{ "id": 8660102, "name": "MARSH v. GRIFFIN", "name_abbreviation": "Marsh v. Griffin", "decision_date": "1904-11-01", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "333", "last_page": "336", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "136 N.C. 333" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "60 N. C., 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 6796505 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/60/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 N. C., 170", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8656795 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/120/0170-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 N. C., 134", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8657877 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/123/0134-01" ] }, { "cite": "9 Am. St. Rep., 39", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Am. St. Rep.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 N. C., 164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "50 N. C., 94", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 N. C., 7", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2101531 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/40/0007-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 N. C., 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8654365 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/116/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 N. C., 571", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8660730 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/122/0571-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 N. C., 585", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11274730 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/125/0585-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 353, "char_count": 5251, "ocr_confidence": 0.464, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.128234503625181e-08, "percentile": 0.5072909656122808 }, "sha256": "16a6e9aa774f0d80b90f71ae9569498b7cd26ba020a6a80da87ba5d40d9dc617", "simhash": "1:4a9eb943de6174da", "word_count": 947 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:53:15.809157+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "MARSH v. GRIFFIN." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ClaeKj C. J.\nThis is an action for foreclosure of a mortgage on the wife\u2019s land, executed by her jointly with her husband. In her answer she avers that the execution of the mortgage \u201cwas procured by the fraud and undue influence of her said husband, who had represented to her and induced her to believe that the said mortgage was only for half the debt attempted to be secured thereby,\u201d and that relying upon,Ms representations she failed to read the mortgage before signing the same. But there is no allegation or proof that the mortgagee had notice of or participated in such fraudulent representations. The privy examination is properly certified. Chapter 389, Acts 1889, provides that where a privy examination is properly certified it shall not be held invalid because procured by fraud, duress or undue influence unless the grantee had notice of or participated in the same. Butner v. Blevins, 125 N. C., 585; Bank v. Ireland, 122 N. C., 571; Riggan v. Sledge, 116 N. C., 87. The certificate is in proper form, and besides there is neither proof nor allegation of any irregularity in taking the privy examination. The wife states that she told the justice she could read, that he gave her the paper to read, that she read part of it and signed it, telling the justice she knew what it was, and that she told him (her husband being absent), in reply to his inquiry, that she signed it freely and voluntarily and without fear or compulsion of her husband. In Butner v. Blevins, 125 N. C., 585, this inquiry was not put, but the Court held that the grantee being ignorant of that fact was protected by chapter 389, Acts 1889.\nThe words of the habendum in the deed to the defendant are \u201cto her, the party of the second part,\" her heirs and assigns during her natural life and at her death then to belong to her bodily heirs to have and to hold in fee-simple forever.\u201d The contention that this deed gave her only a tenancy in common with her children is unfounded. The Code, sec. 1329, providing that a limitation \u201cto the heirs of a living person shall be construed to be to the children of such person,\u201d applies only when there is no precedent estate conveyed to said living person, else it would not only repeal the rule in Shelley\u2019s case bixt would pervert every conveyance to \u201cA and his heirs\u201d into something entirely different from what those words have always been understood to mean.\nHere the words \u201cto her, the party of the second part, her heirs and assigns during her natural life\u201d are contradictory and irreconcilable. Taking the rule that in such cases \u201cthe first words in a deed and the last words in a will control,\u201d we must disregard the words \u201cfor her natural life.\u201d There is then conferred a fee-simple upon the grantee. ' The additional words \u201cand at her death then to belong to her bodily heirs to have and to hold in fee-simple forever,\u201d coming' after the fee-simple already given her, if they have any effect at all, constitute simply an attempt to limit a fee tail after a fee-simple and are nugatory. Taking all the words together, if there is here anything more than the random use of legal terms by a grantor ignorant of their purport and use, we should say that the grantor meant to convey an estate for life to the defendant with remainder to the heirs of her body. This, by the rule in Shelley\u2019s case and The Code, sec. 1325, conveys a fee-simple. Construing the words strictly, as we have said, it is a conveyance to A and heirs with remainder to the heirs of her body. The words \u201cbodily heirs\u201d have the same meaning as \u201cheirs of the body,\u201d and are words of limitation and not words of purchase. Ruffin, J., in Donnell v. Mateer, 40 N. C., 7, cited since in Worrell v. Vinson, 50 N. C., 94, and Leathers v. Gray, 101 N. C., 164, 9 Am. St. Rep., 39, in which last the limitation is very similar to this. Almost in the same language as here is the limitation in Edgerton v. Aycock, 123 N. C., 134, and Chamblee v. Broughton, 120 N. C., 170, in both of which it was held that the rule in Shelley\u2019s case applied. The words used as the basis of a dictum in Williams v. Beasley, 60 N. C., 104, do not occur in this deed. They did occur, however,' in Edgerton v. Aycock, supra, and a direct ruling was made to the contrary of the dictum in Williams v. Beasley.\nThe other exceptions require no discussion. There is\nNo Error.", "type": "majority", "author": "ClaeKj C. J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Bedwine & Stack, for the plaintiffs.", "Adams, J er\u00f3me & Armfield, for the defendants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MARSH v. GRIFFIN.\n(Filed November 1, 1904).\n1. MORTGAGES \u2014 Aclmoioledgments\u2014Husband and Wife \u2014 Acts 1889, oh. 889 \u2014 Fraud.\nWhere a privy examination is properly certified it will not be held invalid because procured by fraud, duress or undue influence, unless the grantee had notice thereof or participated therein.\n2. DEEDS \u2014 Estates\u2014Remainders\u2014The Oode, secs. 1325, 1829.\nA deed to a person and to \u201cher heirs and assigns during her natural life and at her death to belong to her bodily heirs, to have and to hold in fee-simple forever,\u201d conveys a fee-simple title to the grantee named.\nActioN by II. B. Marsh and others against A. T. Griffin and others, heard by Judge B. B. Peebles and a jury, at August Term, 1904, of the Superior Court of ITnioN County. From a judgment for the plaintiffs the defendants appealed.\nBedwine & Stack, for the plaintiffs.\nAdams, J er\u00f3me & Armfield, for the defendants." }, "file_name": "0333-01", "first_page_order": 373, "last_page_order": 376 }