{
  "id": 11274721,
  "name": "Frances Liles v. Robert Fleming, ex'r. of Jacob Liles and others",
  "name_abbreviation": "Liles v. Fleming",
  "decision_date": "1828-06",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "185",
  "last_page": "188",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "nominative",
      "cite": "1 Dev. Eq. 185"
    },
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "16 N.C. 185"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:48:17.309620+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Frances Liles v. Robert Fleming, ex\u2019r. of Jacob Liles and others."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Taylor, Chief-Justice\n\u2014 This bill is brought for the twofold purpose of setting up a contract, made by the testator of the Defendant with the Plaintiff his then wife, whereby lie gave her all the property which he had acquired by his marriage with her, and to obtain likewise, a distributive share of the personal estate of her said late husband. The contract made after marriage, is stated to have been in execution of a parol treaty, made before the marriage, whereby tiie husband agreed to .settle upon her, in the event of her having a child by him, all the property she then possessed, or was entitled to. The writing does accordingly admit, that she has a son, named Richard Liles; and there is proof, by two witnesses, the mother and sister of the Plaintiff*, that Jacob Liles had declared in his lifetime, that he had ex- , ecuted the paper in pursuance of his engagement entered into before marriage. The contract of marriage is a valuable consideration, and a settlement, made by the husband after marriage, is binding upon him, and all persons claiming as volunteers, from or through him. How far the peculiar circumstances of this contract would render it valid, against creditors or subsequent purchasers, is not made a question in the case. The intervention of a trustee is indispensable at law, to enable the husband to convey property to his wife; but there are several cases in this Court, whore the husband\u2019s gifts to the wife, directly made, will be supported, although no property in the things given, passed to the wife at law, by the delivery. The following cases extend fully to the establishment of this principle. Lucas v. Lucas, (1 Atk. 270,) Stanning v. Style, (3 P. Wms. 338) \u2014 Bledsoe v. Sawyer, (1 Vern. 244, Bunbury 205.)\nThe law proceeds strictly upon the notion of union of person in husband and wife, and it is only in some extreme and excepted cases, that the wife can implead or he impleaded, without her husband ; but in Equity, she may be a Plaintiff or Defendant, without the concurrence of her husband, as in cases where she prays relief against him. (Terry v. Terry, Pres. Ch. 275. Lambert v. Lambert. 1 Ves. jun 21.) And she may defend a suit sepa rately, when her interest in the subject of litigation is contradictory to her husband\u2019s claim, and in other instances. (White v. Thornborough, Pres. Ch. 429. Ex parte Halsam, 2 Atk. 50.) Equity, it is said, regards not the outward form, but the inward substance and essence of the matter, which is the agreement of the parties, upon a good and valuable consideration ; so that although a covenant be extinguished at law by the marriage of the parties, this Court will establish it. (Cannel v. Buckel, 2 P. Wms. 243. 1 Fonbl. 39.)\nAs to the remaining question, whether the Plaintiff is to be put to her election? it is believed that the law has left no discretion on the subject; for however desirable it might be, that in so small an estate, the testator\u2019s children should exclusively enjoy the benefit of it, yet the widow\u2019s claim to distribution is founded on a clear legal right. The principle to be extracted from all the cases is, that an intention to exclude that right, must be showm, either by express w'o.vds, or a manifest implication ; but there is here nothing from which such an intent can be inferred.\nPer Curiam.\n\u2014 Declare that the Defendant\u2019s testator made an agreement in the bill mentioned, and direct an account of the property of the Plaintiff at the time of her marriage; and also of the assets in the Defendant\u2019s hands.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Taylor, Chief-Justice Per Curiam."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Devereux, for the Plaintiff,",
      "W. II. Haywood, contra."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Frances Liles v. Robert Fleming, ex\u2019r. of Jacob Liles and others.\nFrom Wake.\nA post-nuptial agreement, made upon sufficient consideration, between husband and wife, will be enforced in Equity.-\nWhere thine was an agreement to settle property upon tile wife, and the husband, by will, bequeathed that property to a stranger, it was be!d, liie \\i ife having dissented from the will, that her right to a child\u2019s part of the personalty, could be defeated only by a satisfaction in express words, or one resulting from a necessary implication, and there being neither, that she was entitled both to the settled property and to her child\u2019s part.\nThe Plaintiff irt her bill alleged, that upon a treaty of marriage between her and the Defendant\u2019s testator, it was agreed by the latter, that in case there should be a child of the marriage, all the property to which the Plaintiff was entitled, either in possession or in action, should be settled upon her. That the marriage took place, and upon the birth of a son, who was named Richard Liles, the Defendant\u2019s testator executed the following instrument:\n\u201c Be it known to all whom it may concern, that I, Jacob Liles, of &c. having intermarried with Frances Holland, widow, &c. and by her having had one son, called Richard Idles, I do hereby certify, that all the property which came by my said wife, of every description, I give to her and her heirs forever. In witness, &c.\u201d\nThe bill then charged, that the Defendant\u2019s testator had taken into bis possession sundry slaves, and some bonds and money, which belonged to the Plaintiff before her marriage witli him \u2014 that by his will he had bequeathed several of those slaves to his children by a former marriage, and in it had made a very small provision for the Plaintiff, who had regularly entered her dissent from it-The prayer was, to have tfie defective instrument set up, and also for a distribution of the assets of the testator..\nThe Defendants, in their answers, put the Plaintiff to the proof of the ante-nuptial agreement, and insisted, if it was made, that the Plaintiff should be put to her election\u2014 contending, that she could not claim under the agreement, and also her share of the testator\u2019s assets.\nThe facts set forth in the bill, were fully established by the testimony of the Plaintiff\u2019s mother and sister, whose depositions were read.\nDevereux, for the Plaintiff,\ncontended, that the right of the widow to a child's part of her husband\u2019s personal estate, was a right which the law gave her; that it was similar to the right of dower at common law, and it had always been held, that nothing but express words, or the most necessary implication, should bar the right of d.ower.\nW. II. Haywood, contra."
  },
  "file_name": "0185-01",
  "first_page_order": 191,
  "last_page_order": 194
}