{
  "id": 8654900,
  "name": "DELLA HELMS, Administratrix, v. SOUTH ATLANTIC WASTE COMPANY",
  "name_abbreviation": "Helms v. South Atlantic Waste Co.",
  "decision_date": "1909-12-01",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "370",
  "last_page": "373",
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    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
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    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:30:26.349792+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "DELLA HELMS, Administratrix, v. SOUTH ATLANTIC WASTE COMPANY."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Hoke, J.,\nafter stating the case: In Hicks v. Mfg. Co., 138 N. C., at p. 325, it is said to be \u201caccepted law in North Carolina that an employer of labor to assist in the operation of railways, mills and oilier plants where the machinery is more or less complicated, and more especially when driven by mechanical' power, is required to provide for his employees, in the exercise of proper care, a reasonably safe place to work, and to supply them with machinery, implements and appliances reasonably safe and suitable for the work in which they are engaged, and such as are approved and in general use in plants and places of like kind and character; and an employer is also required to keep such machinery in such condition, as far as this can be done, in the exercise of proper care and diligence. Witsell v. Railroad, 120 N. C., 557; Marks v. Cotton Mills, 135 N. C., 287.\u201d\nThe principle, so stated, was reiterated in the same terms in Fearington v. Tobacco Co., 141 N. C., 80, and has been upheld before and since in numerous cases before us, as in Pressly v. Yarn Mills, 138 N. C., 410; Lloyd v. Hanes, 126 N. C., 359; Sims v. Lindsay, 122 N. C., 678. Having established this as an arbitrary standard \u2014 that is, machinery, implements and appliances which are reasonably safe and suitable for the work in which they are engaged, and such as are approved and in general use \u2014 and imposed the duty on the employer of supplying such implements, and keeping them in order by the exercise of reasonable care and supervision, it is clearly permissible to show by\u2019proper testimony what implements were in general use in the same mill or in other well-equipped and well-conducted mills of like kind, or where power was applied in the same or similar manner. Thompson\u2019s Commentary on Negligence, sec. 7776. This was the line of testimony suggested as competent in the case of Marks v. Cotton Mills, 135 N. C., 287, a case which seems to have been very closely followed in the present trial. True, in that case it was held that testimony by a single witness of having seen one other frame with the \u201ccogs boxed up\u201d was not of itself sufficient to show that such a custom existed, but decided intimation is given that proof of the custom in a \u201cnumber of other mills could be shown,\u201d and it was not at all decided in that case that plaintiff could not begin this proof by showing its existence in one mill if it had been properly followed up by showing similar conditions in other mills. As said in the opinion: \u201cThe question and answer were not excluded, but admitted, and there was no additional evidence offered by the plaintiff tending to show that cog wheels in mills other than the one mentioned by the witness are boxed. The .plaintiff perhaps might have shown that boxes were in general use by proving that a number of mills used them, but this he did not attempt to do. He had the full benefit of tbe right to begin his proof, and did begin it, but failed to complete it.\u201d\nIt will thus be seen.that while a new trial was awarded in that case, it was because the testimony as to \u201canother machine\u201d stood as an isolated and single instance to establish a custom, and not that it was incompetent to begin with one instance if followed up by others sufficient to show that such use was general and customary. The position urged by counsel, that the testimony was incompetent because it was not applied to machines of the very same kind as the one presented here \u2014 that is, a waste chopper \u2014 \u25a0 is not tenable. The danger arose from the method of applying the power by the shifting of the belt, the negligence being the failure to furnish the usual device by which the incident danger was minimized, and it does not appear that' the character of the machine would seriously or substantially affect the result. It was the drawing power of the belt and the danger of being caught in it which rendered the use of the shifter desirable and necessary for the employee\u2019s protection; and therefore the testimony as to its customary and general use in this and other mills, where the power was similarly applied and the belt controlled, was competent, under the rule. Nor can the objection be sustained that there was no sufficient testimony that the injury was caused by the belt. Not only was such a result probable from the objective facts, but there is direct evidence to that effect.\nThus, Nathaniel Fincher, a witness for the plaintiff, testified, among other things, as follows: \u201cMr. Helms was standing on upper side. He had a stick, pushing belt on tight pulley; he had a stick and was pushing the belt. The stick was about three feet long. He took the stick in his hand and pushed it against the belt, moving the belt from toward him. When I saw Mr. Helms pushing on the belt, I reached for some more cotton, and when I raised up I saw the belt snatching him down in the machine. The stick flew out of his hand.\u201d\nThere was no reversible error shown, and the judgment below is affirmed.\nNo error.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Hoke, J.,"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Stewart & McRae for plaintiff.",
      "Qameron Morrison for defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "DELLA HELMS, Administratrix, v. SOUTH ATLANTIC WASTE COMPANY.\n(Filed 1 December, 1909.)\n1. Master and Servant \u2014 Negligence \u2014 Duty of Employer \u2014 Safe Appliances \u2014 General Use \u2014 Evidence.\nIt being tbe duty of the employer to furnish the employees proper implements and appliances which are reasonably safe and suitable for the work in which they are engaged, and such as are approved and in general use, and to keep them in repair by the exercise of reasonable care and supervision, where an employee sues to recover damages for an injury alleged to have been caused by his negligent failure to furnish them, etc., it is competent to show by proper testimony what implements were in general use at the time in the same mill or in other well-equipped and well-conducted mills of the kind in which the employee received the injury or in which power was applied in the same or similar manner.\n2. Same.\nThe plaintiff employed in defendant\u2019s mill received the injury complained of while using a detached stick furnished by the latter, to shift a belt from a loose to a fast pulley on a-machine run by steam power. Held, competent to show that in this and other mills where power was applied by a belt in the same manner, it was usual and customary to have a safer device for the purpose called a shifter; and it was not material whether the machines were of different kinds or used ior different purposes, if the method of applying the power and dangers incident to it were substantially the same; and while an isolated and single instance is not sufficient , to establish a custom, it is competent to begin with one instance if followed up by others sufficient to show that such use was general and customary. Maries v. Ootton Mills, 135 N. C., 287, cited and distinguished.\n3. Master and Servant \u2014 Negligence \u2014 Cause of Injury \u2014 Direct Evidence.\nTestimony of a witness that he saw the plaintiff in the act of pushing a belt with a detached stick from a loose to a fast pulley to communicate power to a machine at which he was at work, and that he saw the belt snatching\u00bb the plaintiff down in the machine after he, witness, had reached down for more cotton and had raised up again, is direct evidence that the plaintiff\u2019s injury was caused by the belt.\nAppeal from Councill, J., March Term, 1909, of Mecklen-burg.\nCivil action, to recover damages for alleged negligent killing of plaintiff\u2019s intestate-.\nThere was evidence tending to show that on 1 August, 1908, the intestate, an employee' of defendant company, at work in its mill, was killed in the endeavor to push the belt, by which the power was applied to a machine, called a waste cutter, or waste chopper, from the loose to the tight pulley. The belt was in motion at the time, and the intestate, in the effort to push the belt from the loose to the tight pulley, as stated, was using a detached stick, supplied by the defendant for the purpose, and, while so engaged, was caught in the belt and thrown against the machine and killed.\nThere was further evidence, admitted over defendant\u2019s objection, tending to show that on the other similar machines in this mill there was a device called a shifter, by which the belt was pushed from one pulley to the other, the device operating by leverage and enabling the employees to shift the belts in comparative safety. It was further shown \u2014 and this, too, over defendant\u2019s objection \u2014 that in this and other mills, where the power was applied by a belt in the same manner, it was usual and customary to have this device, called a shifter.\nThe jury rendered the following verdict:\n1. \u201cWas the plaintiff\u2019s intestate injured by the negligence of the defendant, as alleged in plaintiff\u2019s complaint?\u201d Answer: \u201cYes.\u201d\n2. \u201cDid plaintiff\u2019s intestate contribute by his own negligence, as alleged in the answer, to his injury and death?\u201d Answer: \u201cNo.\u201d\n*3. \u201c\"What damages, if any, is the plaintiff entitled to recover ?\u201d Answer: \u201c$3,850.\u201d\nJudgment on the verdict, and defendant excepted and appealed.\nStewart & McRae for plaintiff.\nQameron Morrison for defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0370-01",
  "first_page_order": 414,
  "last_page_order": 417
}
