{
  "id": 8657122,
  "name": "A. L. ARUNDELL COMPANY v. IVEY MILL COMPANY",
  "name_abbreviation": "A. L. Arundell Co. v. Ivey Mill Co.",
  "decision_date": "1913-12-10",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "238",
  "last_page": "241",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "164 N.C. 238"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "159 N. C., 348",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
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        8658532
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    {
      "cite": "109 N. C., 852",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8651809
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      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
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    {
      "cite": "68 N. C., 283",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
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      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
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  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:20:25.630766+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "A. L. ARUNDELL COMPANY v. IVEY MILL COMPANY."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "AlleN, J.\nIt was within tbe discretion of tbe judge to allow tbe notice of appeal to be given after tbe ease was docketed in tbe Superior Court. Marsh v. Cohen, 68 N. C., 283; State and Alice Wells v. Johnson, 109 N. C., 852. In tbe last case tbe Court says: \u201cAny hardship which might, under any circumstances, be entailed on an appellant by failure to serve notice in a legal manner and within tbe statutory time is removed by tbe discretion reposed in tbe appellate court to permit notice to be given after that time.\u201d\nTbe case of Abell v. Power Co., 159 N. C., 348, and others like it, relied on by tbe plaintiff, are not applicable, because in them tbe motion to dismiss was on tbe ground that tbe appeal bad not been docketed according to law, and in this case tbe basis of tbe motion is that notice of appeal was not given.\nIf there was error in admitting carbon copies of tbe written order, it was cured when tbe plaintiff, in order to make out its case against tbe defendant, introduced tbe original.\nTbe evidence of tbe conversation with tbe salesman' of tbe plaintiff is competent. It does not vary or change tbe written order, and is important and material only as explanatory of tbe delay in making a test of tbe oil, in order tbat tbe defendant might avail itself of tbe provision in tbe 'order to return if unsatisfactory after a test.\nIf tbe evidence is competent, it follows tbat there was no error in adverting to it in tbe charge.\nNo error.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "AlleN, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "A. A. Whiiener for plaintiff.",
      "B. B. Blaclcwelder, Charles W. Bagby, and W. A. Self for defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "A. L. ARUNDELL COMPANY v. IVEY MILL COMPANY.\n(Filed 10 December, 1913.)\n1. Justices\u2019 Courts \u2014 Appeal Docketed in Superior Court \u2014 Notice of Appeal \u2014 Discretion of Court.\nAfter an appeal from a judgment rendered by a justice of the peace has been duly docketed in the Superior Court, without notice thereof to the appellee, it is within the discretion of the Superior Court judge then to allow such notice to be given.\n2. Contracts,, Written \u2014 Vendor and Vendee \u2014 Trials \u2014 Evidence\u2014 Copies \u2014 Harmless Error.\nWhere the controversy rests upon a written order or contract for the sale of goods, and- a carbon copy of this order offered by the vendee has been admitted in evidence, the original being in the hands of the vendor, the error, if any, is cured by the introduction of the original order by the vendor, identical with the copy. o , \u25a0\n3. Contracts, Written \u2014 Vendor and Vendee \u2014 Warranties\u2014Parol Evidence \u2014 Trials\u2014Evidence.\nWhere a written order for the purchase of oil, accepted by the vendor, provides that if the \u201cgoods prove unsatisfactory after a thorough trial by the purchaser within thirty days after delivery, the remaining quantity may be returned, without any charge for what has been used in the-test,\u201d evidence is competent on behalf of the vendee, tending to show that' the sales agent, at the time of the sale, informed him that the vendor would send a demonstrator and that the vendee should not use the oil until he arrived; for such evidence is not a variance with or contradiction of the written order, and in this case is competent to explain the vendee\u2019s delay in returning the unsatisfactory goods under the provision of the contract.\nAppeal by plaintiff from Cline, J., at July -Term, 1913, of Catawba.\nThis is an action to recover $81.50, the price of certain oil, which the plaintiff alleges it sold to the defendant, which was tried .in the Superior Court on appeal by the defendant from the judgment of a justice of the peace.\nAt a term of court prior to the one at which the action was tried, the plaintiff moved to dismiss the appeal \u201con account of no notice being given.\u201d Iiis Honor denied the motion and allowed notice to be given nunc pro tunc, and the plaintiff1 excepted.\nDuring the trial, the defendant introduced a duplicate or carbon of the order for the oil, which he gave the salesman of the plaintiff, which contains the following clause:\n\u201cNotice. \u2014 It is hereby understood and agreed to by and between the Standard Oil Leather Dressing Company and the purchaser, that should these goods prove unsatisfactory after a thorough trial by the purchaser up to or within thirty days after the delivery, the remaining quantity may be returned, without any charge for what has been used in the test.\u201d\nThe plaintiff excepted,, and afterwards introduced the original order.\nGeorge E. Ivey testified in behalf of the defendant as follows: \u201cI am superintendent of defendant company. In May, 1912, Applebanner, salesman of tbe plaintiff, came to see me. He said be bad a very fine quality of belt oil \u2014 best ever invented ; wanted me to buy some. Tbe order is in tbe possession of tbe plaintiff. Applebanner said it was necessary for ns to be shown bow to apply the oil, and that the company could send a demonstrator; to be sure not to use tbe oil till tbe demonstrator arrived.\u201d\nPlaintiff objected to this evidence. Objection overruled; plaintiff excepted.\nTbe oil was unsatisfactory to. tbe defendant, and was returned to tbe plaintiff.\nThere was a verdict and judgment for tbe defendant, and tbe plaintiff excepted and appealed.\nA. A. Whiiener for plaintiff.\nB. B. Blaclcwelder, Charles W. Bagby, and W. A. Self for defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0238-01",
  "first_page_order": 274,
  "last_page_order": 277
}