{
  "id": 11273146,
  "name": "STATE v. J. E. CLIFTON",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Clifton",
  "decision_date": "1910-04-06",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "800",
  "last_page": "802",
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    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:29:47.463636+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "STATE v. J. E. CLIFTON."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "BkowN, J.\nTbe defendant offered no evidence, but rested bis case upon tbe proof offered by tbe State.\nTbe evidence tended to prove tbat tbe dog\u2019 was running at large off bis owner\u2019s premises witbin tbe town of Lumber Bridge in Robeson County, unmuzzled, and was killed by defendant by tbe administration of poison. There is also evidence tbat tbe defendant was tbe town constable, charged with enforcement of tbe municipal ordinances which prohibited tbe running at large witbin tbe town of dogs without muzzles. Tbe ordinance provided further tbat any dog found running at large after 24 April, 1909, without a muzzle might be killed by any resident of tbe town, and tbat tbe dog in question was killed by tbe defendant, tbe constable of tbe town, after tbat date. The ordinance also imposed a fine upon tbe owner of tbe dog.\nTbe defendant in apt time by proper prayers for instruction requested tbe court to charge tbe jury tbat if there was such an ordinance in force, and be killed tbe dog in obedience to it, be was not guilty.\nWe think tbe defendant was clearly entitled to this instruction.\nIt is needless to consider whether a private citizen could justify under tbe ordinance, or whether tbe ordinance is too broad in providing such a general method of enforcement, for tbe defendant was a police officer whose duty it was to execute tbe lawful and talid ordinances of tbe town.\nTbe town of Lumber Bridge is invested with tbe police powers of tbe State conferred by tbe general law upon all tbe cities and incorporated towns of tbe State. Such powers are usually exercised to further and protect tbe comfort and safety of citizens generally.\nTbe keeping of animals of all kinds is classified as one of \u201ctbe main subjects of police regulation.\u201d Horr and Bemis Municipal Ord., see. 212.\nA very general police regulation found in tbe ordinances of municipalities in this country is one \u201cto require dogs to be muzzled and to authorize tbe police officers to kill those to be found at large and unmuzzled.\u201d Ilorr and Bemis, subdiv. 3, sec. 213,, and cases cited in note to p. 200. In addition, tbe following cases are authority for the text: City of Faribault v. Wilson, 34 Wis., 255; Blair v. Forehand, 100 Mass., 136; Morey v. Brown, 42 N. H., 373; Mitchell v. Williams, 27 Ind., 62.\nThe word willful as used within the meaning of the statute implies something more than a mere voluntary purpose. When used in criminal statutes the word willful means not only designedly, but also with a \u201cbad purpose.\u201d 8 Words and Phrases, p. 7469, citing Potter v. United States, Sup. Court U. S., 39 Law Ed., 214; Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 37 Mass., 206, and other cases.\nA police officer who in good faith kills a dog under color of the authority of a municipal ordinance .cannot be said to do so willfully, within the meaning of the statute upon which this indictment is founded. We think the rulings of the judge deprived defendant of the benefit of a valid defense.\nNew trial.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "BkowN, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney-General Bickett, George L. Jones, and McIntyre, Lawrence & Proctor for tbe State.",
      "McLean & McLean for defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE v. J. E. CLIFTON.\n(Filed 6 April, 1910.)\n1. Cities and Towns \u2014 Ordinances\u2014Police Powers \u2014 Killing of Dogs\u2014 \u201cWillfully\u201d \u2014 Words and Phrases.\nA police officer of a town, acting within his duties imposed by an ordinance, in killing a dog running at large within the town limits without \u00e1 muzzle, when not on the owner\u2019s premises, cannot be convicted, under the statute, of \u201cunlawfully, willfully and wantonly,\u201d etc., killing a certain useful animal, etc., the word willful meaning not only designedly, but with a bad purpose.\n2. Cities and Towns \u2014 Police Powers \u2014 Ordinances\u2014Validity\u2014Killing Dogs.\nAn ordinance of a city authorizing its police officers to kill, under certain circumstances, dogs running at large without being muzzled within the town limits, upon which city the charter confers police powers,' is a valid one.\nAppeal from Lyon, J., at November Term, 1909, of RobesoN. The indictment charged that defendant did \u201cunlawfully, willfully and wantonly ill-use, torment, wound, injure, poison and needlessly kill\u201d a certain useful animal, to wit, \u201cone bound dog, tbe property of E. E. McNair.\u201d From tbe judgment imposed defendant appeals.\nAttorney-General Bickett, George L. Jones, and McIntyre, Lawrence & Proctor for tbe State.\nMcLean & McLean for defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0800-01",
  "first_page_order": 848,
  "last_page_order": 850
}