{
  "id": 8652309,
  "name": "HARRIET A. ROBERSON v. GREENLEAF JOHNSON LUMBER COMPANY",
  "name_abbreviation": "Roberson v. Greenleaf Johnson Lumber Co.",
  "decision_date": "1911-03-15",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "328",
  "last_page": "330",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "154 N.C. 328"
    }
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
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    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
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    {
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    {
      "cite": "141 N. C., 528",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "123 N. C., 216",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
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    {
      "cite": "139 N. C., 500",
      "category": "reporters:state",
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    {
      "cite": "152 N. C., 125",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:16:36.957085+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "HARRIET A. ROBERSON v. GREENLEAF JOHNSON LUMBER COMPANY."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Clark, C. J.\nAction for wrongful death of plaintiff\u2019s intestate, an employee of tbe defendant company, wbo bad boarded its train, as was bis custom, to return borne at night from bis work. Tbe complaint alleges that on reaching the place where said intestate was accustomed to alight, the said train stopped, and while said intestate was getting off said train the engine was suddenly and carelessly, without notice or warning, jerked forward by the negligent operation of the engine, throwing said intestate violently to the ground so that the cars ran over him, causing his death.\nThere was evidence to support the above allegation. The Fellow-servant Act (Revisal, 2646) applies to these logging-roads. Bissell v. Lumber Co., 152 N. C., 125, and cases there cited. Besides, pro hac vice, the plaintiff\u2019s intestate was a passenger.\nThe court having held, upon the motion made in this case, that the appellee\u2019s case having been served in time, must be accepted as modifying the appellant\u2019s case, practically the only exception left for our consideration is the sixth, which is to the refusal of the court to instruct the jury, as prayed by the defendant, \u201cthat the plaintiff can only recover, if at all, the net earnings after deducting all the personal expenses, including what it would cost Roberson to support his family dependent upon him.\u201d This was properly refused. The object of the statute is to assess the present value of the prospective net earnings of the deceased after deducting only his reasonably necessary personal expenses. To deduct, further, the support he would have been able to give his family would be to deduct the very loss for which the statute was intended to give compensation. The whole subject is so fully discussed in Carter v. R. R., 139 N. C., 500, and cases there cited, that it is unnecessary to do more than to reiterate what is there said.\nIn Carter v. R. R., supra, it is pertinently said: \u201cThe true rule requires the jury to deduct only the reasonably necessary personal expenses of the deceased, taking into consideration his age, manner of living, business, calling, or profession, etc.\u201d It adds that to deduct further, as the defendant there requested, \u201cthe aniount spent for his family or those dependent upon him, the result would be to deprive the families of a very large majority of men from recovering damages for their death. But a small number of men accumulate estates. Their income or earnings, after paying their actual personal expenses, are expended in the support and education of their children. Certainly, it was not contemplated that for wrongfully causing the death of such a man no damage could be recovered, although his death deprives his family of their sole support, while for the death of one without any family, or who by miserly living and hoarding deprives his family of support and education, large damages should be awarded. It cannot, with any show of truth, be said that in the first case the family sustain no pecuniary loss by reason of the death of the husband and father. Such a construction of the statute would place beyond the protection of the law nine-tenths of the people.\u201d This same rule had been previously laid down in Mendenhall v. R. R., 123 N. C., 216; Poe v. R. R., 141 N. C., 528, and cases there cited, and has been approved recently in Gerringer v. R. R., 146 N. C., 35.\nThe object of the statute is to render compensation as near as may be for the actual money value of the life of the man by estimating the present cash value of his probable net earnings above the necessary expenses for his own support.. To do this, we should leave out of consideration whether or not he would probably have accumulated anything out of such net earnings, and, on the other hand, the number of the family dependent upon him.\nNo error.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Clark, C. J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "K.. W. Stubbs for plaintiff.",
      "P. H. C. Cabell and Winston & MaMhews for defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "HARRIET A. ROBERSON v. GREENLEAF JOHNSON LUMBER COMPANY.\n(Filed 15 March, 1911.)\n1. Railroads \u2014 Fellow-servants\u2014Logging Roads.\nThe Pellow-servant Act (Revisal, 2C4G) applies to logging roads using' the agency o\u00ed steam. Bissell v. Lumber Co., 152 N. C., 125, cited and approved.\n2. Carriers of Passengers \u2014 Master and Servant \u2014 Fellow-servant\u2014 Employee.\nAn employee of a railroad who customarily used the trains of the company in going to and from his work is a passenger while so doing. \\\n3. Railroads \u2014 Master and Servant \u2014 Employees\u2014Usage\u2014Actionable Negligence \u2014 Warning.\nThe plaintiff, an employee of defendant railroad, boarded the defendant\u2019s train for the purpose of going home from his work, which had been customary: Held, it was actionable negligence for the employees of the train to suddenly start the train forward, without notice or warning, while the plaintiff was getting off at his usual place, and thus causing him to be thrown to the ground to his injury.\n4. Appeal and Error \u2014 \u201cCase Settled\u201d \u2014 Negligent Killing \u2014 Measure of Damages \u2014 Net Earnings \u2014 Support of Family.\nIn an action for damages for the wrongful killing of plaintiff\u2019s intestate, it is not error to refuse an instruction which limited recovery to the net earnings, after deducting the cost the deceased would have incurred in supporting his family depending upon him, the object of the statute being to render compensation as near as may be for tbe actual money value of tbe life by estimating tbe present cash value of bis probable net earnings above tbe necessary expenses for bis own support.\nAppeal by defendant from Peebles, J., at December Term, 1910, of MaRTIN.\nTbe facts are sufficiently stated in tbe opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Cla/rTc.\nK.. W. Stubbs for plaintiff.\nP. H. C. Cabell and Winston & MaMhews for defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0328-01",
  "first_page_order": 370,
  "last_page_order": 372
}
