{
  "id": 11270214,
  "name": "NATHANIEL CARTER v. THE COHARIE LUMBER COMPANY",
  "name_abbreviation": "Carter v. Coharie Lumber Co.",
  "decision_date": "1912-10-16",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "8",
  "last_page": "11",
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      "cite": "160 N.C. 8"
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
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    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
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    {
      "cite": "20 Iowa, 337",
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      "reporter": "Iowa",
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      "cite": "133 N. C., 96",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
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      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "132 N. C., 156",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "85 Minn., 447",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Minn.",
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      "cite": "120 N. C., 557",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8659495
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      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
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    {
      "cite": "141 N. C., 489",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:32:58.976002+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Walker, J., and AlleN, J., dissenting."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "NATHANIEL CARTER v. THE COHARIE LUMBER COMPANY."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "BROWN, J.\nTbe defendant owned and operated a lumber mill and also a standard-gauge railroad in connection therewith to Parkersburg on the Atlantic Coast Line, a distance of three miles. This road was connected with branch railroads extending in tbe woods.\nTbe same engine and cars were used over tbe main stem and its branches. Sometimes a branch is taken up and relaid elsewhere.\nTbe defendant entered into a written contract \u2022frith one Bull-man on 24 February, 1911, by which Buhman was to operate its railroad and lumber business. The plaintiff was foreman of the railroad construction crew, kept the time, and worked in constructing the branch railroads, laying down cross-ties, spiking rails, and doing other construction work. The defendant claims that Buhman was an independent contractor, and solely liable to the plaintiff, and that section 2018 has no application to defendant. His Honor so ruled, and the plaintiff excepted.\nThe plaintiff testified that he was building the railroad for the defendant under a contractor. Assuming that Buhman was an independent contractor, if defendant\u2019s railroad comes within the meaning and spirit of section 2018, the defendant is liable, as it appears that the requirements of the statute have 'been strictly followed.\nThe defendant\u2019s plant constitutes wbat is called a \u201clogging railroad.\u201d . It is standard-gauged, steel-railed, connected by switch with the Coast Line, operated by steam engines and standard-gauge cars, and has branches extending for convenience into the woods, over which the same engines and cars are used.\nThe description of this road brings it within the definitions of a railroad as given by Rapalje and Bouvier, in their law dictionaries. The language of this statute, defining a railroad, is the same as in the fellow-servant act, Revisal, 2646.\nIn construing that act and its similar phraseology, we held that logging roads are railroads within the meaning of the act, and that the term \u201crailroad\u201d embraced any road operated by steam or electricity on rails. Hemphill v. Lumber Co., 141 N. C., 489; Witsell v. R. R., 120 N. C., 557; Schus v. Powers Co., 85 Minn., 447.\nWe have also held that the law as applied to other railroads in respect to negligently causing fires on their rights of way shall be extended to railroads constructed solely for logging purposes. Craft v. Timber Co., 132 N. C., 156; Simpson v. Lumber Co., 133 N. C., 96.\nWe apply to both classes of railroads the same rule in regard to defective spark arresters. Cheek v. Lumber Co., 133 N. C., 96.\nFor these reasons we see no reason why this defendant should not be classified as a railroad' within the meaning of section 2018.\nIt is contended, however, that this section was first enacted in 1872, and that there were no logging roads in existence then, and that therefore they could not have been in contemplation of the Legislature.\nWe are not informed as to that, but we assume the correctness of the statement.\nThe mere fact that \u201clogging railroads\u201d came into more general use since the passage of the act does not alter the case. They are nevertheless \u201crailroads,\u201d although used principally for transporting logs.\nIt is a general rule of statutory construction that legislative enactments, in general and comprehensive terms, prospective in operation, apply alike to all persons, subjects, and business within their general scope coming into existence subsequent to their passage. McAunich v. M. and M. Ry., 20 Iowa, 337; Schus v. Powers Co., supra.\nNew trial.\nWalker, J., and AlleN, J., dissenting.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "BROWN, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Faison & Wright for plaintiff.",
      "II. A. Grady and George- E. Butler for defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "NATHANIEL CARTER v. THE COHARIE LUMBER COMPANY.\n(Filed 16 October, 1912.)\n1. Railroads \u2014 Logging Roads \u2014 Liens\u2014Independent Contractor \u2014 Interpretation of Statutes.\nA logging road operated by tbe use of steam is a railroad within tbe meaning of section 2018, and by following tbe requirements of that section a lien may be obtained for work done in its construction, though under an independent contractor.\n2. Same \u2014 Intent\u2014Prospective Effect.\nLegislative enactments, in general and comprehensive terms, prospective in operation, apply alike to all persons, subjects, and business within their general scope coming into existence subsequent to their passage. Hence, Revisa], sec. 2018, first enacted in 1872, applies to logging roads operated by steam, though they may not have been in existence at the time it was first passed, in 1872.\nWalker and Allek, ,TJ., dissenting,\nAppeal by plaintiff from Carter, J., at August Term, 1912, of SAMPSON.\nAppeal from justice of tbe peace. Tbe plaintiff sued to recover of defendant $83.50 for work done in constructing railroad for defendant. \u25a0 Tbe plaintiff bases bis right to recover under section 2018 of tbe Eevisal of 1905.\nIt is admitted that tbe notice required by tbe act was properly given and served, and that tbe action was commenced in apt time. A motion to nonsuit was allowed, and tbe plaintiff appealed.\nFaison & Wright for plaintiff.\nII. A. Grady and George- E. Butler for defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0008-01",
  "first_page_order": 48,
  "last_page_order": 51
}