{
  "id": 11270964,
  "name": "DONALD McRACKAN v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY",
  "name_abbreviation": "McRackan v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad",
  "decision_date": "1909-03-24",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "331",
  "last_page": "333",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "150 N.C. 331"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "141 N. C., 68",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "146 N. C., 153",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        11270439
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/146/0153-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "144 N. C., 220",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8659457
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/144/0220-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "146 N. C., 218",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        11270671
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/146/0218-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "23 Tex. Civ. App., 82",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Tex. Civ. App.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 281,
    "char_count": 4641,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.468,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08,
      "percentile": 0.23912687573677074
    },
    "sha256": "d3edb4b370255d0b3965d47f7617e3ddbe5694f0ac4d21a465a359157e07c844",
    "simhash": "1:8c29b4f2789db3a8",
    "word_count": 816
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:55:20.077008+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "DONALD McRACKAN v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Walker, J.\nTbis action was brought, under Revisal, sec. 2631, to recover the penalty for refusing to receive a box of goods tendered by the plaintiff in person to tbe defendant, at Clarendon, N. C., for shipment to Whiteville, N. C. The box of'goods belonged to Samuel I. Epstein, who had delivered them to the defendant, at Clarendon, for shipment to Clio, S. C., and received a bill of lading therefor. While the box' was in the defendant\u2019s possession, at Clarendon, it was attached in an action brought by Broom & Mayer against Samuel I. Epstein. The plaintiff testified: \u201cI had no interest in these goods,-except as surety on the attachment bond and as attorney for Broom & Mayer, at whose instance the goods had been attached.\u201d The claim of Broom & Mayer wp.s paid the day after the plaintiff tendered the box of goods to the defendant for shipment to Whiteville. The court, at the close of the evidence, and on motion of the defendant, entered judgment1 of nonsuit, under the statute, and plaintiff appealed.\nTbe question presented, is whether the plaintiff is the \u201cparty aggrieved,\u201d within the meaning of those words, as nsed in the statute. He was not acting in his own behalf, but as agent or attorney for his clients, Broom & Mayer, in the suit against the real owner of the goods, when he made the tender of the box to the defendant at Clarendon. It appears that he had no interest in the goods. He was therefore not in any sense the party aggrieved. If he was acting for the deputy sheriff, who levied the warrant of attachment on the goods, the same result would follow. If there was any default committed by the defendant, it was liable either to the deputy sherifE or to Broom & Mayer, but certainly not to the plaintiff. He was not, in a legal sense, injured by the refusal of the defendant to receive the box.of goods. The party aggrieved is one who is injured, in respect to some right, by the act alleged to be wrongful. Cunningham v. Porchet, 23 Tex. Civ. App., 82; Black\u2019s Law Diet., p: 53. The plaintiff was not acting for himself and had no right or interest in the goods, but he was merely representing his principal, and with the same effect as if the latter had been personally present and acting in his own bghalf. If an agent can recover the penalty under such circumstances, the defendant might be subjected to a double liability, for the principal was surely aggrieved or injured, and he also could recover, unless we should allow the plaintiff to recover for the use of the principal; and this cannot be done, for we have held, at this term, in Chapman v. McLawhorn, that \u201cevery action must be prosecut\u00e9d in the name of the real party in interest,\u201d and the agent of the \u201creal party\u201d cannot therefore maintain an action based upon a transaction conducted by him for his principal. We have said that the \u201cparty aggrieved\u201d is the person, who is interested in having the goods shipped, and whose legal right in respect thereto is denied. Cardwell v. Railroad, 146 N. C., 218. See, also, Stone v. Railroad, 144 N. C., 220; Rollins v. Railroad, 146 N. C., 153; Davis v. Railroad, 141 N. C., 68, where will be found a general discussion of the question as to\u2019 who is the \u201cparty aggrieved,\u201d within the meaning of statutes of like import with the one now under consideration. As the plaintiff had no interest in the transaction in his own right, but solely as the representative of another\" he was not, in contemplation of law, aggrieved by the alleged wrongful act of the defendant, and is not therefore entitled to sue for the penalty. If he can recover, then every shipping clerk of a merchant who is employed to superintend'the forwarding of goods to his customer is entitled to sue for the penalty in case of a refusal by the carrier to receive the goods. We do not think the statute will bear any such construction.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Walker, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Lyon & Greer and Douglas & Lyon for plaintiff.",
      "Davis & Davis for defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "DONALD McRACKAN v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY.\n(Filed 24 March, 1909.)\nPenalty Statutes \u2014 \u201cParty Aggrieved\u201d \u2014 Interest in Goods \u2014 Agent or Attorney.\nThe penalty prescribed' by .Revisal, sec. 2631, is for the person who is interested in having the goods shipped, and whose legal right in respect thereto is denied; and a person may not maintain an action for the penalty, as the party aggrieved, who has no right or interest in the goods tendered by him for shipment, except as agent or attorney for an attaching creditor and surety on his attachment bond, after the debt has been paid and the goods released.\nActioN tried before Lyon, Jand a jury, at July Term, 1908, of Columbus.\nPlaintiff appealed.\nLyon & Greer and Douglas & Lyon for plaintiff.\nDavis & Davis for defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0331-01",
  "first_page_order": 375,
  "last_page_order": 377
}