{ "id": 11269419, "name": "STATE v. WILLIS PITT", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Pitt", "decision_date": "1914-03-11", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "268", "last_page": "272", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "166 N.C. 268" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "52 N. C., 305", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2088631 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/52/0305-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 N. C., 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11276643 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/66/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 N. C., 793", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8651821 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/108/0793-01" ] }, { "cite": "149 N. C., 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11271124 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/149/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 N. C., 25", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8681074 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/49/0025-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 N. C., 648", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8698312 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/79/0648-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 N. C., 603", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 N. C., 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11276474 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/44/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 N. C., 781", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8662951 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/131/0781-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 N. C., 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11275348 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/86/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 N. C., 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 N. C., 604", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11274360 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/110/0604-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 551, "char_count": 9727, "ocr_confidence": 0.45, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.484387492294469e-08, "percentile": 0.39910782443300746 }, "sha256": "c1f6226e8c71a5ac2d70464f67675beb10e680ff458a8a4372c26f900f5cadeb", "simhash": "1:ff91dd6d2773858c", "word_count": 1754 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:23:48.430184+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Walker, J., and Allen, J.,-'concurring in result." ], "parties": [ "STATE v. WILLIS PITT." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ClabK, O., J.\nThe defendant was convicted of larceny of the corn of one J. R. Bunting, standing in the field. The testimony came from eye-witnesses and was clear and explicit. The first exception is to the refusal of the court to quash the bill of indictment on the ground that said Bunting, who was foreman of tbe grand jury that passed on the bill, was also the prosecutor and swore out the warrant before a justice of the peace. The court found as a fact that Bunting at the time that the grand jury was considering the bill retired from the grand jury room and did not discuss the case with the grand jury nor vote on passing the bill, and that he did nothing in regard to it except that as foreman of the grand jury he sighed the bill at the direction of the grand jury and carried the indictment into court.\n\u201cThe general rule has been laid down that interest in a particular prosecution other than a direct pecuniary interest will not disqualify a grand juror or be ground of objection to an indictment in the finding of which he participates. Accordingly, in the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary, the fact that a person has originated a complaint against the person accused of crime, or is a witness for the prosecution, does not operate as a disqualification. And the same rule has been applied to a person who has evinced a desire and purpose to enforce the law against the particular kind of' crime, or has subscribed funds for the purpose of legitimately suppressing a particular violation of law.\u201d 20 Cyc., 1301, title, \u201cGrand Jury.\u201d\nIn S. v. Sharp, 110 N. C., 604, where there is a full discussion of objections to the competency of a grand jury, it is held that the fact that a son of the prosecutor was a member of the grand jury did not vitiate the indictment, though he had actively participated in finding the bill.\nIn S. v. McDonald, 73 N. C., 356, it was held that a grand juror was a competent witness on the trial of the defendant. Revisal, 3232, provides that grand juries shall return all bills of indictment in open court through the acting foreman, except in capital felonies, and it has been often held that an indictment need not necessarily be signed by any one. S. v. Mace, 86 N. C., 668.\nExceptions 2 and 3 are to the ruling of the court that two witnesses, respectively 11 and 12 years old, were of sufficient age and capacity to testify. The competency of a witness to testify is determined by the trial court, and is not reviewable on appeal. S. v. Finger, 131 N. C., 781; S. v. Perry, 44 N. C., 330; 40 Cyc., 2200.\nOne of these witnesses, 11 years old, testified that if he swore to a lie they would put him in j ail; that he intended to tell the truth, and was going to tell what he knew. The other witness, 12 years old, testified that he had never been in court before; that when he kissed the book it meant that he would tell the truth; that if he should tell a lie they would put him in the lockup. When asked, \u201cWhat else?\u201d he replied, \u201cI don\u2019t know, sir.\u201d The finding of the judge that these witnesses were competent to testify was conclusive, and not reviewable. This is so held both as to their moral and religious sensibility and their intelligence. S. v. Manual, 64 N. C., 603; S. v. Edwards, 79 N. C., 648.\nShaw v. Moore, 49 N. C., 25, is a very interesting discussion as to the disqualification of a witness on account of his religious belief. The Court there held that one who believed in the existence of a Supreme Being was a competent witness, though he did not believe that punishment would be inflicted in the world to come. In that case it would seem that the witnesses were of age. If it were open to us to review the findings of fact of his Honor as to the competency of these witnesses, it would seem that they gave very intelligent replies and a sense of their responsibility and intention to tell the truth, and that punishment would be awarded them should they fail to do so. The fact that one of the witnesses said he \u201cdid not know\u201d what punishment would hapjnen to him beyond imprisonment in jail should not disqualify him, in view of the other evidence. showing his intelligence and sense of responsibility.\nHowever, as already stated, the finding of the judge in such case is conclusive, and not reviewable by us.- He sees the witnesses and can judge better of their intelligence and sense of responsibility than can possibly be transmitted to us on paper.\nIn Shaw v. Moore, supra, Pearson, J., said that \u201cin the old cases it was held to be common law that no infidel (in which class Jews were included) could be sworn as a witness in the courts of England.\u201d He tben proceeds to say that the reason for this as given by my Lord Coke, \u201cto say the least of it, is narrow-minded, illiberal, bigoted, and unsound.\u201d And adds that \u201cLord Hale, notwithstanding the opinion of Coke and the old cases, held that a Jew is a .competent witness and may be sworn on the Old Testament, and such has ever since been taken to be the law.\u201d We know that the Old Scriptures, which is the Hebrew Bible, do not teach a future life, and hence there is absent therefrom the doctrine of future rewards and punishments. Indeed, the New Testament teaches that \u201cLife Eternal came through Jesus Christ.\u201d In the same case, Shaw v. Moore, supra, Pearson refers to Omychund v. Barker, 1 Atk., 19, as a great case, \u201cfor it relieved the common law from an error that was a reproach to it.\u201d In that case \u201ca Gentoo, who-did not believe in either Old or New Testament,\u201d was held to be a competent witness, though it did not appear \u201cwhether according to Gentoo religion rewards and punishments are to be in this world or the world to come.. The decision was made without ascertaining how the fact was; so it must have been considered by the Court to be immaterial.\u201d\nJudge Pearson further says that it was insisted on the argument that, however it was decided in Omychund v. Barker, it was otherwise under our statutory provisions prescribing the forms of oath. He says, as to this argument: \u201cWe think it manifest, by a perusal of the statute, that it was not intended to alter any rule of law, but the sole object was to prescribe forms adapted to the religious belief of the general mass of citizens, for the sake of convenience and uniformity.\u201d\nThe form of oath for witnesses now prescribed (Rev., 1496 (29), and 2360) simply requires the witness to swear that his evidence \u201cshall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.\u201d The provision in Revisal, 2354, as to the manner of swearing is, as Judge Pearson says, merely a form \u201cadapted to the religious belief of the general mass of citizens for the sake of convenience and uniformity.\u201d Revisal, 2363 (enacted 1899, ch. 50), validated oaths theretofore taken not in a manner prescribed by the laws of 1777, now Revisal, 2354.\nIf such reply from one who is honestly ignorant of what will happen to him in another world shall render him incompetent to testify, not only the administration of justice will often be hindered, but unwilling witnesses can block needed investigations by professing like ignorance.\nIt was excepted that the defendant was not allowed to state that his employer trusted him with his property. This is not an issue in this cause. The question is not whether he was trusted by his employer, nor that he was unworthy of that confidence, but, Did he steal the corn of the prosecutor, as charged in the bill of indictment? It would not have been competent for the State to show that the defendant was not trusted, or was suspected by his employer. Nor is it competent for the defendant to testify that he was trusted.\nNor do we think it good ground of exception that the judge in his charge, in attempting to define what constitutes a reasonable doubt, said: \u201cA reasonable doubt in the jury box is exactly the same kind of reasonable doubt that an honest man meets up with in- human life.\u201d The law does not require' that any particular formula shall be used in charging upon the doctrine of reasonable doubt. S. v. Dobbins, 149 N. C., 465; S. v. Brabham, 108 N. C., 793; S. v. Matthews, 66 N. C., 106; S. v. Oscar, 52 N. C., 305.\nNo error.\nWalker, J., and Allen, J.,-'concurring in result.", "type": "majority", "author": "ClabK, O., J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney-General Bichett and Assistant Attorney-General Galvert for the State.", "Julius Brown for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE v. WILLIS PITT.\n(Filed 11 March, 1914.)\n1. Indictment \u2014 Motions to Quash \u2014 Interest of Grand Juror.\nA motion to quash a bill of indictment on the ground that the foreman of the grand jury was interested in the prosecution will be denied when it appears that the foreman took no part in passing upon the indictment and signed the bill under the direction of the grand jury and returned it in open court. Revisal, sec. 3232.\n2. Witnesses \u2014 Qualifications\u2014Appeal and Error.\nThe determination of the trial judge of the disqualifications of witnesses to testify for lack of sufficient age or mental capacity is not reviewable on appeal. The religious requirements of a witness discussed, and Revisal, secs. 1496 (29), 2360, and 2354, referred to by Clark:, C. J.\n3. Criminal Law \u2014 Larceny from Employer \u2014 Confidence \u2014 Trials\u2014 Evidence.\nUpon a trial for larceny from an employer, evidence of whether or not the prisoner was trusted by the employer is incompetent.\n4. Criminal Law \u2014 Instructions\u2014\u201cReasonable Doubt\u201d \u2014 Definition.\nNo particular formula is required of the judge in defining to the jury what is \u201creasonable doubt\u201d in a criminal action; and his stating it to be \u201cthe same kind of reasonable doubt that an honest man meets up with in human life\u201d is held to be no error in this case.\nWalker and Allen, JJ., concur in result.\nAppeal by defendant from Whedbee, J., at August Term, 1913, of Pitt.\nAttorney-General Bichett and Assistant Attorney-General Galvert for the State.\nJulius Brown for defendant." }, "file_name": "0268-01", "first_page_order": 310, "last_page_order": 314 }