{
  "id": 8652148,
  "name": "STATE ex rel. J. H. KERR, Solicitor, et al., v. ISAAC HICKS et al.",
  "name_abbreviation": "State ex rel. Kerr v. Hicks",
  "decision_date": "1911-03-01",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "265",
  "last_page": "270",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "154 N.C. 265"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
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    "name": "N.C."
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    {
      "cite": "118 N. C., 774",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
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    {
      "cite": "139 N. C., 446",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
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        8652817
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    {
      "cite": "135 N. C., 385",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8659427
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    {
      "cite": "8 Am. Rep., 280",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "Am. Rep.",
      "year": 1904,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "69 Pa., 462",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Pa.",
      "case_ids": [
        1026428
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      "year": 1904,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/pa/69/0462-01"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:16:36.957085+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "STATE ex rel. J. H. KERR, Solicitor, et al., v. ISAAC HICKS et al."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Clark, C. J.\nIn 1871 a voluntary association, known as \u201cShiloh Association,\u201d was formed by several Missionary Baptist churches for colored people. In 1883 the association purchased land for $2,500 and established a school called Shiloh Institute. Said school was chartered, Pr. Laws 1891, ch. 321, the aforesaid association procuring the charter and naming the trustees. The charter was amended, Pr. Laws 1903, ch. 49. In August, 1907, the association was composed of 58 churches. At the annual meeting held at that time, the church of \u201cBlessed Hope\u201d at Henderson was named as the place for the next meeting of the association. But, subsequently, the officers of the association called an extra session to be held at Manson, 27 December, 1907. The churches were notified and 44 of them sent delegates. At that meeting it was decided to withdraw fellowship from \u201cBlessed Hope\u201d Church, and the resolution to hold the next annual session at that church was rescinded, and it was decided to hold it at Ridgeway. The plaintiffs claim that they were duly elected trustees of the school by the representatives of 10 or 12 churches who assembled at \u201cBlessed Hope\u201d in 1908, in accordance with the resolution passed at the regular annual meeting of 1907, and at subsequent meetings, in pursuance of its action, and that the called meeting at Manson in December, 1907, was without authority and void.\nThe judge below held that there was no provision in the bylaws or constitution of the association for calling the extra session at Manson in December, 1907, and that the proceedings at said meeting were irregular and void, as were all the subsequent meetings held in pursuance thereof, and the election of trustees at such meetings; and. that the annual meeting held at \u201cBlessed Hope\u201d in 1908 was the regular meeting of the association, and that the trustees abosen thereat and at the subsequent meetings held in pursuance of the resolutions adopted thereat are the legally chosen trustees.\nThe question presented, then, is whether the action of a minority of the churches who met at the regular time and place, or that of the seceding majority held at an irregular time and place is valid. The constitution of the association provides: \u201cArticle 11. This constitution may be altered or amended at any regular meeting of the association by a two-thirds vote of the members presentThere is no provision which required a majority to constitute a quorum, nor which authorized the calling, by certain officers, of the meeting at Manson in December, 1907. The association is not incorporated, and the constitution, which is the contract between the parties, contemplates that a majority of the members present at any regular meeting should be the association.\nA corporation has only such powers as are conferred by the charter creating or the laws regulating it, and a voluntary association has no existence or power except as contained in its formal articles of agreement or established by custom, acquiesced in by the parties to it. When the association consists, as here, of the annual meeting of delegates from its constituent members \u2014 the churches \u2014 to further certain common interests, the organization is dissolved, upon adjournment, into its individual elements until reassembled pursuant to the common agreement.\n\u201cIn church organizations, those who adhere and submit to the regular order of the church, local and general, though a minority, are the true congregation.\u201d Roshi\u2019s Appeal, 69 Pa., 462; 8 Am. Rep., 280; Gable v. Miller, 10 Paige, 627. This was recently held by the House of Lords in England as to the State Church of Scotland (L. R. App. Cases, 1904), where a very small per cent of the \u201cregulars\u201d were adjudged entitled to hold the entire property of the organization. The courts will not decide such controversies beyond ascertaining which is the \u201cregular\u201d organization.\nWe concur, therefore, with his Honor, that the regular meeting held in 1908 at \u201cBlessed Hope\u201d in pursuance of the resolution adopted at tbe regular annual meeting in 1907 constituted tbe legal association, tbougb tbe representatives of only a minority of tbe original 58 cburebes attended, and tbat tbe action of tbe seceding majority beld at Manson in December, 1907, bad no legal force or effect. There bas been a regular succession of meetings and tbe election of trustees rof Sbilob Institute thereat in pursuance of tbe action taken at \u201cBlessed Hope,\u201d tbe regular meeting, in 1908, and bis Honor properly beld tbat tbe plaintiffs, being such trustees, are entitled to administer tbe school known as Sbilob Institute.\nThis action was originally instituted by tbe State on relation of tbe solicitor, under Eevisal, 3922-4. Tbe amendment to tbe charter in 1903 provided tbat tbe trustees of Sbilob Institute should be elected by Sbilob Baptist Association, two at each annual meeting of tbe association. Tbe defendants in tbe action were tbe trustees elected at tbe Manson meeting and at tbe other meetings beld in pursuance thereof. It appearing tbat tbe real parties in interest were tbe trustees which bad been elected at tbe regular meeting beld at \u201cBlessed Hope\u201d in 1908, and at tbe successive meetings beld in pursuance thereof, bis Honor properly granted their application to be made parties plaintiff, so tbat the whole matter might be decided upon its merits, and refused to dismiss tbe action. It could have been no advantage to either plaintiffs or defendants to have dismissed tbe action tbat was then pending, which was brought to decide who were entitled to administer tbe trust, and tbe court in its discretion admitted the real parties in interest to be joined. Eevisal, 507.\nNo appeal lay from the refusal to dismiss (Johnson v. Reformers, 135 N. C., 385), and tbe entry of appeal, tbougb not perfected, will be treated as an exception on this appeal from tbe final judgment. Bernard v. Shemwell, 139 N. C., 446.\nTbe defendants were already in court, tbe subject of tbe controversy was not changed by tbe amendment, and tbe additional parties, being tbe beneficiaries for whom tbe action was brought, were properly made parties. Eevisal, 400. Even if it be conceded tbat tbe solicitor was an unnecessary party, this is not ground for exception.\nThe object of The Code system is to^decide cases upon the merits. Here the cause of action from the beginning was to determine which set of trustees should administer Shiloh Institute. The defendants were regularly made parties and had full opportunity to present their side of the question. If there was a defect of parties plaintiff originally, it was cured by the amendment which allowed the beneficiaries of the action, the other set of trustees, to be made parties plaintiff.\nThis case differs from Simmons v. Allison, 118 N. C., 774, where the congregation was permitted to vote as to its choice. There the congregation was the .constituent body. Here, by the constitution, the contract of the association, a \u201cmajority of the members present\u201d at a regular meeting was the organic body and had the right to elect the trustees.\nNo error.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Clark, C. J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "T. M. Pittman, Tasker Polk, and A. J. Harris for plaintiff.",
      "T. T. Hicks for defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE ex rel. J. H. KERR, Solicitor, et al., v. ISAAC HICKS et al.\n(Filed 1 March, 1911.)\n1. Associations \u2014 Churches\u2014Powers\u2014Agreement\u2014Custom.\nA voluntary association of churches has no existence or powers except those contained in its formal articles of agreement or established by custom acquiesced in by the parties to it; and when, as here, it consists of an annual meeting- of delegates from its constituent members, the churches, to further certain common interests, the organization is dissolved upon adjournment into its individual elements until reassembled pursuant to the common agreement.\n2. Same \u2014 School Trustees \u2014 Appointment\u2014Regular and Called Meetings.\nA voluntary association of churches chartered and established a school, naming, as authorized, trustees for the school. The constitution of the association provided that it \u201cmay he altered or amended at any regular meeting . . . by a two-thirds vote of the members present.\u201d At a regular annual meeting the church of \u201cBlessed Hope\u201d was designated as the place for the next annual meeting. Subsequently, the officers of the association met and decided to \u201cwithdraw fellowship\u201d from \"Blessed Hope,\u201d rescinded the resolution to meet there and designated a different church in another locality for that purpose, where a majority of the churches were represented by delegates. Delegates from the majority and minority number of the churches met at each of the respective places on the day appointed, and,at each meeting trustees for the'school were elected: Held, (1) that the meeting at \u201cBlessed Hope\u201d was the legal one, and the, trustees appointed by a majority vote of the delegates there present were those legally entitled to administer the affairs of the school, i\u00e1im.mons v. Allison, Its X. 0., 774, cited and distinguished.\n3. Associations \u2014 Churches\u2014Powers\u2014Trustees\u2014Appointment\u2014Parties \u2014 Court\u2019s Discretion.\nAt a meeting regularly held by a voluntary association of churches, trustees were appointed for a school chartered by the association. At the same time, but at a different place, there, was a meeting called by the officers of the association, when and where other and conflicting trustees were appointed. The question at issue being which set of trustees were the ones legally qualified to act, it was Held, (1) that the trustees appointed at these meetings were the real parties in interest, and it was not error for the trial judge in his discretion to order them to be made parties, so that the matter might bo decided upon its merits (Iievisal, 507) ; (2) no appeal lies from the refusal of a motion to dismiss, and an entry of appeal not perfected is treated as an exception on appeal from the final judgment.\n4. Same \u2014 Exceptions\u2014Appeal and Error \u2014 Procedure.\nThe amendment making additional parties does not affect the decision in this case, as thereby the subject of the controversy was not changed, the additional parties being the beneficiaries for whom this action was brought, and proper parties (Revisal, 400) ; and if it be conceded that the solicitor was an unnecessary party, that is not ground for an exception.\nAppeal by defendants from Ward, J., at June Term, 1910, Of \"WARREN.\nThe facts are sufficiently stated in tie opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Clark.\nT. M. Pittman, Tasker Polk, and A. J. Harris for plaintiff.\nT. T. Hicks for defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0265-01",
  "first_page_order": 307,
  "last_page_order": 312
}