{
  "id": 8658975,
  "name": "LAURA J. FEATHERSTONE v. LOWELL COTTON MILLS",
  "name_abbreviation": "Featherstone v. Lowell Cotton Mills",
  "decision_date": "1912-05-15",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "429",
  "last_page": "431",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "159 N.C. 429"
    }
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "157 N. C., 331",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
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        8657541
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        "/nc/157/0331-01"
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    {
      "cite": "150 N. C., 493",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        11271727
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      "case_paths": [
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    {
      "cite": "154 N. C., 474",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8652749,
        8652727
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      "case_paths": [
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        "/nc/154/0474-01"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:13:45.962633+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "LAURA J. FEATHERSTONE v. LOWELL COTTON MILLS."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Per Curiam.\nUnder our decisions tbe stockholders, officers, or employees of tbe casualty company would not be impartial or competent jurors to determine tbe issue, and under all ordinary conditions tbe questions asked by counsel on tbe voir dire were not improper. Norris v. Cotton Mills, 154 N. C., 474; Blevins v. Cotton Mills, 150 N. C., 493.\nIt bas also been beld with us, however, that the'fact that a principal defendant is- protected from liability by an insurance policy is not a relevant circumstance on tbe trial of the issue (Lytton v. Manufacturing Co., 157 N. C., 331) ; and before jury impaneled, if it should be made to appear that questions of this character have been asked in bad faith and have likely operated to defendant\u2019s prejudice, a recovery should not be allowed to stand. In this case, on tbe facts as presented, both tbe questions asked of tbe jurors, tbe same being as a rule competent, and that addressed to defendant\u2019s counsel, are matters which must be left largely to tbe discretion of the court below, and it must be presumed that tbe character and good sense of tbe jurors selected have protected them from improper bias or that any such tendency bas been effectually checked and corrected by tbe learned and impartial judge who presided at tbe trial.\nWe find no error in tbe record to justify tbe. Court in disturbing tbe results of tbe trial, and tbe judgment in plaintiff\u2019s favor is therefore affirmed.\nNo error.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Per Curiam."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Thomas F. McDow, William H. Lewis, and A. G. Mangum for plaintiff.",
      "0. F. Mason for defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "LAURA J. FEATHERSTONE v. LOWELL COTTON MILLS.\n(Filed 15 May, 1912.)\n1. Liability Insurance \u2014 Evidence of Indemnity \u2014 Prejudicial Questions \u2014 Correction\u2014Presumptions\u2014Courts\u2014Discretion.\nIt is not a relevant circumstance, in an action for damages for personal injuries negligently inflicted, whether or not the defendant\u2019s liability is protected under an insurance policy; and if plaintiff has asked a question of this character in bad faith, before the jury has been impaneled, and which likely operated to defendant\u2019s prejudice, a recovery against him should not be allowed to stand. The presumption, however, is that the court be'low properly corrected any prejudice which may have been produced and that intelligent jurors rejected it; and therefore the matter is largely left in his discretion.\n2. Jurors \u2014 Interest\u2014Corporations\u2014Officers and Employees.\nStockholders, officers, or employees of an indemnifying company are incompetent to serve on the jury in an action against the indemnified for damages covered by the policy.\nAppeal from Long, J., at January Special Term, 1912, of GastoN.\nCivil action to recover damages for personal injuries. There was verdict for plaintiff and judgment, and defendant excepted and appealed, assigning for error:\n1. Tbat plaintiff\u2019s counsel, for tbe purpose of ascertaining tbeir competency to serve as jurors, was allowed to ask, over defendant\u2019s objection, if they were interested as stockholders, officers, or employees, etc., of the Maryland Casualty Company.\n2. That while court was examining an authority on the subject, plaintiff\u2019s counsel stated in the hearing of the jurors and before they were selected, \u201cI desire to ask the attorney for defendant if the Lowell Cotton Mills pays one' cent of any recovery in the action up to $5,000?\u201d Defendant objected oh the ground \u201cThat the statement was calculated to prejudice the jury, and because irrelevant and impertinent.\u201d The court sustained the objection, and added that defendant\u2019s counsel was not required to answer the question. The jurors, already \"in the box, were then sent out, and it was shown that defendant company held an insurance xoolicy in the Maryland Casualty Company to $5,000 and was denying its liability thereunder because not notified as required,\u201d etc. The jurors having returned, plaintiff\u2019s counsel inquired of them if there was any member of the jury interested in the said casualty company, if so, he desired to excuse them. Defendant objected to the question; court overrule\u2019d objection, stating it had allowed the question for the purpose of enabling counsel to ascertain if any juror was interested as agent or otherwise in the Maryland Casualty Company, but only for the purpose of allowing plaintiff\u2019s counsel to peremptorily challenge such juror. Defendant excepted.\nThe case on appeal here proceeds as follows: \u201cNo juror excused himself dn this ground, but there were some jurors, probably as many as three, who were objected to by plaintiff\u2019s counsel for some other reason, and stood aside, and other jurors, either from the regular panel or from bystanders, were called into the box, and the jury was thus supplied with twelve jurors. After such new jurors were called into the box, the plaintiff propounded, among other things, the same question as set out above. The defendant objected. The court allowed the question to be asked for the purpose above set out, and the defendant excepted.\u201d\nThe jury having been obtained, were impaneled and verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant, as heretofore stated, excepted and appealed.\nThomas F. McDow, William H. Lewis, and A. G. Mangum for plaintiff.\n0. F. Mason for defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0429-01",
  "first_page_order": 477,
  "last_page_order": 479
}