{ "id": 11272111, "name": "STATE ex rel. S. B. SPRUILL v. W. M. BATEMAN", "name_abbreviation": "State ex rel. Spruill v. Bateman", "decision_date": "1913-03-26", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "588", "last_page": "594", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "162 N.C. 588" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "89 N. C., 136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 N. C., 199", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11276800 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/63/0199-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 Pa. St., 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "case_ids": [ 426969 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa/59/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 N. C., 595", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8697102 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/73/0595-01" ] }, { "cite": "56 Pa. St., 270", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "case_ids": [ 1009157 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa/56/0270-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 587, "char_count": 12228, "ocr_confidence": 0.463, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.589260728233229e-07, "percentile": 0.681810599768558 }, "sha256": "a9aac77c4c4e89726af9bc24a0c7db527a1e9691a94d164bae0040bad495c254", "simhash": "1:a0f426a263cca4c1", "word_count": 2048 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:55:37.824965+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Waleer and Allen, JJ., concurring in result." ], "parties": [ "STATE ex rel. S. B. SPRUILL v. W. M. BATEMAN." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Clark, O. J.\nAt tbe election in November, 1912; Bateman was elected by tbe'people of Washington County recorder of tbe \u201cRecorder\u2019s Court of Plymouth,\u201d which - was created by chapter 343, Public-Local Laws 1911. Section, 2 of said act prescribes that said recorder shall be \u201ca qualified voter of Washington County and a man of good moral character and a licensed attorney at law.\u201d The defendant does not hold a license -to practice law, and by this proceeding the relator seeks to oust him from the office on that ground, and to have himself inducted upon the ground that Bateman not having all the qualifications prescribed by that act, that the votes cast for him are to be disregarded and that therefore the relator, who received the next highest vote, is entitled to the office.\nTaking up the second proposition first, Bateman having received the largest number of votes, Spruill was not elected. If Bateman is disqualified to act, there must be a resort to the process of filling the office, in case of a vacancy, as provided by section 16 of said act. When the candidate receiving the highest vote is ineligible, that cannot make his opponent, who has been rejected by them, the choice of the people.\nIn Throop on Public Officers, sec. 163, it is held: \u201cIn this country the great current of authorities sustains the doctrine that the ineligibility of the majority candidate does not elect the minority candidate. And this without reference to the question whether the voters knew of the ineligibility of the candidate for whom they voted. Tt is considered that in such a case the votes for the ineligible candidate are not void.\u201d\nIn Mechem Public Officers, sec. 206, it is said that the doctrine in the United States, \u201csupported by an undoubted preponderance of authority, is that the candidate receiving the highest number of votes may, because of his ineligibility, fail of election, yet the votes cast for him are so effectual as to prevent the election of other candidates, and there is no election at all.\u201d This is supported by numerous citations there given. Without citing them, it is sufficient to say that they hold that a candidate'who receives fewer votes than are received by some other candidate cannot be said, under any circumstances, to be elected.\nIn 15 Cyc., 391, the point is thus clearly stated with abundant citation of authority: \u201cAccording to the English rule, if a candidate who receives the highest number of votes is ineligible, and the electors had sufficient notice of his ineligibility at the time of voting for him, their votes are thrown away, and the candidate having the next highest number of votes, if he is eligible, must be declared elected; and in one American jurisdiction (Indiana) the English rule has been adopted. But it is a fundamental idea in American politics that \u201cthe majority shall rule, and that no person can be elected to office unless he shall receive a majority, or at least a plurality, of all the votes. It has accordingly been settled by the House of Representatives of the United States that the ineligibility of the candidate receiving the highest number of votes gives no title to the candidate receiving the next highest number, even though the election was held in a State where the contrary rule obtains. The same rule has been adopted by the United States Senate and has the support of the great weight of judicial authority in the United States. It may be well to add, in this connection, that it is not within the power of a State to add to the qualifications prescribed for Representatives in Congress and Senators of the United States by tbe Constitution of tbe United States so as to render ineligible candidates who would otherwise be eligible under tbe Federal Constitution.\u201d\nTo same effect Com. v. Cluley, Brightley on Elections, 144; s. c., 56 Pa. St., 270. It has also been tbe settled practice as to contested elections in tbe General Assembly of this State that when tbe candidate receiving tbe majority vote has been found ineligible,\u00bb tbe minority candidate has not been seated, but a new election has been ordered.\nTbe English rule was formerly as above stated. When John Wilkes, tbe celebrated \u201cAgitator,\u201d after being three times denied bis seat in Parliament and expelled, was promptly a fourth time elected by tbe voters of Middlesex, Parliament ventured to seat bis opponent, Col. Luttrell, wbo bad received a minority. Tbe storm of indignation that swept through tbe Kingdom came near to becoming a Bevolution, and to Wilkes\u2019 consequent popularity we owe tbe fact that a great county in this State bears bis name.\nAs to tbe other question: The Constitution of this State, Art. VI, prescribes wbo shall be \u201cvoters,\u201d and section 7 of that article provides: \u201cEvery voter in North Carolina, except as in this article disqualified, shall be eligible to office.\u201d Tbe Legislature is therefore forbidden by tbe organic instrument to disqualify any voter, not disqualified by that article, from bolding any office. Tbe General Assembly cannot render any \u201cvoter\u201d ineligible for office by exacting any additional qualifications, as by prescribing, in this instance, that tbe candidate shall be \u201ca licensed attorney at law,\u201d any more than it could prescribe that be should own a specified quantity of property, or should be of a certain age, or race, or religious belief, or possess any other qualification not required to make him a voter.\nIt is true that where a Constitution provides that \u201cno person shall be elected or appointed to any office unless be possesses tbe qualification of an elector,\u201d tbe Legislature can prescribe additional qualifications. .29 Cyc., 1376, and eases there cited. Tbe reason is that where the Constitution requires only that tbe candidate shall be a voter, tbe Legislature can add additional qualifications, providing only tbe candidate is a voter; but our Constitution is just tbe reverse of tbis. It provides. that \u201cEvery voter\u201d'(unless as'in tbis article disqualified) shall be eligible to office.\u201d It may be, therefore, that tbe General Assembly of tbis State could make eligible to office those- who are not voters, as to which we express no opinion. Tbe Constitution contains no prohibition, in terms, as to this. But it does forbid tbe disqualification of \u201cany voter\u201d for office, for it says that \"every voter\u201d is eligible to \u201coffice,\u201d which takes in every office.\nThe purpose .of this peculiar phraseology in. the North Carolina Constitution is well known by every one. A newly emancipated element had been admitted to suffrage, and it was rightly anticipated that at some future day there might be a majority in the General Assembly unfavorable to their holding office, so the provision was made that \u201cevery voter,\u201d except as disqualified by the Constitution, .should be eligible \u201cto office.\u201d The broadest word is used, showing that the eligibility was to any and every office.\nThe convention that formed the Constitution \u2022 seems to have had the most implicit faith that the people were competent to select their own officers, and therefore Article VI imposes no disqualifications upon voters except those named in section 8 of that article. The Amendment of' 1900, while imposing some restriction upon suffrage, left intact the provision that all who continued to be \u201cvoters\u201d remained eligible to office. Indeed, the Constitution does not require even that judges of the Supreme and Superior Courts'shall be \u201clicensed attorneys at law,\u201d presuming that the people would select those who are competent for such positions. It would be strange indeed if the General Assembly could add this restriction in_ the selection of this recorder, which office is now filled in North Carolina by many most competent men who are not lawyers, when the organic instrument does not require that the members of the Supreme and Superior Courts shall possess any other qualification than that of being voters. Neither does the United States Constitution nor any act of Congress require such qualification for Federal judges.\nIn Lee v. Dunn, 73 N. C., 595, tbis subject was fully gone into, and it was held that tbe General Assembly could not impose any additional qualification upon eligibility to office other than that tbe officer should be a voter as required by Constitution, Art. VI, sec. 7, above quoted, but a mere-assurance for tbe faithful discharge of the duties of the office, such as a bond to answer for money intrusted to his care, and, when an official has been in office already, a receipt for the money paid over as evidence of his integrity is not an added \u201cqualification.\u201d The Court goes on to say that even the requirement of an oath by the Constitution itself does not affect eligibility, because that is required after election, and is only an assurance that the officer will faithfully discharge the duties of the office. The Court added that any legislation which directly or indirectly denies or abridges the right of a citizen to vote as specified in the Constitution is invalid, and that \u201cwhat is true of the right to vote is also true of the right to hold office.\u201d Brightly on Elections, 44; s. c., 59 Pa. St., 109. Whoever is entitled under our Constitution to vote is entitled to hold office, except where restricted by that instrument. The constitutional provision in these matters cannot be abridged by requiring any qualifications whatever in addition to those set out in the Constitution. A requirement that a man shall be, a lawyer is not an \u201cassurance\u201d like a bond, but additional \u201cqualification.\u201d\n, The requirements as to age of certain officers, and the disqualification of the Governor for reelection are in the Constitution and cannot be changed, nor applied to other officers, by the Legislature. The ordinary provision that election officers shall not be all of the same political party is not an additional \u201cqualification,\u201d but a mere regulation or \u201cassurance\u201d as recognized in Lee v. Dunn. Besides, it may well be that such'positions are not \u201coffices,\u201d but mere \u201cplaces of trust or of profit\u201d whose qualifications may be prescribed by legislation. But as to this last point we need not now decide. The Constitution recognizes the clear distinction between \u201coffices\u201d (Art. VI, sec. 7) and \u201cplaces of trust or of profit\u201d (Art. XIV, sec. 7). Worthy v. Barrett, 63 N. C., 199; Doyle v. Raleigh, 89 N. C., 136. But the line has not been clearly marked, and we are not called upon to do so in this case, for it is clear that the recorder\u2019s position is an office.\nIt follows, therefore, (1) That the defendant, a duly qualified voter of Washington County, was eligible to the office of recorder and is entitled to fill it,- having received the majority of the votes of the electors of that county. (2) That having received a majority of the votes cast, even if he were ousted because ineligible, the relator would not be \u00e9ntitled to be inducted into office, but the vacancy would be filled in the manner prescribed by the act creating the court.\nReversed.\nWaleer and Allen, JJ., concurring in result.", "type": "majority", "author": "Clark, O. J." } ], "attorneys": [ "W. M. Bond, 17. M. Bond, Jr., Ward & Grimes for relator.", "A. J). McLean for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE ex rel. S. B. SPRUILL v. W. M. BATEMAN.\n(Filed 26 March, 1913.)\n1. Elections \u2014 Public Offices \u2014 Disqualifications to Office \u2014 Next Highest in Votes \u2014 Vacancy in Office \u2014 Appointive Power.\nThe one receiving the next highest number of votes for a public office at an election held by the people, is not elected to fill that office because of the ineligibility of the one receiving the highest number.\n2. Public Offices \u2014 Qualifications \u2014 Constitutional Law \u2014 Legislative Powers\u2014 Recorders\u2019 Courts \u2014 Attorney.\nTbe Constitution of North Carolina,' Art. YI, provides who shall he voters, and by section 7 thereof, that \u201cevery voter in North Carolina, except in this article disqualified, shall be eligible to office,\u201d and the Legislature, cannot add to the constitutional disqualifications to hold office by requiring candidates for the position of recorder in a municipal court to be \u201ca licensed attorney at law.\u201d The difference between an \u201cassurance\u201d and a \u201cqualification\u201d to office pointed out' and discussed by .Clark, C. J.\nAppeal by defendant from Long, J., at February Term, 1913, O\u00cd WASHINGTON.\nW. M. Bond, 17. M. Bond, Jr., Ward & Grimes for relator.\nA. J). McLean for defendant." }, "file_name": "0588-01", "first_page_order": 632, "last_page_order": 638 }