{
  "id": 8698417,
  "name": "Samuel P. Simpson v. Vardy McBee",
  "name_abbreviation": "Simpson v. McBee",
  "decision_date": "1832-12",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "531",
  "last_page": "533",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "nominative",
      "cite": "3 Dev. 531"
    },
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "14 N.C. 531"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "10 Will. 3",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Will.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
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    "pagerank": {
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    "sha256": "539b140ecb84426da10605df90c54e0e52b83880cda8ef73cedbd39a268c2603",
    "simhash": "1:72774ceb277c75d1",
    "word_count": 699
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:11:15.653835+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Samuel P. Simpson v. Vardy McBee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Daniel, Judge,\nafter stating the case as above, proceeded : The agreement of the parties, out of court, set forth in the submission, that the award should be a rule of court, did not make the rule. And although the agreement was made during a Us pendens, yet no attachment could have issued, according to the principles of the common law, against the defendant, for a violation of that agreement. A rule of court to stand to a submission and award, was, according to the common law, a rule entered in some one of the courts at Westminster, where the record and pleadings in the cause were made up. A party who consented to have such a rule entered, and disobeyed it afterwards, was. subject to an attachment for a contempt. We have, after diligent search, been unable to find any authority, estabishing the principle, that an agreement of the parties pending a suit, to submit to arbitration, and that the submission and award should be a rule of court, .was in fact, such a rule, as by tho principles of the common law would authorize an attachment to issue for its violation. In this state, it is the practice to enter judgment according to the award, in those cases, in which, by the rules of the common law in England, an attachment would have been granted, for a disobedience of \u00e1 rule of court, to stand to the submission and award. We therefore, think that the Superior Court had not power to enter the judgment, which was rendered in this case. The statute p rx i _ rr,.,, \u201e \u201e \u201e . , . . . , , oi 9 aim 10 Will. 3 c 15 is not in lorce in tins state*\u2014 The judgment might have stood perhaps, according to tllC provisions ot that statute. As there was not such a rule of court entered in this case as would have authorized an attachment at common law, and the statute of Will. 3. not being in force here, we arc compelled to set aside the judgment, and award a procedendo.\nIn tins state, judg-^ards^^ where by the rule jaWj would issue for theirnon-performance.\nThe statute of jng references, is not in force here,\nPer Curiam. \u2014 Judgment reversed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Daniel, Judge,"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "W. A. Graham, for the defendant,",
      "Badger, contra,"
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Samuel P. Simpson v. Vardy McBee.\nAn agreement between the parties to a cause, made after the issuing, but before the return of the writ, referring the suit to arbitration, and making the submission a rule of court, does not authorise the entry of a judgment upon an award filed at the return day of the writ.\nThis was an action on the case, for slanderous words spoken of the plaintiff, by the defendant.\nThe writ was issued on the 27th of August, .1831, returnable to the ensuing term of Lincoln Superior Court. The defendant accepted service of. the writ on the 31st of that month, and on the 1st of September following, the parties entered into an agreement in writing, whereby the matter in controversy was referred to the arbitrament of two persons, \u201cwhose award made as above, shall he a rule of court.\u201d The arbitrators made their award on the 22d of October following, before the return day of the writ; and on the Monday of the ensuing Superior Court of Lincoln, it was handed to the clerk, when the defendant filed exceptions to it, and pleaded to the action. On the last Fall Circuit, Swain, Judge, overruled the exceptions, and entered judgment according to the award, from which the defendant appealed.\nW. A. Graham, for the defendant,\ncontended, that the agreement to submit, was a matter in pais \u2014 that the submission could not be a rule of court, unless made after the cause was in court, and that judgment could not be entered upon the award, or an attachment issue for not performing it, the only remedy being by an action on the agreement. He cited Tidd\u2019s Practical Forms 148.\nBadger, contra,\nargued, that the issuing of the writ constituted the Us pendens, and that at common law, before the statute of Will. 3, either party had a right to have an agreement of this kind, made a rule of court.\u2014 He cited Tidd\u2019s Practice 75."
  },
  "file_name": "0531-01",
  "first_page_order": 539,
  "last_page_order": 541
}