{
  "id": 8658303,
  "name": "BROWN v. COGDELL",
  "name_abbreviation": "Brown v. Cogdell",
  "decision_date": "1904-09-20",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "32",
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      "cite": "136 N.C. 32"
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    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
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    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
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    "name": "N.C."
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    {
      "cite": "129 N. C., 50",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:53:15.809157+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "BROWN v. COGDELL."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Clark, C. J.\nThis is an action for the recovery of personal property. The plaintiff is a resident of Pitt County and both of the defendants reside in Beaufort County, where also the property seized and the subject of the action was situated.\nThe appeal from the refusal of the defendant\u2019s motion to remove the cause to Beaufort County was not premature. Connor v. Dillard, 129 N. C., 50 ; Roberts v. Connor, 125 N. C., 45 ; Alliance v. Murrill, 119 N. C., 124. Actions for the recovery of personal property are properly triable in the county in which such property is situated. The Code, sec. 190 (4), as amended by Laws 1889, ch. 219. This is true whether the ancillary remedy of claim and delivery is resorted to or not, since the latter is simply to obtain possession of the property before judgment or security for its being forthcoming if the plaintiff obtains judgment.\nIn Smithdeal v. Wilkinson, 100 N. C., 52, it was held that the requirement, The Code, sec. 190 (4), that an action for \u201cthe recovery of personal property\u201d should be tried in the county where the property is situated, was restricted to personal property, \u201cdistrained for any cause.\u201d Thereupon the Act of 1889, chapter 219, struck out the restriction and made the venue for the \u201crecovery of personal property\u201d in all cases the county where the property is situated.\nThe recovery of personal property being the chief object of this action, and not merely an incidental matter (Woodard v. Sauls, 134 N. C., 274), and the motion to remove having been made \u201cin writing\u201d and in apt time, i. e., \u201cbefore the time of answering\u201d expired, the removal was a matter of right, not of discretion. Mfg. Co. v. Brower, 105 N. C., 440 ; Jones v. Statesville, 97 N. C., 86. In refusing the motion to remove there was\nError.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Clark, C. J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Jarvis & Blow, for the plaintiff.",
      "Grimes & Grimes, for the defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "BROWN v. COGDELL.\n(Filed September 20, 1904.)\n1. APPEAL \u2014 Removal of' Causes \u2014 Personal Property.\nAn appeal may be taken from the refusal of a motion to remove an action for the recovery of personal property, and such removal is a matter of right.\n2. VENUE \u2014 Claim and Delivery \u2014 Personal Properly \u2014 The Code, see. 190, subsea. It \u2014 Acts 1889, eh. 219.\nThe venue of actions for the recovery of personal property is in the county where the property is situated, though the ancillary remedy of claim and delivery is not resorted to.\nActioN by James Brown against Samnel Cogdell, heard by Judge T. A. McNeill at April Term, 1904, of the Superior Court of Pitt County. From a judgment for the plaintiff the defendant appealed.\nJarvis & Blow, for the plaintiff.\nGrimes & Grimes, for the defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0032-01",
  "first_page_order": 72,
  "last_page_order": 73
}