{
  "id": 11276316,
  "name": "Mary Watts v. John M. Greenlee",
  "name_abbreviation": "Watts v. Greenlee",
  "decision_date": "1829-06",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "115",
  "last_page": "119",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "nominative",
      "cite": "2 Dev. 115"
    },
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "13 N.C. 115"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
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    "word_count": 1530
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:28:37.349944+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Mary Watts v. John M. Greenlee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Henderson, Chief-Justice.\nWords not in themselves actionable, may be rendered so by a colloquium, or by something extrinsic, with the aid of an innuendo. In such cases, it is necessary that the colloquium, and extrinsic facts, commonly called introductory matter, should be put upon the record, that the Court may see that the jury have drawn a rational and probable conclusion. For notwithstanding the jury are the judges of the farts, and of all inferences to be drawn from facts, yet it is the province of the Court to decide, whether one fact can be inferred from another. Hence- arises the. distinction between relevant and irrelevant evidence. The Court decides the question, whether one fact can or may be inferred from another. \u2014 The jury determine whether the inference insisted on be correct or not, in ibe particular case. The- words are, \u201c all Watts\u2019 girls are big.\u201d There is no colloquium charged, by which any other than the ordinary meaning of the words can be given to them\u2014 They are to be taken, abstracted from any context, for none appears. The innuendo is, \u201cthereby meaning, big with child to his negro Ben.\u201d It is going far enough, and perhaps too far, without a colloquium, or introduction, to say that big, means big with child ; but there, cannot be the least pretence for saying, it means big with child by negro Ben. The innuendo therefore, which the jury have inferred, was quite unwarranted ; at least there is nothing stated, which shows that it was warranted. That must appear, or the declaration is bad j for otherwise juries would be quite arbitrary in giving to words such a meaning as they pleased. If this was the Defendant\u2019s meaning, the words are actionable $ and liad a colloquium, or introductory matter been stated, which showed that this might have been (\u00a1is meaning, it would have sustained the innuendo which the jury have affirmed. The verdict being general upon all the counts, and this being defective, the judgment must be arrested.\nOther objections were made, which I will only slightly notice, the one before mentioned having put an end to the case. It is objected by the Defendant, that it is not seated that he gave publicity to the charge; that the word \u201c publish\u201d does not sufficiently convey that idea. But for my part, I can scarcely conceive a word in language, which more definitely cosh eysiii \u25a0 dea requisite in law, to support an action for speakicg slanderous words. Publish is to proclaim, to make known gone* rally. It needs not the epithet palam, \\\\ hieh was relied on, for palam promulgare is to publish.\nIt is objected that the words, \u201c the. Plaintiff is incontinent,\u201d required a colloquium or introduction, to make them actionable. Incontinent is the word used in the statute ; it would be strange, that the Court should require the jury to tel! them the meaning of a word thus used, and the argument amounts to that. It is true, that where a statute declares, that he who commits a certain crime, murder for instance, shall suffer death without benefit of clergy, in an indictment on that statute, it is not sufficient to say that the Defendant committed murder, but it must be shown how. But in a civil action, the rule is different; it is not necessary to show how the Plaintiff is incontinent, with whom, for instance, there being no prosecution against her for incontinence. Tins would have been a more apt illustration than the case of murder. But the question is, what did the Defendant mean by the word incontinent, which cannot be understood, when generally applied to a female, to mean any tiling else but that she is unchaste. If there were facts, or cir-stances, which showed such was not his meaning, the Defendant should have shown them. It was not incumbent on the Plaintiffs to prove the reverse. But the errors in the Count before mentioned, are fatal.\nPer Curiam. \u2014 Let the judgment be arrested.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Henderson, Chief-Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Gaston and Badger moved in arrest of judgment.",
      "Bevereux for the Plaintiff"
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Mary Watts v. John M. Greenlee.\nFrom Burke.\nIn declaring for slander, the office of an innuendo is to connect words not in themselves actionable, with some precedent fact formally averred, which explains their meaning.\nWords not in themselves actionable., cannot be rendered so by an innuendo, without a prefatory averment of extrinsic facts which explains their meaning, and makes them slanderous.\nHence, when the words were, \u201c all W\u2019s girls are big,\u201d and the declaration contained no averment of a fact affixing a slanderous meaning to the words, an innuendo, affirming- the meaning to be \u201c big with child to negro B,\u201d was held to be insufficient, and the declaration to be defective.\nThe word \u201cpublish\u201d is insufficient in a declaration for slander, without charging the words to be spoken in the presence and hearing of others.\nThe act of 1808 ( Rev, ch. 748,) has given a precise meaning to the term \u201cincontinent,\u201d and having rendered a charge of it against a woman actionable, a Count, charging the Defendant with saying the Plaintiff is \u201c incontinent,\u201d without prefatory mutter, and without an \u2022innuendo, is good.\nAfter the new trial granted in this cause at June Term, i 827, (Ante, 1 vol. 210,) it was again tried on the. last Circuit, before M AN gum Judge. A verdict was returned for the Plaintiff and after discharging1 rules for a new trial and in arrest of judgment, judgment was rendered for the Plaintiff. It is unnecessary to state the grounds Up0tl which these rules were discharged, as tiie cause was disposed of in this Court, upon a point not brought to the notice of his Honor, on the Circuit.\nJune, 1829.\nThe declaration was in the following words :\n\u201c Mary Watts complains of John M. Greenlee, in custody, &c. of a plea, &c. and whereupon the said Mary, by, &c. complains that she being'-a person of good fame and reputation, and so esteemed by all persons, and never having been guilty of the infamous acts imputed to her by tile said J. M. G. as hereinafter stated \u2014 nevertheless, the said J. M. G. being an evil-minded person, and intending to slander her in her good name, fame and character, on, &c. in, &.c. did falsely and maliciously publish of her the said M. W. the following scandalous words, to wit, \u201c she the said M. is big. (meaning big with child to his negro Sen,) That all Waite\u2019s girls (meaning the said M. W. as one of said girls,) is with child to negro Ben.\u201d He the said J. M. G. knowing, &c.\u201d\nThere was another count, similar to the above in all respects, charging the words as being, \u201cshe (meaning the said M. W.) is incontinent.\u201d\nGaston and Badger moved in arrest of judgment.\n1st. Because the words \u201c she is incontinent,\u201d unaccompanied by any averment, do not convey the idea of a want of chastity. They contended that the declaration ought to contain a clear and technical statement of all facts, necessary to enable the Court to see upon the face of the record, that the words were defamatory \u2014 . That the statement of the words was not accompanied with an averment, alleging them to be spoken of and concerning the chastity of the Plaintiff, and there being no colloquium to that effect charged, the omission could not be supplied by an innuendo, For this was cited Rex v. Horne, (Cowp. 682,J \u2014 Starkieon Slander, 294, 295, 296 \u2014 4 Hep. IS \u2014 Hawks v. Hawkey, (8 Mast. 427J\u2014 Peak v. Oldham, (Cowp. 275,J \u2014 Holt v. Scholefield. (6TJ. 691.)\n2(1. That the words \u201cshe is big,\u201d u\u00f1are.mpanied by any precedent averment, explanatory of their meaning, did not impute any slander of the Plaintiff: and for this the same reasons were urged, and the same authorities cited.\n3d. That the declaration contained no avprment that ihe words were spoken in the presence and! hearing of any one \u2014 that the word publish.\u201d taken singly, did not convey the idea of that kind of communication to the world, which caused the injury and gave the action.\nBevereux for the Plaintiff\ncontended that any defects in the declaration were aided by the verdict, and cited 1 Ghiti-y FI. 402 \u2014 1 Sauiul. 228, \u00ab. 1 \u2014 6 Comyn\u2019s Big. Hammond\u2019s Ed. 97\". On the first point, he argued that the act of 1808, (Rev. c. 748,) had affixed to the word \u201c incontinent,\u2019\u2019 a precise and technical meaning, and had rendered words imputing to a female want of personal chastity, actionable in themselves. From this, lie urged, it should be inferred, that no colloquium nor innuendo was necessary, as their only use was to explain words in themselves innocent, and point out their actionable character. He contended, that there was a sufficient averment of publication \u2014 the word \u201c publish\u201d meant \u201c to proclaim,\u201d \u201c to make generally known,\u201d \u201c to discover to mankind,\u201d and this was equivalent to an averment of speaking \u201cin the presence and hearing\u201d of \u201c'sundry persons.\u201d On the authority of Taylor v. How, (Cro. E. 891,) he urged that the words \u201c publicly promulgated\u201d were good, without saying \u201c in the presence and hearing\u201d of others j and that the word \u201c publish\u201d was exactly synonymous with the words \u201c publicly promulgate.\u201d"
  },
  "file_name": "0115-01",
  "first_page_order": 131,
  "last_page_order": 135
}