This action is brought to recover damages against tbe defendant construction, company for an injury to tbe defendants’ vessel, a three-masted schooner called tbe “Edna A. Pogue,” while attempting to pass through an opening in the bridge across Albemarle Sound, en route from Elizabeth City to Plymouth for a cargo.
There are * several assignments of error contained in the record, but we deem it unnecessary to consider more than one *505or two. Tbe defendants request tbe court to instruct tbe jury that if they believe tbe .evidence they should answer tbe first issue “No.” This prayer for instruction, we think, was properly refused.
At tbe time of tbe injury to tbe “Edna Pogue,” tbe defendant company was engaged in constructing a bridge across Albe-marle Sound for tbe Norfolk Southern Eailway Company. While they bad tbe right to construct this bridge under tbe authority of tbe State, as well as tbe War Department, it was tbe duty of tbe defendants to leave" open a space sufficient to enable passing vessels to go through. This tbe evidence shows that tbe defendants’ agents in charge of tbe work undertook to do.
Tbe evidence shows that on 12 December tbe “Pogue” sailed up to within three-quarters of a mile of tbe bridge and anchored to wait for a favorable breeze. It is common knowledge to all who are familiar with sailing craft that it is impracticable to “beat them” against a bead-wind through an opening in a bridge.
Tbe evidence shows that at half-past 2 o’clock on tbe following morning, the wind having arisen, tbe ' captain weighed anchor and got under way up tbe sound. Tbe evidence shows that at tbe time that tbe regular drawbridges intended for tbe passage of vessels, one on one side of tbe sound and one on tbe other, bad not been completed and were not in use for tbe passage of vessels.
Tbe evidence further shows that tbe open space through which tbe master of tbe “Pogue” attempted to sail her was in use with tbe knowledge and permission of tbe defendants’ agents for tbe passage of craft going up and down tbe sound.
Tbe captain testifies that be saw a large tugboat with large raft, and a number of other vessels, passing through this same opening, and that there was a light put there for tbe purpose of indicating that it was intended to be used for tbe passage of vessels.
In attempting to make tbe passage through tbe bridge, tbe vessel came in contact with a raft of piling material which bad been tied by tbe cónstructors of tbe bridge to tbe east side of it, *506and.to the south side of the gap, by a rope made fast to one end of the raft of piling, leaving the .other end of the raft loose, so that it had swung around into the opening and the vessel had come in contact with it, causing her to lose her headway, whereby she fell off to the leeward, and her rigging became entangled with the pile-driver, which had been left on the north end of this opening, and the vessel was very greatly injured. The evidence shows that the wind increased very much at the time, so that the captain was unable to free his vessel and get her away from the bridge, and a large sea making up in the morning, she was badly chafed before she could get away. ,
The testimony of one of the-witnesses, who was an employee of the defendants at the time, was to the effect that this gap or opening was being used by all the craft going up and down the sound while the drawbridges were being completed.
It scarcely needs the citation of authority to prove that, .although the right to build this bridge cannot be gainsaid, it was nevertheless the duty of the constructors to do the work in a safe and careful manner; to leave open during the constructive period spaces amply sufficient for the safe passage of vessels navigating the waters of Albemarle Sound; and to keep those spaces free from all obstructions that would endanger the passage of vessels through such spaces.
There are numbers of cases which support the contention of the plaintiffs in this ease. Jutte v. Bridge Co., 21 Ohio C. R., 422; Maxon v. R. R., 122 Fed., 555; Kelly Line Co. v. Cleveland, 144 Fed. In this case it is said that a company constructing a bridge is liable for injury resulting from its negligence when a vessel collides with the partly constructed bridge, or with works used in the construction when such collision could have been avoided by reasonable precaution upon the part of the constructors. See, also, 29 Cyc., 214. Jutte v. Keystone Bridge Co., 146 Pa. State Reports, 400; Casement v. Brown, 148 U. S., 615; Wilson v. Chicago, 42 F., 506.
At a prior term of this Court we considered the case Whitehurst v. R. R., 156 N. C., 48. We 'think it has no bearing whatever upon this controversy. There was no evidence of *507negligence whatever upon the part of the defendant in that case, as it was perfectly manifest that the vessel was lost before she ever reached the bridge by failing to respond to her helm at a critical moment.
The defendants except because the court permitted witnesses to testify to the meaning of certain lights and what such lights are intended to communicate in nautical terms. It is true that these are fixed by the rules and" regulations of the National Government, but they are not known • to jurors, but only to navigators and persons familiar with nautical regulations.
It was entirely competent to prove by witnesses the meaning of such terms and what certain kinds of lights were intended to indicate.
We have examined the charge of the judge, and deem it unnecessary to comment upon the exceptions relating to that.. The charge was eminently clear and fair, and presented the matter to the jury fully and completely, with conspicuous impartiality.
Upon a review of the whole record, we find
No error.
The motion to nonsuit is covered by the ruling on the prayer for instruction, and is therefore overruled.