{ "id": 8656256, "name": "C. H. CURRY v. F. H. FLEER", "name_abbreviation": "Curry v. Fleer", "decision_date": "1911-11-15", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "16", "last_page": "20", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "157 N.C. 16" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "152 N. C., 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11271730 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/152/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 N. C., 56", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11270131, 11270110 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/156/0056-02", "/nc/156/0056-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Atl. Rep., 234", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 N. C., 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11271730 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/152/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 N. C., 56", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11270131, 11270110 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/156/0056-02", "/nc/156/0056-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 519, "char_count": 9597, "ocr_confidence": 0.449, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.1670898584345296e-08, "percentile": 0.2673265893108054 }, "sha256": "d6c0ad66edb738377921b09fc44e66eaddf50fbfa76af91cb5d755b9d00d0974", "simhash": "1:310613ca08ee37f9", "word_count": 1655 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:57:03.195282+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "C. H. CURRY v. F. H. FLEER." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Hoke, J.,\nafter stating the case: The General Assembly of 1909 made extended regulation in reference to the ownership, operation, and use of the automobile. Laws 1909, ch. 445, Poll\u2019s Supplement, secs. 3876, a to t, inclusive, and on matters more directly relevant, the statute provides as follows: \u201cUpon approaching a horse or horses or other draft animals, being-ridden, led, or driven thereon, a person operating a motor vehicle shall slow down to a speed not exceeding eight miles an hour and give reasonable warning of its. approach and use every reasonable precaution to insure the safety of such person or animal, and in case of a horse or horses or other draft animals, to prevent frightening the same.\u201d With the exception of establishing speed limits, this legislation is to a great extent an embodiment of the general principles of law applicable to these motor vehicles when operated on the highway and on places where their use is likely to be a source of danger to others; principles recognized and applied in two recent cases before the Court: Gaskins v. Hancock, 156 N. C., 56; Tudor v. Bowen, 152 N. C., 441.\nSpeaking to the duties incumbent upon chauffeurs and others driving these cars, in Tudors case, supra, Associate Justice Brown said: \u201cAlthough the use of automobiles began in recent years, it seems to have caused much litigation, though not in this State. It is the consensus of judicial opinion that it is the duty of the operator of an automobile upon highways and public streets to r\\se every reasonable precaution to avoid causing injury, and this duty requires him to take into consideration The character of. his machine and its tendency to frighten horses.\u2019 Hannigan v. Wright, 63 Atl. Rep., 234; House v. Cramer, 13 Am. and Eng. Annotated Cases, p. 463, note, and cases cited. The possession of a powerful or dangerous vehicle imposes upon the chauffeur the duty of employing a degree of care commensurate with the risk of danger to others engendered by the use of such a machine on a public thoroughfare.\u201d And it may be well to note that the legislation referred to establishes, as a rule, a maximum rate of speed \u201cnot exceeding eight miles an hour,\u201d etc., and in doing so it is not at all contemplated or intended that the specified limit is always permissible. The chauffeur or other driving a machine of this character on the public highway is charged with notice of things which he observes or could observe in the exercise of proper care, having-regard to the nature of the vehicle he is operating and its tendency to frighten animals, and not infrequently it may become his duty to move at a much slower speed, and stop altogether if conditions so require. This, too, is in accord with approved precedent (Christy v. Elliott, 216 Ill., p. 31), and is expressly recognized in other sections of the statute, notably Pell\u2019s Supplement, 3876m, 3876n, 3876p, and 3876r, 3876s, the last citation being in terms as follows: \u201cNothing in the general law shall be construed to curtail or abridge the right of any person to prosecute a civil action for damages by reason of injuries to person or property resulting from the negligence of the owner or operator, or his agent, employee, or servant, of any motor vehicle, or resulting from the negligent use of the highway by them- or any of them.\u201d\nApplying the principle; the case was clearly one for the jury. The grievance alleged on part of plaintiff, being not so much and of itself that -the speed limit was exceeded \u2014 a limit established principally to lessen the danger of collision \u2014 but because, by reason in part of exceeding the speed limit, the machine was upon the plaintiff\u2019s team without adequate warning, that at twenty miles per hour and a signal at 25 steps behind, to use the plaintiff\u2019s own language, the vehicle \u201cjust passed right by me all at once and didn\u2019t give me any chance to hold on to my horses, trying to do all I could.\u201d True, there is evidence on defendant\u2019s part in contradiction of this testimony, but, under a correct charge, the jury have accepted the plaintiff\u2019s version, and, in our opinion, an actionable wrong is clearly established.\nObjection was further made that the court allowed plaintiff to ask a witness who testified for defendant if he had not sold his land to defendant at a big price. The answer was admitted as tending to show a bias in defendant\u2019s favor. If on the facts the answer had a reasonable and natural tendency to create a bias in defendant\u2019s favor, it was relevant, and if otherwise it should be treated as harmless, and certainly not held for reversible error. We find no error in the record, and the judgment in plaintiff\u2019s favor must be affirmed.\nNo error.", "type": "majority", "author": "Hoke, J.," } ], "attorneys": [ "Phillips & Bower and McCrary & McCrary for plaintiff.", "E. E. Paper and A. F. Sams for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "C. H. CURRY v. F. H. FLEER.\n(Filed 15 November, 1911.)\n1. Public Highways \u2014 Motor Vehicles \u2014 Operation\u2014Declaratory Statutes \u2014 I nterpretation.\nThe Laws of 1909, ch, 445, requiring a person operating a motor vehicle \u201cto slow down to a speed not exceeding eight miles an hour and give reasonable warning of its approach and use every reasonable precaution to insure the safety of\u201d a horse being ridden or driven, etc., upon the highway upon which the motor is being driven, etc., with the exception of establishing a speed limit, is to a great extent an embodiment of general principles of law applicable to motor vehicles when operated on the highway and in places where their use is likely to be a source of danger to others. Gaskins v. Hancock, 156 N. C., 56; Tudor v. Bowen, 152 N. C., 441, cited and applied.\n2. Same \u2014 Requirements.\nThe maximum speed limit o\u00ed eight miles an hour for the running of motor vehicles upon the highways in approaching horses being ridden or driven tbereon, etc., prescribed by tbe Laws of 1909, cb. 445, does not contemplate or intend that tbe specified limit is alwaj's permissible; for one driving a machine of this character is charged with notice of things which he observes or could observe in the exercise of proper care, having regard to the nature of the vehicle he is operating and its tendency to frighten animals; and not infrequently it may become his duty to move at a much slower speed, or stop altogether if conditions so require.\n3. Same \u2014 Negligence\u2014Evidence\u2014Nonsuit.\nIn an action for damages for personal injury received by reason of the team plaintiff was driving becoming frightened from a motor vehicle approaching from tbe rear, there was evidence tending to show that the speed of the automobile greatly exceeded the limit prescribed by the Laws of 1909, ch. 445, and that the machine was upon the plaintiff\u2019s team without adequate warning and without giving him \u201cany chance to hold on to his horses\u201d: Held, sufficient to go to the jury upon the question of defendant\u2019s actionable negligence, not so much and of itself that the speed limit was exceeded, but tending to show the defendant\u2019s negligence in not doing what the circumstances reasonably required for the plaintiff\u2019s safety; and upon conflicting evidence, a motion to nonsuit should be denied.\n4. Evidence \u2014 Objections and Exceptions \u2014 Appeal and Error \u2014 Harmless Error.\nOver defendant\u2019s objection, plaintiff was permitted to asir tbe witness of the former if he had not sold ht\u00e9 land to the defendant at a big price: Held, if on the facts the answer had a reasonable and natural tendency to create a bias in defendant\u2019s favor it was relevant; and if otherwise, it would be harmless and not' reversible error.\nAppeal from Lyon, J., at April Term, 1911, of Davidson.\nCivil action to recover damages for injuries caused by alleged negligence of defendant in driving bis automobile.\nThere was evidence on part of plaintiff tending to show that on 7 December, 1909, on tbe road about one and a balf miles from Thomasville, plaintiff was driving a two-horse wagon, loaded with 100 chairs, when his horses took fright at defendant\u2019s automobile, and, getting beyond his control, ran the wagon against a telephone post, whereby plaintiff was thrown to the ground and received painful physical injuries; that the-automobile, driven by defendant, approached from behind at a speed of fifteen or twenty miles an hour; sounded the warning signal when only 25 yards back, and came so suddenly on witness that he had no chance to get control of his team and prevent the running. Speaking to this question, the witness said: \u201cJust passed right by me all at once and didn't give me any chance to hold on to the horses, trying to do all I could with them. If I had had warning in time, I might have prevented the horses from running away.\u201d\nThe evidence of defendant tended to show that he approached at a speed of twelve miles, reduced to eight when nearing the team; gave the .ordinary and usual signals 100 feet back, and passed without observing any sign of fright in the horses or of any change or disturbance in the movement of the team, etc.1 There was further evidence on part of defendant tending to show that the horses were young horses, unused to the road, and that there was no default on part of defendant in the use and operation of the machine or in failing to give the proper signal.\nThe question of defendant\u2019s negligence was submitted to the jury, and the following verdict rendered:\n\u201cWas the plaintiff injured by the negligence of the defendant, as alleged in the complaint? Answer: Yes.\n\u201cWhat damages, if any, is plaintiff entitled to recover ? Answer: $500.\u201d\nJudgment on the verdict, and defendant excepted, alleging for error, chiefly, the refusal of the court to order a nonsuit.\nPhillips & Bower and McCrary & McCrary for plaintiff.\nE. E. Paper and A. F. Sams for defendant." }, "file_name": "0016-01", "first_page_order": 56, "last_page_order": 60 }