{
  "id": 8659725,
  "name": "VANDERFORD v. FOREMAN",
  "name_abbreviation": "Vanderford v. Foreman",
  "decision_date": "1901-11-12",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "217",
  "last_page": "219",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "129 N.C. 217"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
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    "simhash": "1:3e70bb0566f50363",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:00:26.986874+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "VANDERFORD v. FOREMAN."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "MONTGOMERY, J.\nThe tender, in writing, made by tbe defendant and accepted by tbe plaintiff, and in which there was an offer made to pay a certain amount, less than that mentioned in tbe complaint, in full of rent claimed and the costs, contained tbe following words in its conclusion, \u201cAnd ask and demand that tbe same be accepted and this action and proceeding cease and be dismissed under said sec. 1 *173 of Tbe Code.\u201d Upon tbe further prosecution of tbe case by tbe plaintiff, his Honor, upon tbe motion of tbe defendant, made, both at tbe call of the case and at tbe end of the evidence, refused to dismiss the action.\nTbe plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that tbe lease bad expired on the 31st of December, 1899, and that demand for possession and notice to vacate on that date bad been properly given, and that since the expiration of tbe lease a large amount was due as rent for the occupation of the premises.\nTbe defendants contend that tbe plaintiffs can not further prosecute their action for recovery of possession for tbe reason that the tender contained a condition to that effect, and as tbe plaintiffs received tbe amount tendered they are bound by tbe condition; and also, that if it be taken as true that the lease'expired on tbe 31st of December, 1899, yet, when tbe plaintiffs received under the tender the amount offered in settlement of tbe rent claimed for occupation after tbe expiration of tbe lease, the tenancy became one from year to year.\nWe think the defendants\u2019 contention can not be made good. The tender was avowedly made under section 1773 of The Code, but tbe action was brought for tbe recovery of tbe possession of tbe premises, not upon a forfeiture of tbe lease for tbe non-payment of rent, but because of tbe expiration of tbe term; and, therefore, under that section of Tbe Code tbe attempted condition contained in tbe tender could only apply to tbe settlement of tbe dispute about tbe amount of rent due.\nIt is not contended by tbe defendants that tbe tender was made under section 573 of Tbe Code. It stands, then, disconnected with either section of Tbe Code above referred to, \"and tbe request made that the suit be dismissed is no more than what it purports to be \u2014 a simple request which tbe plaintiffs could comply with or not as they saw fit to do.. It was merely tbe defendants\u2019 view of tbe effect, in law, of tbe acceptance of tbe money under section 1773 of Tbe Code. It concluded tbe plaintiffs as to tbe amount of tbe rent due for tbe time mentioned, but could not affect tbe Court in the plaintiffs\u2019 complaint for tbe recovery of possession' of tbe premises.\nAs to tbe other phase of tbe defendants\u2019 contention, i. e., that tbe acceptance of the rent for the- time after the expiration of tbe term converted tbe tenancy into one from year to year, it may be said that there would be force in it, if there had not been served in proper time a notice upon tbe defendants to vacate 'the premises and deliver possession at tbe end of the term. In an action to recover the possession of leased premises, tbe plaintiff can recover damages for tbe occupation of tbe premises since tbe cessation of tbe estate of the lessee, and surely tbe plaintiff could receive it by voluntary payment without tbe effect of continuing tbe lease.\nThe defendants Avere not entitled to have their fourteen prayers for instruction given, or either one of them, for they all covered tbe two points above discussed, except tbe seventh and the fourteenth; and tbe seventh Avas too general, and tbe fourteenth correct in part and incorrect in part.\nNo Error.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "MONTGOMERY, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Overman & Gregory, and T. F. Kluttz, for tbe plaintiffs.",
      "R: Lee Wright, for tbe defendants."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "VANDERFORD v. FOREMAN.\n(Filed November 12, 1901.)\n1. LANDLORD AND TENANT \u2014 Tender\u2014Lease\u2014Rents\u2014The Code, Secs. 613, 1113.\nA tender by tenant of rent accrued after termination of lease does not preclude tlie landlord from recovering possession.\n2. LANDLORD AND TENANT \u2014 Rent\u2014Termination of Lease \u2014 Tenancy from Tear to Year.\nAcceptance by tbe landlord of rent accruing after termination of lease, after suit for possession, does not create a tenancy from year to year, and does not preclude landlord from recovery.\nActiON by T. H. Vanderford and others against J. Q. and I). F. Foreman, trading as Foreman Bros., heard by Judge 'Geo. IT. Broten and a jury, at May Term, 1903, of the Superior Court of RowaN County. From a judgment for tbe plaintiffs, tbe defendants appealed.\nOverman & Gregory, and T. F. Kluttz, for tbe plaintiffs.\nR: Lee Wright, for tbe defendants."
  },
  "file_name": "0217-01",
  "first_page_order": 249,
  "last_page_order": 251
}