{ "id": 8658950, "name": "MEADOWS v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY", "name_abbreviation": "Meadows v. Western Union Telegraph Co.", "decision_date": "1902-09-30", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "73", "last_page": "78", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "131 N.C. 73" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "78 N. C., 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8698036 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/78/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 N. C., 285", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2092681 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/67/0285-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 N. C., 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8662369 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "663" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/129/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 N. C., 814", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8652117 ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/94/0814-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 N. C., 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8682413 ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/88/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 N. C., 696", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "98 N. C., 712", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11276128 ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/98/0712-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 N. C., 27", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8683865 ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/29/0027-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 Am. St. Rep., 658", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Am. St. Rep.", "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "126 N. C., 304", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8659482 ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/126/0304-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 N. C., 285", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2092681 ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/67/0285-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 552, "char_count": 9852, "ocr_confidence": 0.432, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.428965615154966e-08, "percentile": 0.3972563651394348 }, "sha256": "07d7de2d96d63d53968c5392f36ce830e920b7ec03e7cf4adcd17e692d4a582f", "simhash": "1:c46d2ac983b14698", "word_count": 1758 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:56:51.027382+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "MEADOWS v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MONTGOMERY, J.\nTbis action was brought to recover of the Western Union Telegraph Company, the defendant, damages on account of alleged mental anguish suffered by plaintiff on account of an alleged negligent failure to deliver to him a telegraphic message. The telegram was 'in these words: \u201cNew Bern, N. C., October 3, 1901. To Bill Meadows, Pollocksville, N. C. Will Phillips' wife at point of death. Will Phillips.\u201d The language of 1he telegram differs from that of any in our reported cases, but as a new trial is to be had for matters hereinafter mentioned, it might not be of any benefit to discuss now the legal effect of the language of the dispatch.\nIn his instructions to the jury, his Honor, among other things, said \u201cthat it was the duty of the telegraph company lo use reasonable diligence in the transmission of all messages committed to' it, and that by the term reasonable or due diligence was not meant the speed of the lightning, except in the transmission of the message over the wire, on the one hand; not the proverbial slowness of the messenger boy, on the other.\u201d There was an excejrtion to- the latter part of that instruction, and the same was assigned by the defendant as error, and we are of the opinion that the position of the defendant is a correct one. Whether the defendant had exercised due diligence in the delivery of the message was the question of fact- before the jury. Telegraphic messages arc usually delivered by boys, called \u201cmessenger boys\u201d; and the plaintiff had testified that \u201cR. R. White\u2019s boy worked in the telegraph office. He knows me, knew where I lived; could stand in the office and see my house. The boy signed the receipt for the message himself. After my name was signed, I said, \u2018This thing has been delayed, what is the matter V \u201d It seems to us that his Honor, in the language used, took as a criterion of negligent delay the agency employed by the defendant to- deliver its message. \u201cNo Judge, in giving a charge to the petit jury either in a civil or criminal action shall give an opinion whether a fact is fully or sufficiently proven, such matter being the true office and province of the jury; but he shall state in a plain and correct manner the evidence given in the case, and decl\u00e1re and explain the law thereon.\u201d Code, Sec. 413. It is true that his Honor did not, in precise and exact words, tell the jury that in his opinion the fact of a negligent delay had been fully proved, but it. seems to us \u201cthat his language, when fairly interpreted in connection with so much of the context as is set out in the record, was likely to convey to the jury his opinion of the weight of the evidence.\u201d That is the construction of the statute adopted in State v. Jones, 67 N. C., 285, and approved in State v. Laxton, 78 N. C., 564.\nNew Trial.", "type": "majority", "author": "MONTGOMERY, J." }, { "text": "Douglas, J.,\nconcurring in result. I concur in the result of the opinion of the Court, because it appears to me, not that harm has been done, but that- harm may have been done.\nHad I been a juror, the objectionable words would probably have made no such impression on my mind, but that fact alone does not authorize me to say that they could not have such effect upon the minds of other reasonable men, in view of the evident effect that they have had upon the minds of a majority of this Court.\nThe words themselves do- not contain the slightest intimation that any fact in controversy has been proved or disproved. The most that can be said is that they may have been understood by the jury as meaning that the defendant's messenger boys were proverbially slow, and that such intimation may have operated to the prejudice of the defendant. If this is so, the defendant should have a new trial. My views as to the absolute right of the citizen to a fair and impartial verdict upon the facts, free from the slightest influence of the Court, Lave been too \u2019 fully and too recently expressed in State v. Howard, 129 N. C., 584, 663, to require any further expression in the present case.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "Douglas, J.," }, { "text": "Clare, J.,\ndissenting. The uncontradicted evidence is that the sister of plaintiff being at the point of death in New Bern, her husband, at her request and in consequence of her prior promise to plaintiff in such contingency, on October 3, 1901, at 4:15 p. m., sent a message, which the company\u2019s agent wrote for him, to the plaintiff at Pollocksville: \u201cWill Phillips\u2019 wife at point of death.\u201d The husband prepaid the message, which was written by defendant\u2019s agent, who testified that he knew it was an important message. The train passed Pollocksville coming to- New Bern at 5 :04 p. m. The plaintiff was at work a little more than half a mile from the station in Pollocksville, but in plain view of the office, as was also his house near by, and the message could have been delivered in less than fifteen minutes. The defendant made no effort to deliver the message, but kept it till 6:55 p. m., and then wired back to New Bern for fifty cents more to deliver the message, the residence of plaintiff being just outside of the free-delivery limits. The fifty cents was promptly sent, but the message was not delivered to plaintiff till 8:30 p. m., four hours and fifteen minutes after its receipt by the defendant. The plaintiff contends that it was negligence not to have at once wired back for money to pay for extra service, and that if this had been done, plaintiff could have, come to New Bern on 5:04 train, before his sister became unconscious.\nThe .Court, in its charge to the jury, incidentally said: \u201cThe company is required to use due diligence in the delivery of a message; by this is not meant the speed of the lightning, except in the transmission of the message over its wires, nor the proverbial slowness of a messenger boy, but it is required to use reasonable diligence, and nothing moi\u2019e.\u201d The defendant excepts because of the use of the words \u201cproverbial slowness of a messenger boy.\u201d This could not possibly have banned the defendant, nor have, been any expression of opinion whatever npon the controversy in this case. There was no contention by plaintiff that the messenger boy was slow. the jury did not have to consider that matter in any possible view of the case. It was not controverted that defendant received the message at 4:15 p. m., that the only train on which plaintiff could have gone to New Bern passed Pollocksville at 5:04, and that defendant took no steps to deliver the message at that time, and did not telegraph to New Bern for money to send the message out till 6:55. This was the ground relied upon to show defendant\u2019s negligence. Hendricks v. Tel. Co., 126 N. C., 304, 78 Am. St. Rep., 658. When at last at 6:55 defendant wired for money to- send the message, the damage bad been done, the train bad passed, and there is no allegation that when the message was finally delivered to the messenger boy, after 8 p. m., that be lingered or delayed. the fault was wholly and entirely with the operator at Pollocksville, and the incidental remark by the Court in regard to the slowness of messenger boys could not possibly be an expression of opinion \u201cupon those facts respecting which the parties take issue or dispute, and upon whose existence depends the liability of the defendant.\u201d State v. Angel, 29 N. C., 27; State v. Jones, 67 N. C., 285; State v. Debnam, 98 N. C., 712; State v. Jacobs, 106 N. C., 696, and cases there cited.\nIn Wharton v. Stilley, 88 N. C., 18, the Judge laid down some moral observations and the Court said: \u201cWe know of no law which prohibits a Judge, in bis charge to the jury, from pronouncing a dissertation upon such moral questions as may be suggested by the incidents of the trial, provided it be innocent and work no prejudice to either of the parties\u201d ; and in State v. Gay, 94 N. C., 814, the Court says: \u201cIt can not be error to state a proposition to the jury which is universally admitted.\u201d\nWhat can be more undoubtedly admitted from common observation than the \u201cproverbial slowness of a messenger boy,\u201d and how could the expression of that truism be harmful to defendant when the conduct of no messenger boy was called in question. From plaintiff\u2019s contention, the liability of defendant accrued solely from the neglect of the operator at Pollocksville', long prior to the delivery by him of the message to the messenger boy.\nIn the trial of Warren Hastings, to a criticism of a rhetorical ffourish in his opening speech, Sheridan replied that it was a novelty in legal proceedings \u201cto take a bill of exceptions to a metaphor or enter a special pleading against a trope,\u201d but the appellant seems to have repeated that precedent. It- is the function of this Court to. pass upon alleged errors of law of the trial Judges, but it has not been deemed part of our duties to pass upon matters which should be left to' their individual tastes. Some Judges' are terse, others are florid, some may refer incidentally to matters of common knowledge, and others restrict themselves to- narrower limits, but unless what is said is an expression of opinion \u201cupon the facts in controversy,\u201d the appellate Court has not felt that it was called upon to criticise the style or tenor of the charge, as reversible error.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Clare, J.," } ], "attorneys": [ "D. L. Ward, for tbe plaintiff.", "W. W. Glarh, and F. H. Busbee, for tbe defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MEADOWS v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY.\n(Filed September 30, 1902.)\nOPINION ON EVIDENCE \u2014 negligence\u2014Instructions\u2014Telegraphs\u2014 The Code, See. J\u00a11S \u2014 Mental Anguish.\nIn an action against a telegraph company for negligence in delivering a message, it is error for the court to refer in its charge to the \u201cproverbial slowness of the messenger boy.\u2019\u2019\nClark, J., dissenting.\nActioN by W. D. Meadows against tbe Western ,Union Telegraph Company, beard by Judge Francis D. Winston, at February Term, 1902, of tbe Superior Court of CeaveN County. From a judgment for tbe plaintiff, tbe defendant appealed.\nD. L. Ward, for tbe plaintiff.\nW. W. Glarh, and F. H. Busbee, for tbe defendant." }, "file_name": "0073-01", "first_page_order": 111, "last_page_order": 116 }