{
  "id": 8652162,
  "name": "W. L. PATRICK v. A. A. SPRINGS",
  "name_abbreviation": "Patrick v. Springs",
  "decision_date": "1911-03-01",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "270",
  "last_page": "273",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:16:36.957085+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "W. L. PATRICK v. A. A. SPRINGS."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Brown, J.\nThe record discloses that this action was brought by the plaintiff to recover damages suffered by reason of being-asphyxiated while plaintiff was a guest in defendant\u2019s hotel in Washington, N. C. The testimony shows that plaintiff and companion were assigned by defendant\u2019s clerk to a room in defendant\u2019s hotel. The evidence of plaintiff tends to prove that he resided in Hyde County and was visiting Washington and stopped at defendant\u2019s hotel with his companion, one Mann. They were assigned to a room and went to bed about 11 o\u2019clock at night. The hotel was lighted by gas, and the plaintiff\u2019s room had a gas burner with no stop or safety-pin in it, so that the key was loose and could be turned all way around. Defendant\u2019s witness, Martin, testifies he examined fixture next morning, having been called in to fix it. He says the safety-pin was out, and that with the pin out it would not be safe.\nPlaintiff testifies that he turned out gas carefully and discovered that there, was no stop-pin, and that he turned the key at place where it should stop and that he could smell no gas. Then he went to bed. During night he woke up and found Mann crawling over him. The room was full of gas. He says he was asphyxiated, but managed to reach the door and called for help. Plaintiff testifies that he has not recovered from the effects. There are no exceptions to evidence. The motion to nonsuit was properly denied.\nThere has been considerable discussion by judges and text-writers as to the liability of an innkeeper for personal injuries sustained by a guest. Cases are to be found where the innkeeper has been held liable for assaults by servants, and cases contra.. But it seems now to be well settled that in case of an injury occurring in consequence of the unsanitary and defective condition of the inn premises, or room to which a guest is assigned, the innkeeper is liable upon the same principles applicable in other cases where persons come on the premises at the invitation of the owner or occupant and are injured in consequence of their dangerous condition.\nThe innkeeper is not an insurer of his guests\u2019 personal safety, but his liability does extend to injuries received by the guests from being placed in an unsafe room. This is a matter peculiarly within the innkeeper\u2019s knowledge and entirely beyond the control of the guest. In that particular he is peculiarly within the innkeeper\u2019s power and protection. Ten Brock v. Wells, 47 Fed., 670; West v. Thomas, 97 Ala., 622; Stanley v. Bircher, 78 Mo., 245; 16 Am. and Eng., 547; Sandys v. Florence, 47 L. J. C. Pl., 598; 22 Cyc., 1081.\n. This is not only the settled law of this country, but is held by the courts of Great Britain.\nOne who keeps a public house extends an invitation to all to come on his premises, and is therefore liable for injuries sustained in consequence of the bad condition of his inn premises. Oxford v. Prior, 14 W. R., 611. This principle is applied in cases of warehousemen, common carriers, and the like. Finch v. R. R., 151 N. C., 106; Fetter on Carriers, 228. When the plaintiff proved the unsafe and defective condition of the gas fixture, in consequence of which gas escaped during the night and injured him, he made out a prima facie, case of negligence, which it was defendant\u2019s duty to answer.\nThe learned counsel for defendant, Mr. McMullan, in a well considered argument, insists that the plaintiff is guilty of con-tributary negligence upon bis own evidence, and for that reason tbe motion to nonsuit should bave been sustained. We are not prepared to go that far under tbe circumstances in wbicb plaintiff was placed.\nIt is undoubtedly true that if tbe defect is an obvious one, tbe guest must use reasonable care on bis part, and if be is himself negligent and could have avoided tbe injury by due care, be cannot recover. 22 Cyc., 1081, and cases cited.\nThere are circumstances when tbe court can declare as matter of law whether a person has exercised reasonable care, but there are conditions when tbe question can only be solved by adopting tbe rule of tbe prudent man and submitting tbe matter to tbe jury. \"We think, under tbe conditions surrounding-plaintiff, it cannot be fairly held that be necessarily failed to exercise due care as a matter of law. He fixed tbe key, as be thought, safely so as to cut off tbe gas. Smelling none, be retired and went to sleep. Tbe gas may bave escaped through tbe loose key during tbe night by reason of continued pressure, tbe key not being firm enough in place to bold it.\n\"We think tbe question one peculiarly for tbe jury under such circumstances, and that it was fairly presented by tbe court to them.\nWe find no. err or in tbe charge of wbicb tbe defendant can justly complain.\nNo error.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Brown, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "W. M. Bond for plaintiff.",
      "Small, McLean & McMtillan for defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "W. L. PATRICK v. A. A. SPRINGS.\n(Filed 1 March, 1911.)\n1. Public Inns \u2014 Hotels\u2014Guests\u2014Invitation\u2014Negligence.\nA liotol keeper, from the nature of Ills occupation, extends an invitation to all who come on his premises; and though not an insurer of the guest\u2019s personal safety, he is responsible in damages for injuries received by the guest from being placed in an unsafe or unsanitary room.\n2. Same \u2014 Contributory Negligence \u2014 Evidence\u2014Questions for Jury.\nIn this ease there was evidence tending to show that the plaintiff, a guest at defendant\u2019s hotel, was shown into a bedroom wherein there was a defective gas fixture by which a light was furnished to the occupant, by reason of not having a safety-pin to prevent the turning of the key all the way around, and that the gas fixture was not safe in consequence; that before retiring for the night the plaintiff discovered the absence of this safety-pin, but turned the key to where it should have stopped, and could smell no gas escaping, and thereupon he retired, but was injured by asphyxiation that night when asleep: Held, a motion to nonsuit was properly denied, there being evidence of defendant's negligence; and it was for the jury to say wlietlier. according to tlie rule of the prudent man, the plaintiff was guilty of such contributory negligence as would bar his recovery.\nAppeau from Ward, J., at July Special Term, 1910, of Hyde.\nTbe action was brought to recover damages of defendant Springs, tbe keeper of a hotel in Washington, N. C., for damages suffered by plaintiff by reason of having been assigned to an unsanitary room in .which was an unsafe and leaky gas fixture.\nThe usual issues were submitted of negligence, contributory negligence,, and damage. The jury answered first issue \u201cYes,\u201d the second \u201cNo,\u201d and assessed plaintiff\u2019s damage at $250. The court rendered judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appealed.\nW. M. Bond for plaintiff.\nSmall, McLean & McMtillan for defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0270-01",
  "first_page_order": 312,
  "last_page_order": 315
}