Ann Hoskins, adm’x. of Richard Miller, v. Charles G. Miller,
From New.flanover.
The statute 22 & 23, Charles II, giving to the husband the whole of the personal estate of his deceased wife, is in affirmance of the common law.
A grant of administration as follows : “ Administration on the estate of A, granted to E, he giving bond, he.” is to be construed as unconditional. Letters of administration are only a copy of the minutes certified under the seal of the Court.
An administrator de bonis non is barred by a possession adverse to the first administrator continued for three years.
Detinue for several slaves. The Defendant pleaded the general issue, and the statute of limitations,
*361June, 1830.
On the trial, the Plaintiff offered one Herring as a witness, who being sworn on his voir dire, deposed, that • u * ' he had married a granddaughter of the Plaintiff’s intestate — that botli the parents of his wife, as well as his wife herself were dead intestate. The Counsel for .the Defendant objected to-the competency of the witness, arid the objection was sustained by the presiding Judge. To rebut the defence arising under the. plea of the statute of limitations, the Plaintiff produced her letters of administration, which were issued in .the year 1826, within three years of the date of her writ, and proved that the intestate died in the year 1798 — and offered evidence to show that the Defendant had taken possession of the slaves after the death of the intestate, but before the grant of administration to her. The Defendant produced the minutes of New-Hanover County Court, of June term, 1799, and read in evidence an entry iu the following words : “Administration on the estate of Ri- “ chard Miller, deceased, granted to William Taylor, “ giving bond in ^600, with I. M. and D. B. as sureties and contended that the slaves were in his possession, adverse to tiie title of Taylor, the first administrator, after the grant of administration to him, and before bis death. The Plaintiff insisted, that the grant of administration to Taylor was conditional — that the Defendant should show a performance of the condition, by producing the bond — and that the qualification of the administrator should also be proved, and the letters of administration exhibited. But bis Honor Judge Norwood ruled that the record was evidence of the administration — that the grant was unconditional, and that it was not incumbent on the Plaintiff either to produce the bond or the letters of administration, or to prove the qualification of the administrator. Upon the issue of fact, his Honor instructed the Jury, that if they were satisfied that the Defendant, or those under whom he claimed, had possession of the slaves during the life of Taylor, and held *362tfiem adversely to his title, that they ought to find for the Defendant.
A verdict was returned accordingly, and the Plaintiff appealed.
No Counsel appeared for the Plaintiff.
Gaston, for the Defendant,
submitted the case without argument.
Ruffin, Judge.
The witness offered by the Plaintiff was properly rejected. It was the husband of the dis-tributee of the intestate ; and although his wife was dead, that made no difference. The declaratory act of 22 and 23, Charles II is only in affirmance of the common law; and the husband, jure maritali, is entitled to the wife’s personal estate, let who will administer.
The opinion of the Court below was clearly right on the other point also. The letters of administration d®< not contain any matter distinct from the record. They are a mere copy of it, with the addition only of a certificate that they are a copy, verified by the seal of the Court. If the order had been, that administration would he granted to William Taylor, upon his giving bond, it would have been conditional and nugatory. The Court can make no such order, for they would still have to judge of the bond and administer the oath. But the words “ granted” and “ giving,” in this order, plainly mean “ is granted” and “ now giving” bond — for the bond, its amount and the sureties are specially set forth. In making profert of the letters, the administrations avers only, that he has them, and does not show forth his bond or his oath, that he has duly obtained them. That is all merged in the fact of his being the administrator by order of the Court, which is held to do every thing rightly.
If there was a previous administrator, during whose time the Defendant held the slaves adversely, he is clearly protected. For as a bailment from the first administrator would enure to the benefit of the admiuis-*363trator de bonis non, so shall,a bar against the former operate against the latter.
Per Curiam. — Let the judgment of the Court below be affirmed.