{
  "id": 11270336,
  "name": "J. G. STATON v. J. G. GODARD",
  "name_abbreviation": "Staton v. Godard",
  "decision_date": "1908-10-14",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "434",
  "last_page": "435",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "148 N.C. 434"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
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    "pagerank": {
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    "simhash": "1:2b45e8f4efa4ea16",
    "word_count": 530
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:55:17.237307+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "J. G. STATON v. J. G. GODARD."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Clarx, C. J.\nThe sole question is the construction of the following clause in the will of Louisa Tates: \u201cI lend and bequeath to my granddaughter, Mary Louallie Poole, during her natural life, and then to her child or children and issues, if any, Fat if she should die without child or children or issue, then this property to belong to James Grist Staton, Louisa Staton and Ella Staton during their natural lives and then to their child or children and issues thereof, the following real and personal property\u201d (describing it).\n\u2022 Upon the facts agreed it appears that Mary Louallie Poole married the plaintiff, James Grist Staton; that there were born to said marriage three children, who died previous to their mother, and without issue, and the mother is since dead. The plaintiff insists that the children took a vested remainder, that upon their death such vested remainder passed to him, and he is entitled to the whole.\nSuch is not the language of the will. It provides that if Mary Louallie \u201cshould die without child or children or issues, then this property to belong to James Grist Staton, Louisa Staton and Ella Staton during their natural lives,\u201d and then over. And this was exactly what happened. The first life tenant died without leaving any child or children or issue. The devise to them was contingent upon their being alive at the death of the life tenant, and was never vested in them. At-her death the property passed to James Grist Staton and his two sisters as life tenants, and then over. The intent of the will to this effect is clear. If it had been doubtful, chapter 7, Laws 1827 (now Eevisal, 1581), provides, as the rule of construction,- that a devise to one for life, with remainder over upon his dying \u201cwithout heirs\u201d or \u201cwithout issue\u201d or \u201cwithout children,\u201d shall be construed to mean dying without heirs or children or issue \u201cliving at the time of his death\u201d (or born to him within ten lunar months thereafter), unless a contrary intent is \u201cexpressly and plainly declared in the face of the deed or will.\u201d\nThe ruling of the court below that James Grist Staton, upon the death of his wife, took a fee simple is\nEoversed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Clarx, C. J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "IL. W. Stubbs for plaintiff.",
      "No counsel contra."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "J. G. STATON v. J. G. GODARD.\n(Filed 14 October, 1908.)\nWills, Interpretation of \u2014 Remainders\u2014Vested Interests \u2014 Child, etc., Living.\nProperty was devised to a daughter, but \u201cshould she die-without child,\u201d etc., then to J., L. and E. for life, and then over. J. and the daughter intermarried and had children, who did not survive their mother. At the death of the mother: Held, that J. could not take a fee simple, as no interest vested in the children; this, both by interpretation of the language of the will itself and the rule in Revisal, sec. 1581, providing that, unless it is otherwise clearly expressed in the will, the children, etc., must be alive at the death of the first taker for the interest to vest in them.\nCONTROVERSY submitted without action, heard before Lyon, J., at June Term, 1908, of Martin.\nDefendant .appealed.\nIL. W. Stubbs for plaintiff.\nNo counsel contra."
  },
  "file_name": "0434-01",
  "first_page_order": 464,
  "last_page_order": 465
}