#### JOHN R. HAGAMAN v. J. M. BERNHARDT and S. F. HARPER.

(Filed 22 May, 1913.)

1. Appeal and Error — Appeal by Two Parties — One Record.

Where both defendants appeal to the Supreme Court on exceptions which are not antagonistic to each other, it is an unnecessary expense to send up separate records.

2. Deeds and Conveyances — Evidence—Maps Unidentified.

Where boundaries to lands are in dispute,, a map is incompetent as evidence when there is nothing thereon to identify it, and it is not attached to any muniment of title.

3. Deeds .and Conveyances — Boundaries—'Admitted Corners — Evidence.

In an action involving a disputed boundary to lands, Held, testimony of a witness that in surveying the land he had com-mencéd at a Spanish oak marked as a corner, etc., was competent, as the Spanish oak was admitted to.be the corner by both parties to the controversy.

4. Deeds and Conveyances — Boundaries—Disputed Corners — Declarations — Interests—Evidence.

Declarations of one as to a disputed corner of lands in controversy, as the one he claimed at that time as a corner of his own lands, is incompetent, being in his own interest.

5. Deeds and Conveyances — Boundaries—Disputed Corners — General Reputation — Evidence.

The reputation of the marking of a disputed corner to lands in controversy is .incompetent as evidence, it being necessary to show its general reputation as such.

6. Deeds and Conveyances — Boundaries—Course and Distance — Evidence — Instructions.

The lands in dispute in this case involve the location of a boundary line which in part reads “south to and with C’s line 145 poles to a stake,” the next call being “east 135 poles to a stake in M. C.’s line”: Held, a requested prayer for instruction should be refused, under all the circumstances, that “the call in said grant is ‘south to and with said O’s line 145 poles to a stake,’ ” which “would follow the C. line from the point E. 145 poles, irrespective of coarse, and at the end of the 145 poles, wherever that line would be, the line should turn east'and continue that course until it struck the next line called for,” it appearing that to run this line south in the direction and in the number of poles called for and then to run it in the direction and extent of the next call, *382would close the calls to the deed, and that the charge of the court In this respect was correctly given. In such case the course (S.) and the distance (145 poles) should control, and not the various courses of O’s line.

Brown, J., dissenting.

Appeal by defendants from Adams, J., at May Term, 1912, of Caldwell.

This is an action of ejectment, tbe plaintiff claiming to be owner and entitled to tbe possession of tbe land described in tbe complaint, of wbicb tbe defendant S. E. Harper was in possession and tbe • defendant J. M. Bernbardt bas cut timber tbereon, botb defendants claiming title under G. A. Sullivan, and asking an injunction against tbe defendants from cutting said timber or removing tbat wbicb bas already been cut. Tbe. jury rendered a verdict in favor of tbe plaintiff, assessing tbe damages at $60. Judgment was rendered accordingly in favor of tbe plaintiff for tbe tract of land described in tbe first issue and for-said damages. Tbe defendants appealed.

W. G. Newland for plaintiff.

Edmund Jones for defendant Iiarper.

Lawrence Wakefield and Mark Squires for defendant.

Clare:, C. J.

Botb, defendants appealed and sent up separate records, but as tbey were not on opposite sides nor presented antagonistic exceptions, tbis was an unnecessary expense. Pope v. Lumber Co., ante, 208. (McCurdy’s appeal.)

Tbe decision of tbis case depends upon tbe location of Grant No. 384 to Aaron Bradsbaw., Tbe first exception by tbe defendant Harper is for tbe refusal of tbe motion to nonsuit. Tbis motion could not bave been granted, as there was sufficient evidence to go to tbe jury.

Harper’s second exception is for tbe refusal to admit in evidence a map claimed by tbe defendants to be a plat of McOaleb Coffey’s land. Tbis .map consisted of some lines only, nothing being written upon it explaining wbat lands were referred to, and there was nothing to give it validity or authority as evidence in tbis controversy. It-was not attached to any muniment of title, and was incompetent. Jones v. Huggins, 12 *383 N. C., 134; Dancy v. Sugg, 19 N. C., 515; Dobson v. Whisenhant, 101 N. C., 645.

The defendant Bernhardt’s first exception is to permitting the witness Sullivan to state that when he bought the land from Coffey and began to -survey he commenced at a Spanish oak marked as a corner down next to the river 30 poles from the river. The Spanish oak referred to was admitted by both parties to be a proper corner of the land in controversy. Kirby, witness for defendants, testified under their examination, that J. T. Montgomery, now deceased, pointed out to him the Spanish oak as the corner of the land in controversy.

Bernhardt’s second exception is abandoned and his third exception is the same as Harper’s first exception above. Bernhardt’s fourth exception is the exclusion by the court of the map made by J. C. Harper, and was incompetent, upon the same authorities that are cited in x>assing upon Harper’s second exception above. It was not attached to any deed and was merely an isolated plat, and not competent, in this controversy. Bernhardt’s fifth exception is to the refusal of the coiirt to permit C. 0. Coffey to testify that his fathei’,' Thomas Coffey, XDointed out to him a rock as the corner of Grant No. 4157. The witness stated that his father in pointing out this rock was pointing, out to him his own lines. It was therefore incompetent as a declaration in his own interest.

Bernhardt’s sixth excexrtion was to the refusal of the court to allow the said witness to answer the question, “Do you know the reputation of the rock as being the corner of Grant No. 4157?” This seems to be rex>etition of the last question above, for the witness was not asked if he knew the “general reputation of said rock as a corner.”

The chief exception and controversy seems to be this: The defendants asked the court*to charge that “the call in said grant is ‘south to and with said Elijah and Wilborn Coffey’s line 145 X>oles to a stake,’ and the court charges you that the line of' the Bradshaw grant would follow the Wilborn Coffey line from the point E. 145 poles, irrespective of course, and at the end of the 145 x>oles, wherever that might be, the line should turn east and continue that course until it struck McCaleb Coffey’s line, *384the next call of the Bradshaw grant being- ‘east 135 poles to a stake in McCaleb Coffey’s line.’ ” Instead of this, the court charged: -“The proper interpretation of the next succeeding call in the Bradshaw grant, ‘thence south to and with Wilborn Coffey’s line 145 poles to a stake,’ would be met by running the line from the circle in the parallelogram to the line E F, and then from the intersection of these two lines south 145 poles along the line E F- and to the ‘south as far as the distance may extend.’ ”

We think there was no error in the above respect. If the prayer asked, by the defendant'had been given, the lines could not have been, closed. Under the instruction given, the jury followed the line E E, which was the Wilborn Coffey line (as admitted by the defendants) prolonged to 145 poles.

Under the defendants’ prayer, if given, the line would have followed the Wilborn Coffey line a short distance south, and then have turned west with that line and then south, and the lines, as already said, would not have closed. Under the instruction as given, the line ran with the Wilborn Coffey line till it turned square off to the west, and then kept on iff its course “south to a stake 145 poles from E” (where the line had struck the Wilborn Coffey line). It could not have been -intended to follow all the turns of the Wilborn Coffey line, irrespective of course.

No error.

BROWN, J., dissenting.