appeared that the person who owned the buildings or crops at the time of making the contract had died before the filing of the lien.

*7It is true that if there bad been an attempt on tbe-part of tbe plaintiff to enforce bis lien against tbe estate of Carter, or against tbe crops in tbe bands of tbe administrator or tbe beirs at law of Carter, then it would have been necessary for tbe plaintiff to liave brought tbe personal representative into Court for the purpose of reducing tbe claim to judgment, as required by section 1190 of Tbe Code. But tbe crops bad been taken.into possession of tbe defendant under a claim of ownership and under process of law, and tbe contention was shifted as to tbe plaintiff’s debt and his superior lien from a contention against tbe personal representative to one with tbe defendant, a wrong-doer.

But tbe defendant contends that tbe relation of debtor and creditor must be shown to have existed between tbe estate of Carter and the plaintiff, and that tbe plaintiff could not show indebtedness of tbe estate of Carter to himself, because, as matter of law, upon the death of Carter early in tbe Spring, tbe plaintiff bad no contract with tbe administrator of Carter to continue tbe work, and therefore was entitled to no compensation. In our investigation in our own Reports, we find no decision directly on this point, but we are of tbe opinion that tbe contract made by Carter, the employer, with tbe plaintiff did not end with tbe death of Carter. Tbe plaintiff was employed by -Carter, not at tbe will of Carter, but by tbe year, payments to be made monthly for bis work, and the' appointment of an administrator, and bis ratification of tbe contract of bis decedent, during tbe year 1898, could not have affected, one way or tbe other, tbe original contract between tbe plaintiff and Carter. Tbe plaintiff did exactly what be contracted to do with Carter, and that contract was binding on Carter during bis life, and on bis personal representative after bis death. But we find elsewhere numerous authorities for this position. “Under a contract for employment for a *8specified time, tbe employe may recover from tbe personal representative as sncb for tbe whole term, though part of tbe services were rendered after tbe employer’s death.” 8 Am. and Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.), p. 1008, and cases there cited. Especially do we bold that that principle of law is a sound one when applied to tbe hiring of persons by tbe owners of land by tbe year to make crops. Tbe plaintiff, upon tbe facts agreed, should have bad judgment against tbe defendant for tbe amount due him. There was error in tbe judgment of tbe Court below, and tbe same is reversed.

Reversed.