{
  "id": 11272069,
  "name": "URSULLA LYNCH et al. v. RALPH MELTON et al.",
  "name_abbreviation": "Lynch v. Melton",
  "decision_date": "1909-05-05",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "595",
  "last_page": "597",
  "citations": [
    {
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      "cite": "150 N.C. 595"
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
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    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
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      "cite": "118 N. C., 422",
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    {
      "cite": "44 N. C., 290",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:55:20.077008+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "URSULLA LYNCH et al. v. RALPH MELTON et al."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Clark, C. J.\nBy consent, the judge found the facts, which may be succinctly stated as follows: The testatrix, wife of J. D. Simmons, was childless, and took her orphan niece, L. E. Melton, to live with her, at the age of four years, on the death of the latter\u2019s mother. When the child had reached ten the testatrix died, leaving a will, with the following clause therein: \u201cI give and devise to my beloved husband, J. D. Simmons, the tract of land on which we now reside, containing thirty-three acres of land, and also all my personal effects, of whatsoever character, for his special benefit during his natural life, then to go to my niece, L. E. Melton, if anything left at his. death, provided she lives with her said uncle until she becomes free, by age or marriage, otherwise to go\u00bb as the law directs.\u201d After the death of the testatrix the little girl continued to live with her uncle a few months, when he evinced symptoms of insanity, and, being-conscious of it, he asked her father to take the child to his home in Oklahoma, which he did. The child was willing and anxious to stay with her uncle, but it was unsafe'to remain, and he had decided to break up Ms borne. Soon after, he was admitted to the insane asylum, and died something over two years after the testatrix.\nA will must be so construed as to effectuate the evident intent of the testator. Here the child was evidently the object of the testatrix\u2019s bounty, and the just construction of the clause of the will above quoted is that she devised a life estate in the land to her husband, with a vested remainder in fee to her niece, defea-sible if she voluntarily failed to live with.her uncle until she became married or of age. Without her -fault and contrary to her will, she was compelled to leave, by the insanity of her uncle and his determination to break up his home, and at the uncle\u2019s request the child was removed by her father to his own home.\nHis Honor properly held that the fee was vested in remainder in L. E. Melton, expectant, upon the death of the life, tenant, and had not been divested. The performance of the condition having become impossible without any f\u00e1ult on the-part,of the devisee, the condition, in the eye of the law, was not broken and there was no defeasance. Woods v. Woods, 44 N. C., 290; Thomas v. Howell, 1 Salk, 110; 1 Inst., 206; Hammond v. Hammond, 55 Md., 575; Merrill v. Merrill, 10 Pick., 511.\nWhere plaintiff, to whom a tract of land was devised upon condition that he should remain with the widow of the testator until'her death, was wrongfully ejected from the land by the agent of the widow (who was a devisee of the land of which the plaintiff\u2019s was a part), the plaintiff\u2019s estate, upon the widow\u2019s death, cannot be defeated upon the ground that the condition was not performed by the plaintiff\u2019s not remaining on the plantation until the widow\u2019s death. Harris v. Wright, 118 N. C., 422.\nIn Finley v. King, 3 Pet., 711, Marshall, O. J., said: \u201cIt was admitted in argument, and is certainly well settled, that there are no technical or appropriate words which always determine whether a devise be on a condition precedent' or subsequent. The same words have been determined differently, and the question is always a question of intention. If the language of the will shows that the particular clause, or if the whole will shows that the act on which' the estate depends must be performed before tbe estate can vest, tbe condition is, of course, precedent, and unless it be performed tbe devisee can take nothing. If, on tbe contrary, tbe act does not necessarily precede tbe vesting, and where the estate bad previously vested, it will become absolute by tbe death of. such person.\u201d ' '\n' Again in tbe same case be says: \u201cConditions belong to cases where all means to accomplish tbe testators purpose are in bis view and being; but when subsequent events change tbe existing state of things so essentially as to render tbe performance impossible \u2014 for instance, if a devise be made on condition that tbe devisee consent to marry a particular person and that person dies \u2014 tbe performance is rendered impossible by tbe happening of an event subsequently which tbe testator never contemplated; and where tbe estate bad previously vested, it will become absolute on tbe death of such person.\u201d\nTbe appellants rely upon Tilley v. King, 109 N. C., 461, but tbe facts in that case are not similar to this. There tbe testator clearly intended to provide support and attention for himself and wife in their declining years, and tbe devise to bis grandson \u25a0was made to compensate him for bis services if be \u201cstays with us until after our death and takes care of us.\u201d Tbe devisee, P. H. Tilley, voluntarily left tbe wife of the testator about one year after tbe death of testator and seven or eight years before her death. There was no providential hindrance to bis compliance with tbe prescribed conditions, as in tbe case at bar.\nTbe judgment below is\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Clark, C. J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Ryburn & Hoey for plaintiffs.",
      "Quinn & Hamrick for defendants."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "URSULLA LYNCH et al. v. RALPH MELTON et al.\n(Filed 5 May, 1909.)\n'Wills \u2014 Construction\u2014Devises Upon Condition \u2014 Unforeseen Circumstances.\nA will must be so construed as to effectuate the evident intent of the parties; and a devise by a testatrix of all of her property to her child by adoption and the object of her affection and solicitude, \u201cprovided she lives with her said uncle until she becomes free by age or marriage,\u201d-will not be construed to divert the estate of the niece, who lived with her uncle after testatrix\u2019s death, because she was forced to leave him for her safety, owing to his subsequent unsoundness of mind and insanity, a condition not to have been anticipated by the testatrix before her death.\nActioN beard by Justice, J., who found the facts, by consent^ at November Term, 1908, of Cleveland.\nPlaintiffs appealed.\nRyburn & Hoey for plaintiffs.\nQuinn & Hamrick for defendants."
  },
  "file_name": "0595-01",
  "first_page_order": 639,
  "last_page_order": 641
}