{ "id": 11270863, "name": "REID and BEAM v. SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY", "name_abbreviation": "Reid v. Southern Railway Co.", "decision_date": "1908-12-16", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "423", "last_page": "426", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "149 N.C. 423" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "144 N. C., 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8658836 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/144/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 L. R. A., 271", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L.R.A.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "179 U. S., 287", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5708129, 5707363 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/179/0287-02", "/us/179/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 N. C., 532", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8661074 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/144/0532-01" ] }, { "cite": "141 N. C., 355", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11253075 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/141/0355-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 N. C., 536", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 N. C., 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8650208 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/109/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 U. S., 542", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "201 U. S., 321", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 345020 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/201/0321-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 433, "char_count": 7934, "ocr_confidence": 0.451, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.804749432791573e-08, "percentile": 0.45743246034807433 }, "sha256": "e70928315e0e818dbdedd8c3eecca018f2ca8ee3d7362fcb4aa75cea0acdd033", "simhash": "1:a4ec7971b88bdf1c", "word_count": 1368 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:20:43.519867+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "REID and BEAM v. SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Clare, O. J.\nAction for penalty under Revisal, sec. 2631, for refusal to \u201creceive for transportation\u201d a carload of' shingles tendered to defendant\u2019s agent at Rutherfordton, 2 July, 1906, for shipment to consignee at Scottsville, Tenn. The plaintiff testified that he tendered prepayment of freight, and repeatedly, on many succeeding days, asked that the car be shipped, and offered to. prepay freight. The agent refused to ship because he said he did not know Where Scottsville was, nor the rate. The plaintiff told the ageiit that Scottsville was near Knoxville, which is a station on defendant\u2019s road. On 11 July, a new agent came to Rutherfordton, he had a talk' with plaintiff about the carload of shingles, and on 18 July, wired an inquiry to the division freight agent, who the same day wired back the rate, and the car was sent forward on 19 July. It appeared by testimony of defendant\u2019s witnesses that Scottville, instead of Scottsville, is the name. of.the station, that it is a siding a few miles from' Knoxville, on a branch road operated by the defendant, that it is not a regular station, but freight is usually shipped there on way-bills made out to a regular, station two miles away. On 19 July, the. defendant shipp\u2019ed the car on a way-bill to \u201cScottsville, Tenn.,\u201d the freight being prepaid. -The name \u201cScottsville, Tenn.,\u201d does not appear in the \u201cOfficial Railway Guide,\u201d nor in the \u201cShipping Guide\u201d used by railroad companies.\nThe fact that on 18 July, the new agent promptly learned where Scottville, Tenn., was, and the rate, and gave a bill off lading and shipped the carload the next day, is evidence that the rate and destination could have been ascertained by the other agent on 2 July. \u25a0\nThe defendant contends, however, that R\u00e9visal, sec. 2631, giving, a. penalty for refusing to accept freight for shipment is unconstitutional when the freight is to be shipped.into, another State. But \u201crefusing to receive for shipment\u201d is an act done wholly within this State. It is not part of the act of transportation, and our penalty statute applies. This was held by Avery, J., in Bagg v. R. R., 109 N. C., 279, where the railroad company received the freight for shipment-to' a point in another State, but negligently detained it for five days before shipping. The precise point herein was raised in Currie v. R. R., 135 N. C., 536, and it was held that this section, giving a penalty for failing and refusing to accept for shipment \u00e1 carload of lumber, was not unconstitutional-as an interference with interst\u00e1te commerce, when the lumber was offered for shipment to a point in another State. Both these cases were cited and reaffirmed by Walker, J., in Walker v. R. R., 137 N. C., at p. 168.\nIn Twitty v. R. R., 141 N. C., 355, it was held, Brown, J., that where the agent held the freight in storage, but refused to give a bill of lading because he did not know the freight rates, this was \u201ca refusal to receive for transportation, and the railroad company is liable to a penalty under Revisal, 2631.\u201d The Court said, \u201cThe fact that the agent did not know the freight rates is no excuse. It is his duty to know them. At least, he could readily have telegraphed and ascertained, and need not have refused to give a bill of lading on that account.\u201d\nIn Harrill v. R. R., 144 N. C., 532, Walker, J., it was held, that Revisal, sec. 2633, imposing a penalty for failure to deliver freight was valid, though the freight was interstate. There the penalty, was incurred after the transportation had ceased. Here the penalty accrued before.the transportation had begun, and before the freight was even received and accepted for transportation.\nThe owner of the shingles is the proper party plaintiff.\u2019 There was no consignee till after the bill of lading was given. That the State Court has authority in such cases is now well settled. Cooke, Commerce Clause, 233, citing R. R. v. Jacobson, 179 U. S., 287, and many other cases.\nThe fact that Scottville was not a regular station at which was kept an agent is no valid excuse for not receiving the shingles. When goods are shipped to a place where there is a side-track, but no depot platform or agent of the carrier, and this is known to the parties, it has been held that leaving the car of goods upon the side-track is. a good delivery, and relieves the'company from further responsibility. 4 Elliott Railroads, sec. 1521. That a depot was or was not maintained at Scottville in no way affected the right of the plaintiffs to have their goods received at Rutherfordton when tendered. Narville v. R. R., 67 L. R. A., 271; Alexander v. R. R., 144 N. C., 93.\nThe judgment of nonsuit is\nReversed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Clare, O. J." }, { "text": "BnowN, J.,\nconcurring: I concur in sending this case back for trial in order that the facts may be found. I reserve the right to determine for myself whether the penalty, in case one should be imposed, is a burden upon interstate commerce, in case the cause shall come back upon a final judgment against the defendant.\nAs I read the record the defendant would be liable, if at all, for only fifty dollars, the penalty imposed for one day only, as there is proof of only one distinct tender and refusal. That matter, however, will be made clearer on a'nother trial.\nAs the plaintiffs admit that they lost nothing by the delay in shipping the shingles, if they are permitted to recover seven hundred and fifty dollars as penalties under the statute, I should be inclined to hold that such an excessive impost could not be sustained, under the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in Houston & T. C. R. R. v. Mays, 201 U. S., 321, and McNeil v. R. R., 202 U. S., 542.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "BnowN, J.," } ], "attorneys": [ "Edwards & Elliott for plaintiffs.", "W. B. Rodman and Gallert & Oarson for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "REID and BEAM v. SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY.\n(Filed 16 December, 1908).\n1. Carriers of Goods \u2014 Penalty Statutes \u2014 Regular Stations \u2014 Refusal to Accept Shipment.\nA refusal by the carrier\u2019s agent to receive, at its depot, freight, and transportation charges therefor, destined for a point on the carrier's road which was only a siding, and was not a regular station, is wrongful, and subjects the carrier to the penalty prescribed by Revisal, sec. 2031, when the refusal is on the ground that the agent did not know where the given destination was, and it appears that he could have ascertained that 'freight was ordinarily shipped there on way bills made out to a regular station on the carrier\u2019s road some two miles distant therefrom.\n2. Same \u2014 Evidence.\nWhen a shipment of freight and transportation charges are refused by carrier\u2019s agent because he did not know where its given destination was, and it appears that the name given was very slightly changed from that appearing on the \u201cOfficial Railway Guide and Shipping Guide\u201d used by the carrier; the fact that another agent, who afterwards took the place of the first, promptly learned the location of the destination and the rate, and gave bill of lading and made shipment, is evidence that the rate and destination could have been ascertained by the first from the information given him, in an action for the penalty prescribed by Revisal, sec. 2631.\n3. Carriers of Goods \u2014 Penalty Statutes \u2014 Refusal to Accept Shipment \u2014 Commerce Clause \u2014 Constitutional Law.\nThe penalty arising under Revisal, sec. 2631, from the wrongful refusal of carrier\u2019s agent to accept an interstate shipment of freight, bears no relation to the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution, for the penalty accrues before the freight is accepted for transportation.\n4. Carriers of Goods \u2014 Penalty Statutes \u2014 Refusal to Accept Shipment \u2014 \u201cParty Aggrieved.\u201d\nThe shipper of the goods is the \u201cparty aggrieved,\u201d and is the one entitled to sue for the penalty prescribed in Revisal, sec. 2631, which arises from the wrongful refusal of the carrier\u2019s agent to accept them for transportation.\nActioN tried before Ward, J., and a jury,\" April Term,-1908, of. Rutherford. Plaintiff appealed.\nEdwards & Elliott for plaintiffs.\nW. B. Rodman and Gallert & Oarson for defendant." }, "file_name": "0423-01", "first_page_order": 457, "last_page_order": 460 }