#### Thomas M. Blount v. William H. Davis.

From Chowan.

Dec. 1828.

A purchaser at a Sheriff'» sale can assign his bid, and a deed by the Sheriff to the assignee vests the title in him.

An executor can purchase the goods of his testator, at an execution sale.

DetiNUE for a slave, tried on the last circuit, before his honor Judge Strange. The Plaintiff produced a judgment and execution against one John B. Blount, as executor of one Muse, and a bill of sale from the Sheriff to him. The Defendant claimed under a bill of sale made to him by the administrator de bonis non of Muse. For the Defendant it was proved, that the Plaintiff was not the purchaser at the Sheriff’s sale, but that the negro had been stricken off to one Hoskins, who swore that he was requested by Blount, the executor, and the Defendant in the execution, to bid off the slave for him&emdash;that he, Hoskins, being unwilling the purchase should stand in his name, applied to Blount to substitute another&emdash;who told him that he, being the executor, could not buy at the sale, and if the witness was unwilling the execution should be returned with his name as the purchaser, that of Blounf s son, the present Plaintiff, should he substituted. The Sheriff stated, that the execution was discharged by John B. Blount&emdash;and that after his death, under the advice of counsel, the bill of sale to the Plaintiff was executed.

His Honor instructed the jury that the production of the judgment, execution and bill of sale, with proof that the slave was the property of the Defendant in the execution, prima faeie vested the title in the Plaintiff, and that if they could infer from the testimony that Hoskins was the real bidder, and had assigned his purchase to John B. Blount, by whom it had been transferred to the Plaintiff, and that the Sheri If had executed *20the bill of sale in pursuance of these transfers, it vested the legal title in the Plaintiff, as the fact that John B. Blount was the executor of Muse, did not prevent him from purchasing the assets at an execution sale.

A verdict being returned for the Plaintiff, and judgment entered according to it, the Defendant appealed.

No counsel appeared for the Appellant.

ICinney, for the Plaintiff,

admitted that an executor cannot purchase at his own sale, but contended that he could purchase the goods of his testator, at an execution sale ; for this he cited the Office of Exeeutor, 131.

He also contended that a sale made by an Agent, or Trustee, and a re-conveyance by the vendee to the Agent or Trustee, although under circumstances to justify a suspicion of fraud, yet was good at law, and that the only relief was in equity — for this was cited Jackson ex dem. Me Carty v. Van Dalfrin, (5 John. Hep. 43) Jackson ex dem. Golden v. Walsh, (14 Do. 407). If this be the rule as to strangers, he submitted a fortiori, it was so as to the Defendant, who claimed under the administrator de bonis non, who stood in the place of the executor and was estopped to deny the title of the latter. He insisted that the levy divested the title of the executor, and put an end to his character of trustee for the specific chattel, leaving him only a trustee as to the surplus, after satisfying the executio n.

Hall, Judge.

-It must be taken for granted that more was proved on the trial than appears upon the record, and it is unnecessary to send up any statement of facts, unconnected with those questions of law which are made by the case. From the facts set forth, it does not appear that the Plaintiff has any title to the property in question. The Sheriff made him a bill of sale, but he did so only because he was advised to do it. It does not appear that the Plaintiff bid off the property, or paid for it. But I presume there was more evidence offered, be*21cause the Judge instructed (he Jury, that if they could infer that the real bidder transferred his right to the Plaintiff, and that in consequence thereof, the Sheriff made him a bill of sale, that gave him the legal title.— The Jury have passed upon the facts under this charge, and have found for the Plaintiff, and as no exception can be taken to the charge, and as the Judge was not dissatisfied with the verdict, the rule for a new trial must be discharged.

Per Curiam. — Let the judgment be affirmed.