#### CARR v. COMMISSIONERS.

(Filed October 4, 1904).

LICENSES — Q(institutional Lato — Acts 1908, oh. 21ft.

Acts 1903, ch. 247, see. 74, imposing a license tax on emigrant agents, does not apply to a person who comes into this state and employs laborers to work for him in another state.

ActioN by H. C. Carr against tbe Commissioners of Dplin County, beard by Judge Frederick Moore, at August Term, 1904, of tbe Superior Court of Dupitn County. From a judgment for tbe plaintiff tbe defendant appealed.

Rountree & Carr, for tbe plaintiff.

Carlton & Williams and Shepherd & Shepherd, for tbe defendant.

Connon, J.

Tiie parties submitted tbe decision of tbis case to tbe Court upon a case agreed. Tbe material facts are: Tbe plaintiff is and bas been for five years a resident of Harrison County in tbe State of Mississippi. He is a producer and manufacturer of naval stores and a dealer in general merchandise. He came to tbis State during tbe month of December, 1903, and during tbe first week in January, 1904, employed and carried with him to tbe State of Mississippi, to work in bis own turpentine business on bis own place in said State, ten or twelve laborers. Before taking tbe laborers away the sheriff of Duplin County required him to pay “an emigration tax,” which was paid under protest and to avoid being detained and interrupted in his business. None of the laborers were used or employed in any other business than bis own, and were not carried to Mississippi for any other purpose. Tbe plaintiff received no *126consideration or compensation for carrying the laborers out of the State from any person and is not engaged in the emigration business as such. He has not solicited laborers to leave this State to be employed in any business save his own, and at the time he paid for the license it was not his purpose to carry laborers from North Carolina, except to be used in his own business and under his personal direction. Within thirty days after paying the tax ($200) he demanded in writing of the proper State and county officers that said amount be refunded to him in accordance with section 30, chapter 558, Acts 1901. More than ninety days have elapsed since making the demand. The case was tried by Moore, J., upon an appeal from the Justice of the Peace. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed.

The money sought to be recovered in this action was demanded by the sheriff pursuant to the provisions of section 74, chapter 247, Acts 1903, imposing a license tax upon “every emigrant agent or person engaged in procuring laborers for employment out of this State.” This statute is a part of the Revenue Act of 1903, and has been uniformly held to be imposed pursuant to the power conferred upon the Legislature to tax trades, professions, etc. State v. Moore, 113 N. C., 697, 22 L. R. A., 472; State v. Hunt, 129 N. C., 686; 85 Am. St. Rep., 758; State v. Roberson, at this term, 136 N. C. In these cases it was found by the jury, as a part of their special verdict, that the defendant was engaged in the business of procuring laborers for some other person or corporation. To so construe the statute as to include a person coming here from another State, and making contracts of employment with laborers for himself and in his own business to go out of the State, would present grave and serious constitutional objections. We prefer, as being more reasonable and consistent with the language of the act to *127adopt tbe construction put upon tbe same language by tbe Supreme Court of Georgia. In Theus v. State, 114 Ga., 53, Lewis, J., says: “Tbe legislative enactment imposing a tax upon emigrant agents, and providing a penalty for tbe failure to register and pay such tax, was clearly intended to apply to persons wbo, as agents of others, make it tbeir business to bire laborers in tbis State to be sent beyond the-limits of tbe State and then employed by others. To extend its application to a resident of another State, wbo, being in tbis State, incidentally employs laborers on bis own behalf to work for him beyond tbe limits of this State, would be entirely unwarranted.” We fully concur in tbis construction of tbe statute. Thus construed, tbe constitutional objections do not arise. Tbe judgment of bis Honor upon the case agreed must be

Affirmed.