{ "id": 8658231, "name": "COPLAND v. WIRELESS TELEGRAPH CO.", "name_abbreviation": "Copland v. Wireless Telegraph Co.", "decision_date": "1904-09-13", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "11", "last_page": "13", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "136 N.C. 11" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "113 N. C., 29", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 N. C., 781", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8683399 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/74/0781-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 N. C., 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2085594 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/69/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 N. C., 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11277198 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/71/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 N. C., 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8681834 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/77/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 N. C., 230", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8658266 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/122/0230-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 297, "char_count": 3739, "ocr_confidence": 0.446, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.6346087702110324e-07, "percentile": 0.9268835750655733 }, "sha256": "145722d994931efb59281b0cac53799013f42b0d338e5901954b4e94b56ab8ff", "simhash": "1:bae7948189cc192a", "word_count": 652 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:53:15.809157+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "COPLAND v. WIRELESS TELEGRAPH CO." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Clabk, C. J.\nTbis action against a \u201cwireless telegraph company,\u201d which now makes its first appearance in' this Court, proves the oft-repeated observation that every phase of life, the customs, pursuits and progress of a people, soon or late, are photographed in tire records of its Courts, as flies are preserved in amber and as the rays of the sun axe imprisoned in the diamond.\nThe summons was served upon the local operator who the Cburt found as a fact was in sole charge of the defendant\u2019s property at that point and in control of its business, and has received messages from ships at sea for pay, though the office was not yet open for general business. This made him \u201cits local agent\u201d under The Code, sec. 217. The words in the proviso, \u201cany person receiving or collecting moneys within this State for or on behalf of any corporation of this or any other State or government shall be deemed a local agent for the purposes of this section,\u201d are not intended to limit service to such class of agents, but to extend the meaning of the word \u201cagent\u201d to embrace them. The authority to receive money, of itself, constitutes the one so authorized a local agent, but this is not the exclusive test of agency.\nThe items of the plaintiff\u2019s claim having been incurred under different contracts and at different times, the plaintiff could maintain a separate action for the amount due under each contract, and if under two hundred dollars, before a Justice of the Peace, though the aggregate be in excess of that sum. It is optional with the creditor in such cases to join the amounts and bring an action therefor, or upon each item separately. Fort v. Penny, 122 N. C., 230; Magruder v. Randolph, 77 N. C., 79; Boyle v. Robbins, 71 N. C., 130; Caldwell v. Beatty, 69 N. C., 365. The defendant contends that tbe plaintiff, having rendered a statement for tbe entire amount due, is bound by sucb statement and cannot after-wards elect to sue upon tbe items separately. Tbis is true when tifie account rendered is accepted or there is no dissent within a reasonable time, for this amounts to a new contract to pay tbe amount or balance therein stated to be due. Hawkins v. Long, 74 N. C., 781. But here the defendant \u201cobjected to such statement\u201d (Marks v. Ballance, 113 N. C., 29), and the only contract between the parties is upon tbe original transactions, and tbe plaintiff could sue upon each separately.\nTbe letter from tbe company objecting to tbe correctness of tbe account rendered was competent. It was not tbe admission of an agent as to a past transaction.\nNo Error.", "type": "majority", "author": "Clabk, C. J." } ], "attorneys": [ "D. M. Stringfield and B. G. Crisp, for the plaintiff.", "Ward & Thompson, for the defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "COPLAND v. WIRELESS TELEGRAPH CO.\n(Filed September 13, 1904).\n1. AGENCY- \u2014 Process\u2014Corporations\u2014The Code, see. 217.\nThe authority to receive money is not the exclusive test of a local agent upon whom service of process may be made.\n2. ACCOUNTS \u2014 Jurisdiction\u2014Justices of the Peace.\nWhere the items of an account are incurred under different contracts, an action may be brought on each item before a justice of the peace, the separate items being less than $200.\n3. ACCOUNTS \u2014 Actions\u2014Jurisdiction.\nThe rendering of a statement of an account for the entire amount due under different contracts does not prevent an action on each item if the account as rendered is objected to.\n4.' DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE \u2014 Agency\u2014A ccount.\nThe letter of a corporation objecting to an account rendered is competent to show such objection by the corporation.\nActioN by J. P. Copland against the American De Forest Wireless Telegraph Company, heard by Judge George H. Brown and a jury, at May Term, 1904, of the Superior Court of Daxus Cbunty. From a judgment for the plaintiff the defendant appealed.\nD. M. Stringfield and B. G. Crisp, for the plaintiff.\nWard & Thompson, for the defendant." }, "file_name": "0011-01", "first_page_order": 51, "last_page_order": 53 }