{ "id": 8656215, "name": "STATE v. R. F. RICE", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Rice", "decision_date": "1912-04-10", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "635", "last_page": "640", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "158 N.C. 635" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "222 U. S., 380", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3659936 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/222/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 Ga., 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 Mass., 563", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 3507195 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/151/0563-01" ] }, { "cite": "56 S. E., 561", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 L. R. A., 781", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L.R.A.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 Ind., 476", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ind.", "case_ids": [ 1631533 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ind/140/0476-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 L. R. A., 326", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L.R.A.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 S. C., 570", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "S.C.", "case_ids": [ 4406481 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sc/48/0570-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 N. C., 1093", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 N. C., 811", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11254155 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/141/0811-01" ] }, { "cite": "149 N. C., 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11271180 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/149/0480-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 Mo. App., 427", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mo. App.", "case_ids": [ 1576146 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mo-app/128/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 Ind., 512", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ind.", "case_ids": [ 1553384 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ind/163/0512-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 Iowa, 297", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Iowa", "case_ids": [ 4374284 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/iowa/64/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 Ind., 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ind.", "case_ids": [ 1456214 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ind/18/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 Ill., 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5339442 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/88/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 Ala., 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ala.", "case_ids": [ 3269191 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ala/70/0361-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 641, "char_count": 13664, "ocr_confidence": 0.463, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1025698729831166e-07, "percentile": 0.5687223463607338 }, "sha256": "6fd1d0ba89d57714f2c3da2042f364373d5df440a4f1a82114df2439bc2d43e3", "simhash": "1:9f4272f7c46ea08d", "word_count": 2303 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:45:05.014249+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "'Walker and Allen, JI., dissenting." ], "parties": [ "STATE v. R. F. RICE." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Clark, O. J.\nThe defendant, who lives outside the corporate limits of Greensboro, was indicted in the Municipal court of the city of Greensboro for unlawfully and willfully \u201ckeeping and running hogs in a lot within one-fourth of a mile of the corporate limits of the city of Greensboro,\u201d in violation of the city ordinance which is set out and which provides: \u201cIt shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation to keep any hogs or pigs within the corporate limits of the city of Greensboro or within one-fourth of a mile of said limits.\u201d\nOn appeal from the Municipal court the warrant was quashed, and the State appeal\u00e9d.\nThe General Assembly provides in the charter of Greensboro, Private Laws 1911, ch. 2, sec. 27, that all ordinances of the city of Greensboro enacted \u201cin the exercise of police powers given to it for sanitary purposes or for the protection of the property of the city, shall apply to the territory outside of said city limits within one mile of same in all directions.\u201d\nThe Legislature has unquestioned authority to confer upon the town authorities jurisdiction for sanitary or police purposes of territory beyond the city limits. 28 Cyc., 704, 20 A. and E. Enc., 1148, and cases there cited. This is sometimes conferred for police protection, but oftener for the preservation of public health. Power is often granted to the town authorities to police the watershed beyond corporate limits so that the city may have pure water. Also, to insure cleanliness, to protect the sewerage, and for many like purposes to protect the health of those living within the city. Among the most notable cases are Van Hook v. Selma, 70 Ala., 361; Chicago Packing Co. v. Chicago, 88 Ill., 221; Emerich v. Indianapolis, 18 Ind., 279; Albia v. O'Hara, 64 Iowa, 297; S. v. Franklin, 40 Kansas, 410; Jordan v. Evansville, 163 Ind., 512.\nThere are many other cases to like effect and none to the contrary. Among the\" late cases are Gower v. Agee, 128 Mo. App., 427; Ex parte Glass, 49 Tex. Cr., 87. In this last case the Court sustained an ordinance forbidding the keeping of hogs within one mile of the courthouse. The Court held that this was a matter within the discretion of the town commissioners, though it permitted hogs to be kept at places within town limits beyond that distance from the courthouse. In 2 Abbott Mun. Corp., sec. 562, it is said: \u201cIt is of course within the power of the State Legislature to authorize a town to pass ordinances which shall have a restricted effect beyond their limits.\u201d In Chicago Packing Co. v. Chicago, supra, the Court said: \u201cPersons desiring to engage in particular avocations in or near cities must submit to have their pursuits limited and controlled at least so far as the preservation of health and to a reasonable extent the comfort of the people may require. . . . The lives, the health, and comfort of the people are the highest claim and demand the first and greatest protection. . . . They have the right to be protected against all kinds of business that endanger life and health and from intolerant nuisances that destroy their comfort. To accomplish this purpose, the power was conferred upon cities and villages to regulate these establishments for the distance of one mile beyond their corporate limits, even if that shall lap over and embrace a portion of territory included in the boundaries of another municipality. Each, to that extent, has the right to protect its inhabitants, and such establishments, located in such territory, are subject to the police power of both corporate bodies.\u201d The ordinance there sustained was for the regulation of the great packing houses located outside of Chicago and which had been licensed by a neighboring town.\nThe argument that the town of Greensboro is governed under the Commission form of government, with \u201cinitiative, referendum, and recall,\u201d and therefore that its municipal authorities should have no control outside of the city limits, is wanting in application. Tbe question is not bow the city authorities are chosen, but what power the Legislature has conferred upon them over adjacent districts beyond the city limits in which may be set up establishments, business, or other things which would be injurious to the health of its people. There is nothing in our Constitution which restricts the Legislature in the exercise of its police power from conferring upon the municipal authorities of Greensboro such power. Indeed, the Municipal court of Greensboro is given jurisdiction outside the city limits and such jurisdiction has been affirmed at this term in S. v. Brown, citing S. v. Shine, 149 N. C., 480; S. v. Baskerville, 141 N. C., 811, and divers other cases.\nThe city, therefore, had the same power to pass this ordinance and make it applicable to a district within a quarter of a mile outside the city limits as it had to prohibit \u201ckeeping any hogs or pigs within the corporate limits.\u201d The question, therefore, is whether it could pass such ordinance applicable within the city limits. In S. v. Hord, 122 N. C., 1093, the Court held that the town authorities could forbid keeping a hogpen within the city limits. In that case the prohibition was against keeping a hogpen within 100 yards of the residence of another, which was, of course, practically an entire prohibition. In 2 Dillon Mun. Corp. it is said that \u201cThe keeping of hogs and swine is a generally, recognized subject of regulation of municipal ordinance.\u201d In Darlington v. Ward, 48 S. C., 570; 38 L. R. A., 326, it is said: \u201cAn ordinance cannot be held invalid because it is unreasonable when the power to jiass the ordinances on the subject is conferred by a constitutional statute.\u201d It is further held: \u201cAn ordinance making it unlawful to keep any hogs within the corporate limits of the town cannot be held void.\u201d In Skaggs v. Martinsville, 140 Ind., 476; 33 L. R. A., 781, the Court held it would not \u201cinquire as to the reasonableness of an ordinance when the power exists to pass it.\u201d The same was held in the late case of Brunson v. Youmans (S. C.), 56 S. E., 561, in which the Court sustained a town ordinance which made it \u201cunlawful to keep any hogs within the town,\u201d oiling Darlington v. Ward, supra. Ordinances to prohibit hogs within a town have also been sustained in Quincy v. Kennard, 151 Mass., 563; Smith v. Collier, 118 Ga., 417; Ex parte Glass, 49 Tex. Cr., 87.\nEven if this Court were of opinion that the orclinahce is not sound, public policy and might work hardship, we could not declare it invalid. The Legislature has conferred jurisdiction upon the town, commissioners \u201cto make such rules and regulations, not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the State, for the preservation of the health of the inhabitants of the city as to them may seem right.\u201d Private Laws 1911, oh. 2, sec. 17. An appeal in such ease must be to the lawmaking power. Red \u201cC\u201d Oil Co. v. Board of Agriculture, 222 U. S., 380, decided January, 1912. But as a matter of fact, there are some 20,000 people within the limits of the town of Greensboro and they have a right to be protected against such matters as their local Legislature may deem unsanitary. If that body is wrong, it will be influenced by their constituents to repeal or modify the ordinance. But the authority to make the ordinance and to extend its limits, not to exceed one mile, beyond the city boundaries has been conferred by the Legislature. Of their own volition the city authorities made the ordinance applicable only to the extent of one-quarter of a mile beyond the city boundaries.\nThe language of the ordinance forbids \u201ckeeping any hogs or pigs within the corporate limits of the city of Greensboro or within one-fourth of a mile of said limits.\u201d The warrant charges that the defendant \u201cdid unlawfully and willfully keep and run hogs in a lot within one-fourth of a mile of the corporate limits of the city of Greensboro.\u201d It therefore comes within the terms of the ordinance. It does not appear what size the lot was, nor is it material. The ordinance prohibits \u201ckeeping hogs\u201d within the limits named. In Darlington v. Ward, 48 S. C., 570, there was a single hog kept within a two-acre lot. The Court held that the question was not whether the keeping of that particular hog was injurious to the health of the town, but whether the town had authority to prohibit the \u201ckeeping of hogs\u201d within the limits prescribed and whether the defendant had violated that ordinance. The Court said that the nature and condition of the premises were immaterial and that \u201cthe power of the town council to preserve the public health cannot be measured by the size of Ward\u2019s lot\u201d nor by the cleanly condition in which he kej)t his premises. The Court further said: \u201cCourts cannot run a race of opinion upon points of right, reason, and expediency against the lawmaking power. No act of the Legislature can be declared void or unconstitutional unless it conflicts with some provision of the Constitution. Nor can any ordinance of any municipal corporation within the power conferred by the Legislature, and not in conflict with the laws and Constitution of the State, be impeached in a court for unreasonableness. A critical examination of cases holding police regulations void, because unreasonable, will disclose that the attempted police regulations violated some constitutional guaranty. The right asserted by some courts to declare municipal ordinances invalid because unreasonable is limited to ordinances passed under the implied or incidental powers of the municipality.\u201d\nThe greatest advance of the age probably is towards the preservation of the public health and in measures for the prevention of disease. The Legislature conferred power upon the municipal authorities of Greensboro to adopt sanitary regulations. In passing this ordinance they acted within this authority, and doubtless upon the advice of the sanitary board.\nThe necessity and the benefit of sanitation cannot be better shown than by a statement which recently appeared in a Government publication that in Cuba, a tropical country, under the impetus given by United States supervision, there is an expenditure now of 46 cents per capita for better sanitation and an annual mortality of 15 per 1,000 of the population, while in North Carolina, in naturally a healthy climate, there is an expenditure of only 1 cent per capita and a mortality of 18.3 per thousand of population, or 22 per cent greater. In view of such fact, the courts will be slow to interfere with sanitary regulations which have been adopted by city authorities, presumably in accordance with the wishes of the most intelligent and advanced portion of its population, even if we possessed the power to interfere. It is not our province to review the action of boards of sanitation, within the limits of their powers. The judgment quashing the warrant is\nReversed.\n'Walker and Allen, JI., dissenting.", "type": "majority", "author": "Clark, O. J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorbey-General and A. Wayland Coolce for the Slate.", "Sapp & Williams for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE v. R. F. RICE.\n(Filed 10 April, 1912.)\n1. Statutes \u2014 Cities and Towns \u2014 Health Ordinances \u2014 Extraterritorial Effect \u2014 Constitutional Law.\nA legislative act is -constitutional and valid which confers the exercise of police powers, for sanitary purposes, etc., upon an incorporated city and town, to be operative by ordinances within the corporate limits and to a distance of one mile in all directions beyond them.\n2. Same \u2014 Hogs or Pigs.\nWhen by legislative enactment it is provided that all ordinances of a certain city passed \u201cin the exercise of police powers given to it for sanitary purposes, etc., shall apply to territory outside of the city limits within one mile.of the same in all directions,\u201d the city may pass a valid ordinance making it an offense for \u201cany person, firm, or corporation to keep any hogs or pigs within the corporate limits,\u201d or within \u201cone-fourth of a mile\u201d beyond them.\n3. Cities and Towns \u2014 Health Ordinances \u2014 Extraterritorial Effect\u2014 Commission Government.\nThe extraterritorial effect of an ordinance of a city relative to the health of its citizens depends upon the legislative authority conferred, and the validity of such an ordinance is not affected by the fact that the city is under a Commission form of government, with the \u201cinitiative, referendum, and recall.\u201d\n4. Cities and Towns \u2014 Health Ordinances \u2014 Extraterritorial Effect\u2014 Legislature \u2014 Municipal Discretion \u2014 Courts.\nFrom the operation of an ordinance prohibiting the keeping of hogs and pigs within the corporate limits of an incorporated town and beyond to the extent of one-fourth of a mile in all directions, passed under a legislative act conferring upon the town the authority to make sanitary ordinances applicable to the extent of one mile beyond its limits, an appeal should be made either to the proper authorities of the city or to the Legislature, for upon its reasonableness or unreasonableness when so authorized by the Legislature the courts are without authority to act.\n5. Cities and Towns \u2014 Health Ordinances \u2014 Hogs or Pigs \u2014 Indictment.\nWhen a valid ordinance of a city forbids \u201ckeeping any hogs or pigs within the corporate limits or within one-fourth of a mile of said limits,\u201d a warrant following the language of the ordinance is sufficient; and the offense is indictable without reference to the number of hogs or pigs, the condition or size of the pens or inclosures where they are kept. The advantages or benefits of sanitary laws discussed by Clark, C. J.\nWalker and Ai,leN, JJ., dissenting.\nAppeal from Coolc, J., at February Term, 1912, of Guilford.\nTire fact's are sufficiently stated in tbe opinion of the \u2018Court by Mr. Chief Justice Claris.\nAttorbey-General and A. Wayland Coolce for the Slate.\nSapp & Williams for defendant." }, "file_name": "0635-01", "first_page_order": 679, "last_page_order": 684 }