{ "id": 11271252, "name": "W. F. WYATT v. SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY COMPANY", "name_abbreviation": "Wyatt v. Seaboard Air Line Railway Co.", "decision_date": "1911-10-18", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "307", "last_page": "316", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "156 N.C. 307" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "137 N. C., 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8656338 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/137/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 N. C., 37", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8657567 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/124/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 N. C., 214", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 N. C., 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "11 W. Va., 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "W. Va.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 Wis., 199", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 Va., 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Va.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 Ind., 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ind.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 Pa. St., 345", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 Ind., 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ind.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 N. Y., 521", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 Tenn., 718", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Tenn.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 Mo., 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mo.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 Ala., 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ala.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Kan., 34", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Kan.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 Mich., 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 Miss., 779", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Miss.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 N. J. L., 12", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J.L.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 N. C., 624", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 N. C., 472", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 773, "char_count": 17757, "ocr_confidence": 0.448, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.2232001347482048e-07, "percentile": 0.777869481965937 }, "sha256": "9aa61879ee556eb5c1c8d90f5ad8c75cd96d601a5f2d42254b8338d1aa46a233", "simhash": "1:f385fe66963bd79c", "word_count": 3091 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:09:22.906707+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "W. F. WYATT v. SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY COMPANY." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "AlleN, J.,\nafter stating the case: The uniform rule, prevailing under our present system, is that the allegations of a pleading shall be liberally construed with a view to substantial justice between the parties, and that every reasonable intendment is made in favor of the pleader. Brewer v. Wynne, 154 N. C., 472.\nThe just application of this rule tends to the trial of cases upon their merits, and we would not be justified in relaxing it in a ease like this, where there has been a trial before a jury, and both parties have had full opportunity to present their evidence.\nIt would require a very strict construction of the allegations of the complaint to give it the meaning contended for by the defendant, to wit, that it only alleges negligence in the operation of the train.\nIf we give to the pleading every \u201creasonable intendment in favor of the pleader,\u201d and \u201cconstrue it liberally,\u201d as our authorities require, the negligent act alleged in the third paragraph of the complaint is that the defendant \u201cnegligently and carelessly permitted said engine to emit sparks and coals of fire therefrom, wbicb fell on plaintiff\u2019s property, etc.\u201d; and the preceding language, \u201cin operating and running an engine,\u201d merely indicates where the engine was, and what was being done with it, at the time of the negligent act.\nIf so, it was competent for the jury to consider evidence of defects in the engine under the allegations of the complaint.\nThe defendant\u2019s counsel presented his contention as to the contributory negligence of the plaintiff with much force and ability and cited authority from eminent courts in support of his position.\nWe do not, however, agree with him that the weight of authority sustains his view, and we think his Honor held correctly that there was no evidence to sustain the plea.\nThe buildings, which were destroyed by fire, were on the land of the plaintiff, adjoining the right of way of the defendant, and the negligence alleged is that the plaintiff failed to repair them, and had permitted the roofs, where the fire began, to become rotten and highly inflammable.\nThe buildings had been erected about eighteen years, and there is no evidence they were ever ignited prior to the time they were destroyed.\nAs the buildings were not on the right of way, and there is no evidence that fire caught in combustible matter on the right of way and was communicated to them, the plaintiff could not recover unless he succeeded in proving that the engine of the defendant was defective or that it was negligently operated. Williams v. R. R., 140 N. C., 624.\nIf so, to hold that a failure to repair is contributory negligence would require the plaintiff to foresee the negligence of the defendant and to provide against it.\nWe think the contrary is the rule, and that the plaintiff .had the right to assume that the defendant would perform its duty, and that it would not operate an engine negligently or one that was defective.\n\u201cThe general rule is that every person has the right to presume that every other person will perform his duty and obey the law, and in tbe absence of reasonable ground to think otherwise it is not negligence to assume that be is not exposed to danger wbicb can come to bim only from violation of law or duty to sucb other person. Hence failure to anticipate defendant\u2019s negligence does not amount to contributory negligence, even though he places his property in an exposed or hazardous position.\u201d Cyc., vol. 29, p. 516.\n\u201cSince a person is not required to anticipate the negligence of another, \u25a0 he will not be guilty of contributory negligence because the injury results in part from the defective condition of the property, or because its condition is such as to render the danger greater.\u201d Ib., 526.\nAgain it is said in Cyc., vol. 30, p. 1343: \u201cAs a general rule, an owner of land has a right to use it in the ordinary and usual way and is not bound to remove dry grass, weeds, leaves, or other combustible material from his land adjoining a railroad right of way, in anticipation of probable negligence on the part of the railroad company, and a failure to perform such acts will not make him guilty of contributory negligence so as to preclude a recovery for damages caused by a fire originating through the railroad company negligence.\u201d\nThe following authorities, among many others, sustain the text: Salmon v. R. R., 38 N. J. L., 12; R. R. v. Ins. Co., 82 Miss., 779; Hendrick v. Towle, 60 Mich., 371; Walker v. R. R., 76 Kan., 34; R. R. v. L. Co., 125 Ala., 261; Matthews v. R. R., 121 Mo., 334; R. R. v. Short, 110 Tenn., 718; Kalbfleisch v. R. R., 102 N. Y., 521; R. R. v. Burger, 124 Ind., 278; R. R. v. Schultz, 93 Pa. St., 345; R. R. v. Jones, 86 Ind., 500; R. R. v. Medley, 75 Va., 506; Coswell v. R. R., 42 Wis., 199; Snyder v. R. R., 11 W. Va., 28.\nWe quote from only two of them.\nIn the case from Pennsylvania, the Court says: \u201cAgain, complaint is made that the court refused to instruct the jury that if either Schultz or the owner of the strip lying between his land and the railroad allowed the accumulation of dry leaves, brushwood, and other rubbish on his property, which would be readily fired by sparks ordinarily issuing from a properly equipped locomotive, tbat might be regarded as contributory negligence. This was certainly an extraordinary proposition: first, because the learned judge throughout the trial held that if the defendant\u2019s locomotive was properly equipped with spark-arresting appliances, the plaintiff could not recover, whether he had been careful or negligent; second, because it is an attempt to impose upon property owners along the line of a railroad duties unknown and unnecessary before the building of the road; and, third, if this proposition means anything, it means that upon such property owners devolves the duty of guarding against the negligence of railroad companies and their servants; but this is simjply absurd.\u201d\nAnd in the Michigan case: \u201cThe obligation of care to prevent the fire from the defendant\u2019s engine burning the plaintiff\u2019s mill rested upon the defendant, and the fact that old, combustible matter accumulated about the mill and in near proximity to the railroad cannot be urged as contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. He had a right to use the offal of his mill to fill up the waste and low places with, just as he was accustomed to do before the railroad was built. He was not obliged to guard his premises to relieve the defendant from liability for his negligent acts.\u201d\nThe same principle has been recognized in Phillips v. R. R., 138 N. C., 19: \u201cThe owner of premises is not bound to anticipate negligence of a railroad and, by way of prevention, make provision against communication of fire.\u201d\nOpinions of witnesses as to value of land, houses, etc., have been very generally received when the witnesses, by experience and information, are qualified to speak, and we think there was no error in their admission in this case. 1 Wig. Ev., secs. 714-720; Whitfield v. Lumber Co., 152 N. C., 214.\nIt is true that in estimating value as an element of damage, the jury is restricted to the time of the injury, as his Honor held, but a witness may speak of value at other times as bearing on the value when the injury occurred.\nThe evidence as to reduction in the valuation of the property for taxation after the fire was properly excluded. Ridley v. R. R., 124 N. C., 37; R. R. v. Land Co., 137 N. C., 330.\nIt was tbe act of tbe officers of tbe law, wbicb tbe plaintiff could not control, and tbe tax lister testified tbat be bad no recollection of tbe amount of tbe reduction asked for bj the plaintiff or bis agent.\nWe have examined with care tbe entire record, and find\nNo error.", "type": "majority", "author": "AlleN, J.," } ], "attorneys": [ "Aycock & Winston and D. L. Ward for plaintiff.", "Murray Allen for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "W. F. WYATT v. SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY COMPANY.\n(Filed 18 October, 1911.)\n1. Pleadings \u2014 Interp'retation\u2014Substantia! Justice.\nTbe allegations of a pleading shall be liberally construed witb a view to substantial justice between the parties, and every reasonable intendment is made in favor of tbe pleader.\n2. Same \u2014 Railroads\u2014Fire Damage \u2014 Defective Locomotive \u2014 Sparks.\nIn an action against a railroad company for damages caused by fire from the defendant\u2019s locomotive, it was alleged tbat the defendant negligently and carelessly permitted said engine to emit sparks and coals of fire, which fell upon plaintiff\u2019s property, etc.: Held, the preceding allegation in the same paragraph, \u201cin operating and running an engine,\u201d merely indicated where the engine was at the time, and what was being done with it, and the pleading was sufficient for the introduction of tbe plaintiff\u2019s evidence tending to show, as the cause of his damage, that the locomotive was defective.\n3. Same \u2014 Off Right of Way \u2014 Contributory Negligence \u2014 Buildings\u2014 Inflammable Conditions.\nIn an action for damages against a railroad company for the negligence of the defendant in setting fire to plaintiff\u2019s buildings, adjoining but not on the right of way, by sparks emitted from a passing locomotive, there being no evidence that the fire was communicated from combustible matter on the right of way, the right of plaintiff\u2019s recovery depends upon whether he could show that the' fire was caused by a defective engine, or that it was negligently operated, and evidence sought to establish his contributory negligence is incompetent which tends to show that the buildings destroyed were old, neglected, and inflammable, for the plaintiff would have the right to assume that the defendant would not run an engine so defective or in such a negligent manner as to cause the fire.\n4. Witnesses \u2014 Opinion Evidence \u2014 Nonexperts\u2014Experience.\nOpinions of witnesses as to the value of lands, houses, etc., when relating to the measure of damages caused thereto in an action concerning them, are competent when the witnesses, by experience and information, are qualified to speak.\n5. Evidence \u2014 Railroads\u2014Negligent Burning \u2014 Time of Injury \u2014 Other Times.\nWhile in estimating the value of lands and houses on the issue of damages the jury is restricted to the time of the injury, testimony as to the value at other times is competent when it bears on the value at that time.\n6. Railroads \u2014 Fire Damage \u2014 Measure of Damages \u2014 Evidence\u2014Tax Deeds.\nTax deeds are incompetent evidence of value of plaintiff\u2019s lands and buildings, in his- action to recover damages to his buildings and lands caused by defendant\u2019s negligence, or to show a reduction in the damages from the amount that plaintiff\u2019s evidence tended to establish.\nAppeal from Whe&bee, J., at April Term, 1911, of \"Wake.\nThis action, is to recover damages for the negligent destruction of property of the plaintiff by fire. The allegation of negligence is as follows:\n\u201cThat on 11 April, 1910, the employees and agents of the defendant, in operating and running an engine over said railway near the premises of the plaintiff above described, negligently and carelessly permitted said engine to emit sparks and coals of fire therefrom, which fell on plaintiff\u2019s property above described and set fire thereto and burned up and destroyed the. same, to his damage in the sum of $5,000, as he is informed and believes.\u201d\nThe defendant denies negligence, and for a further defense alleges:\n\u201cThat if the plaintiff\u2019s property was destroyed by fire, as alleged in the complaint, which the defendant denies, plaintiff by his own negligence contributed to bring about such injury, in that he permitted his property to become and remain in an inflammable state and in a negligent condition, and failed to provide a watchman' therefor, and his contributory negligence is set up by the defendant in bar of plaintiff\u2019s right to recover in this action.\u201d\nThe defendant does not contend that there is no evidence that the defendant set out the fire which burned the property of the plaintiff, but insists that the complaint alleges negligence in the operation of the train, and that this allegation is not supported by evidence of a defective spark arrester.\nThis contention is presented by two prayers for instruction, which were refused:\n\u201cThere is no evidence of negligence in the operation of this engine by the employees of the defendant, and you will answer the second issue No.\u2019 \u201d\n\u201cIn order to answer the second issue \u2018Yes,\u2019 you must find that the defendant\u2019s employees negligently operated the engine on the train which set out the fire, if you find that it was set out by an engine.\u201d\nHis Honor instructed the jury to answer the issue of contributory negligence \u201cNo,\u201d and defendant excepted.\nThe evidence in support of the plea of contributory negligence is as follows:\nPlaintiff testified that he placed one of his buildings as near the railroad line as he could get it; that he had no tenant for the tannery or bark sheds.\nJ. H. Harrison, witness for the plaintiff, said the roof of the bark house where fire started was rotten and very dry, and that be might have described it as burning like powder; that tbe tannery property was a loafing place for hoboes, and there was one who cooked in the building one or two nights. The buildings were in a dilapidated condition.\nFor the defendant, A. L. Pritchett testified that the grade is north at the point of the fire. From the outside, buildings were ragged looking, especially the roof. Conditions around the buildings grassy and trashy looking.\nJ. H. Edgerton said the buildings were in a very dilapidated condition; the shingles were turned up and mossy; grass and weeds around the building.\nCharles Creighton testified that the buildings were in a very bad state; they were all decayed and rotten; roof all rotten; doors off, windows off, and in every way in bad state. The property did not appear to ever be looked after, and it was in bad fix. Weeds as high as a man\u2019s head were in the yard around the buildings. It was a regular \u201chold-out for hoboes.\u201d\nW. T. Smith said the property was in pretty bad shape, mostly rotted down, the roof especially, and the shingles were curled up, and there was moss on the shingles. Sides of building were torn off, the floors up, windows out, the plastering knocked off in the cottage, and part of the flooring torn up.\nT. B. Moseley testified that the buildings were dilapidated and run down for want of repairs; they seemed neglected; grown up in weeds; \u201cthe condition of an old settlement that has been abandoned.\u201d\nJ. J. Haywood testified that the property was in bad shape; it was all gone down and dilapidated; no windows at all; doors all down and some panels knocked out. The building nearest the railroad was pretty near down; the weatherboarding and roof were rotten; it was used by gamblers, white and colored, and disreputable women; the grounds around the buildings were grown up in dry weeds and grass. The buildings had been used by tramps, and it could be seen that they had built fires in the buildings.\nPlaintiff asked the witness I. H. Harrison: \u201cWhat, in your opinion, was the value of the property that was burned, in the condition tbe property was in at the time of the fire?\u201d The witness answered, \u201cNot less than $4,000, if it was mine.\u201d The defendant objected to the question and answer.\nJohn Briggs, who qualified as an expert, testified as follows:\nQ. Taking the buildings as you saw them, what would you say they were worth? A. I base my calculation on them as of the last time I saw them, and I figured on the sizes from what I was told. I have no personal recollection of the sizes of the buildings or of the size of the part I put up.\nQ. Can you give an opinion satisfactory to yourself as to their value? A. I think so.\nQ. Assuming that the jury should find from the evidence that the two tan-bark houses were 25 x 100 feet and 30 x 80 feet, respectively, and taking into consideration your own personal knowledge of the- construction of the two houses, what were they worth on the day of the fire? A. One tan-bark house 25 x 100 feet I value at $1,000; one tan-bark house 30 x 80 feet, with 30-foot basement, I value at $1,320. The three-story tannery, 25 x 50 feet, I value at $1,500; the three-room cottage I value at $650, making a total of $4,470. (That part of the answer as to the three-story tannery and cottage was excluded.)\nQ. Assuming that the jury should find from the evidence that the tannery was 25 x 50 and three stories high, from your own knowledge of the condition of it the last time you saw it, can you form an opinion satisfactory to yourself as to the value of the tannery? A. Yes.\nQ. What would you say the tannery was worth? A. $1,500.\nThe defendant excepted to the admission of this evidence.\nThe defendant introduced' M. E. Haynes, a tax lister of Wake County, and proposed to prove by him that after the fire the plaintiff, through his agent, asked for a reduction in the valuation of his property, and the amount of the reduction asked for.\nThe witness testified that he did not know what reduction was asked for; that he only knew how much was made. He was then asked what reduction was made.\nThis evidence was excluded, and the defendant excepted.\nThe defendant also offered in evidence the abstracts before and after the fire, to show the difference in valuation. This evidence was excluded, and the defendant excepted.\nThe. jury returned the following verdict:\n1. Was plaintiff\u2019s property damaged by fire set out by defendant\u2019s engine? Answer: Yes.\n2. If so, was the fire set out by sparks negligently emitted by the defendant\u2019s engine? Answer: Yes.\n3. Did the plaintiff by his own negligence contribute to the cause of said fire? Answer: No.\n4. What damage has plaintiff suffered by reason of said fire? Answer: $2,500.\nThere was a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed. ,\nAycock & Winston and D. L. Ward for plaintiff.\nMurray Allen for defendant." }, "file_name": "0307-01", "first_page_order": 347, "last_page_order": 356 }